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ABSTRACT 
 
Since 1982, 40 states and the District of Columbia have offered amnesty programs.  In 
December 1990, the Multistate Tax Commission (MTC) established the National Nexus 
Program (NNP), a permanent tax amnesty program.  Prior literature has focused on 
amnesty programs and has shown that these programs do little to increase tax revenues 
and compliance when increased future enforcement is absent.  I examine the impact of 
the NNP on state corporate tax revenues.  From 1991 through 2008, state corporate tax 
revenues are significantly lower than revenues from 1973 through 1990.  Further, I find 
that states joining the NNP have a negative impact on state corporate tax revenues; 
however, the initial year impacts revenues differently than all other years.   
 
The implementation of Financial Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48) provides another reason 
for firms to disclose in the NNP.  Specifically, to reduce the FIN 48 liability on financial 
statements, firms may disclose in the NNP.  The primary purpose of FIN 48 is to increase 
the comparability and transparency of financial reporting of income taxes through 
requiring consistent recording and disclosure across firms.  Although FIN 48 has been 
replaced with the Accounting Standard Codification 740-10, I continue to refer to FIN 48 
because of familiarity.  I examine whether FIN 48 resulted in an increased number of 
firms entering the NNP by state.  I also investigate whether FIN 48 impacted the dollar 
amount of NNP disclosures by state.  Using aggregated proprietary data obtained from 
the NNP and matched with hand-collected data from 1994 through 2008, I find that FIN 
48 has a positive effect on the number of NNP disclosures but has no impact on the dollar 
amount of disclosure.  Rather, for states joining the NNP, the dollar amount of disclosure 
tends to be driven by the states adopting combined reporting requirements.  In examining 
publicly-traded firms on an individual case basis, I find that economic presence and 
voluntary compliance initiatives predominately have a negative effect on the dollar 
amount of disclosure while FIN 48 has an insignificant impact.   
 
Keywords: Permanent tax amnesty program, FIN 48, MTC, NNP. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
From 1991 through 2008, the ratio of state and local corporate taxes to corporate 
profits has declined from 7.2 percent to 4.7 percent, representing a dramatic decrease of 
34.7 percent.1  Aggressive and sophisticated tax planning techniques implemented by 
firms may partially account for this decline (Fox and Luna, 2002; Dubin, 2007).2  In 
response to these techniques, states have expanded the nexus threshold, taxed bases other 
than profits, required addbacks of intercompany expenses, enacted combined reporting, 
and decoupled from federal tax provisions and incentives (Cronin et al., 2002; Fox et al., 
2005).  To curtail excessive tax planning and increase compliance, states also have 
offered tax amnesty programs.  An amnesty program provides taxpayers an opportunity 
to pay prior unpaid taxes without owing penalties and enduring the prosecution that is 
usually associated with discovery of evasion.  Historically, states have focused only on 
state initiatives as primary mechanisms for increasing tax compliance and revenues and 
have not considered financial statement pronouncements or other mechanisms outside the 
state tax arena to encourage tax compliance. 
Experimental research on state tax amnesty programs indicates that the average 
level of tax compliance falls after a one-time tax amnesty (Alm et al., 1990).  Other 
empirical studies investigate the revenue implications of state tax amnesties and find that 
the amnesty had no long run impact on tax collections (Alm and Beck, 1993; Lopez-
                                                 
1
 Corporate profits here are collected from National Income and Product Accounts from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) rather than using calculations appropriate for financial accounting or tax-based 
approaches due to data limitations.  BEA data differs from Compustat data by including both publicly-
traded and privately-held firms.  Corporate profits are defined as the corporate profits before tax of 
domestic industries less earnings from Federal Reserve banks.   
2
 The decline also may be associated with measurement errors, changes in the federal corporate tax base, 
and actions of policy makers. 
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Laborda and Rodrigo, 2003).  Contrary to most of the literature that finds tax amnesties 
to be efficiency decreasing, Andreoni (1991) theoretically examines a permanent tax 
amnesty and finds that this type of program can actually increase the efficiency and 
equity of the tax system.  A permanent tax amnesty program does not have the traditional 
beginning and ending dates of a state tax amnesty program.3  This difference is important 
because, unlike a traditional state tax amnesty program, a permanent tax amnesty 
program does not have increased enforcement after establishment and does not have the 
ability to attract participants with a narrow participation period.  While the literature has 
examined the effects of individual tax amnesties in certain settings, the research has yet 
to explore the impact of a permanent tax amnesty on corporate tax revenues.  An 
empirical examination of a permanent tax amnesty will give policymakers information to 
evaluate whether this type of program should be sought in lieu of shorter traditional 
amnesty programs.4   
The Multistate Tax Commission (MTC) implemented its own permanent tax 
amnesty program, the National Nexus Program (NNP), in December 1990.  Initially, 20 
states plus the District of Columbia participated in the NNP with the level of participation 
rising to 40 states plus the District of Columbia in 2008.  The program allows multistate 
taxpayers to disclose prior liabilities in several states while only supplying facts and tax 
                                                 
3
 To date, no state tax amnesty programs have been implemented as a permanent amnesty program. 
4
 Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden all have characteristics in amnesties that 
resemble permanent tax amnesty programs.  In fact, from 1919 to 1952, the United States had a permanent 
amnesty program for income taxes (Alm, 1998). 
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returns to a single commission or organization, the MTC.5  The NNP database contains 
proprietary data obtained from firms disclosing prior unpaid tax liabilities.   
Issued in July 2006 and effective for publicly-traded firms with fiscal year-ends 
beginning after December 15, 2006,6 Financial Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48), 
Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes7 requires firms to record a liability for an 
uncertain tax position and include FIN 48 disclosures in financial statements provided to 
creditors and shareholders.8  To avoid recording FIN 48 liabilities in the financial 
statements, firms may enter into a tax amnesty program with an individual state or the 
NNP and voluntarily disclose prior tax liabilities.9  Depending on the extent of the NNP 
disclosure, firms may reduce or completely eliminate the need for a FIN 48 liability in the 
                                                 
5
 Throughout the dissertation, I refer to disclosure in the National Nexus Program (NNP) as well as 
Financial Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48) disclosures.  NNP disclosures represent a firm voluntarily 
disclosing prior unpaid tax liabilities in the NNP.  However, FIN 48 disclosures refer to mandatory 
disclosures in the financial statements through recording a FIN 48 liability.  Also, firms may include a 
vague textual disclosure related to the FIN 48 liability in the financial statements. 
6
 Originally Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued FIN 48 for both publicly-traded and 
privately-held firms.  However, on February 1, 2008, FASB Staff Position (FSP) No. FIN 48-2, deferred 
the effective date for nonpublic entities to fiscal year-ends beginning after December 15, 2007.  Later in 
2008, FSP No. FIN 48-3 deferred the effective date of FIN 48 for nonpublic entities further to fiscal year-
ends beginning after December 15, 2008. 
7
 On June 30, 2009, the FASB issued the final FASB Statement No. 168, The FASB Accounting Standards 
Codification (ASC) and the Hierarchy of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles – a replacement of 
FASB Statement No. 162, to flatten the U.S. GAAP hierarchy.  The FASB codification was effective for 
interim and annual reporting periods ending after September 15, 2009.  As a result of the FASB 
codification, FIN 48 is now located in ASC 740-10. 
8
 An uncertain tax position represents a single filing position taken by a taxpayer where the taxpayer 
determines based on the technical merits of the filing position that the filing position does not have a 
greater than 50 percent chance of being sustained under audit.  Simply stated, if the taxpayer believes that 
the taxing jurisdiction has a better position based on the merits, then the filing position represents an 
uncertain tax position.  One of the primary concerns with FIN 48 is the level of quantitative and qualitative 
disclosure required in the financial statements.  Taxpayers are required to disclose the following four items: 
(1) the amount of unrecognized tax benefits impacting the effective tax rate, if recognized; (2) the amount 
of related interest and penalties; (3) any significant changes in the amount of unrecognized tax benefits 
within 12 months of the financial reporting date; and (4) a description of open tax years by jurisdictions.  
9
 In the future, firms also may consider Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Announcement 2010-9 when 
entering the NNP.  IRS Announcement 2010-9 indicates that the IRS is considering an attachment to 
federal tax returns requiring certain taxpayers to report uncertain tax positions. 
  4
financial statements.  Because only two states had an amnesty during 2007, firms may 
choose the NNP rather than a state amnesty program.   
In this study, I empirically investigate whether the NNP has any long-run effects 
on per capita state corporate tax revenues using an expanded model of Alm and Beck 
(1993) [Model 1].  Further, I develop two aggregated state models that measure the 
impact of FIN 48 on tax compliance and revenues.  Model 2 examines the impact of FIN 
48 using aggregated state data and tests whether the ratio of the number of firms entering 
the NNP in a state to gross state product (GSP) is positively associated with the 
implementation of FIN 48.  FIN 48, a financial statement pronouncement, requires 
publicly-traded firms to increase disclosure and transparency around uncertain tax 
positions.  To the extent that firms’ uncertain tax positions result from non-filing of 
particular state tax returns or tax positions not previously reported on state tax returns, 
FIN 48 will aid in increasing tax compliance.  These findings further shed light on 
whether FIN 48 is changing the NNP disclosure behavior of firms.   
I use Model 3 to test whether the ratio of the state-aggregated dollar amount of 
NNP disclosure to GSP is significantly impacted by FIN 48. The dollar amount of NNP 
disclosure may rise after FIN 48 due to firms increase in NNP disclosures and the desire 
not to record a FIN 48 liability.  On the other hand, the dollar amount may fall as firms 
disclose only small dollar amounts in the NNP to begin the statue of limitations.10  Of 
course, other state tax characteristics exist that may drive a firm’s decision to disclose in 
                                                 
10
 The statute of limitations is three years, on average, and runs from the later of the date the actual return 
was filed or the original due date.  The statute of limitations represents the time period in which a taxing 
jurisdiction can audit a firm or assess additional taxes.  If no return has been filed, the statute of limitations 
runs indefinitely.  This issue is discussed further below.  
  5
the NNP and the dollar amount of disclosure.  During this period, firms were struggling 
with understanding state economic presence requirements for income tax purposes, 
perhaps resulting in increased disclosure and dollar amount of disclosure as these 
requirements become more clearly defined.  Also, firms might seek other state tax 
amnesty programs or voluntary compliance initiatives (VCIs) for disclosure.  Firms 
located in states viewed as business-friendly (states without combined reporting 
requirements, addbacks, and throwbacks) may also have more disclosure resulting from 
increased opportunities for tax planning.  Finally, I develop an individual case-level 
model using publicly-traded firms to examine the impact of FIN 48 on the dollar amount 
of disclosure (Model 4).11  Model 4 differs from Model 3 in that its focus is at the case-
level, thereby allowing for both state-level and firm-level controls providing information 
on whether firm characteristics of size and tax aggressiveness influence the dollar amount 
of NNP disclosure.   
In exploring the effects of the NNP, I find that a break occurred in per capita state 
corporate tax revenues when comparing 1991 through 2008 to 1973 through 1990.  In 
fact, after controlling for state tax characteristics, I find that corporate tax revenues from 
1991 through 2008 are 19.8 percent lower than from 1973 through 1990.  As stated 
earlier, the ratio of state and local corporate taxes to corporate profits has declined 34.7 
percent from 1991 through 2008, demonstrating that state corporate taxes are declining.  
Although the establishment of the NNP began in December 1990, I am not suggesting 
that the NNP caused this large decline in revenues as I am unable to control for time 
                                                 
11
 Each case in the NNP database is comprised of a unique taxpayer disclosing prior liabilities in a 
particular state for income taxes.   
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fixed effects and unobservable shocks.  Rather, I focus on the break in the dependent 
variable indicating that additional investigation is needed to determine the cause of the 
revenue decline.   
In further investigation of the NNP, I find that the NNP has a permanent 
decreasing effect on per capita state corporate tax revenues.  In other words, once a state 
joins the NNP, the state’s corporate tax revenues are, on average, lower than had the state 
not joined the NNP.  Andreoni (1991) theoretically demonstrates that a decrease in 
revenues after the introduction of a permanent tax amnesty program results when firms 
view the program as an insurance benefit.  Based on my empirical findings and the 
theoretical findings of Andreoni, I conclude that firms tend to view the NNP as insurance 
available to the firm for disclosure when facts change or additional information is made 
available.  The benefit of the insurance program assumes that a firm uses the information 
and discloses prior to a taxing jurisdiction auditing and/or assessing additional liabilities.  
I also include a transitory effect in the model for the first year of participation in the 
NNP.  In the year a state joins the NNP, the overall effect on tax revenues remains 
negative although the result is not as negative as in future years of participation.  
According to Andreoni, this finding may indicate that firms enter the program upon a 
state’s initial adoption of the NNP due to elevated levels of cheating that existed prior to 
a state joining the NNP.   
In investigating the impact of FIN 48 on both the number of NNP disclosures and 
the dollar amount of NNP disclosures from a state aggregated perspective, I find that, 
conditional on a state joining the NNP, FIN 48 is associated with an increase in the ratio 
  7
of the number of NNP disclosures to GSP but had no significant impact on the ratio of 
the dollar amount of NNP disclosure to GSP.  Finally, I investigate the impact of FIN 48 
using individual case-level data.  While I do not find broad evidence that FIN 48 or the 
interaction of FIN 48 and firm size or tax aggressiveness impacts the dollar amount of 
disclosure in the NNP, I do find that economic presence matters.   
When investigating publicly-traded firms using data at the individual case level, I 
find that, conditional on a state joining the NNP and a firm selecting to disclose in the 
NNP, predominately two state policy control variables, VCIs and economic presence, 
have significant and negative effects on the dollar amount of NNP disclosure.  In states 
with VCIs, firms disclose less in the NNP perhaps because the firm disclosed in the state 
VCI.  Contrary to initial intuitions, firms disclose more dollars in states following the 
well-established physical presence standard rather than in states seeking a more 
aggressive form of substantial nexus – economic presence.  As firms become explicitly 
aware of the physical presence standard as established through rules, firms increase the 
dollar amount of disclosure in the NNP.  However, a more principles-based standard, 
such as economic presence, that is nebulous and open for interpretation results in 
decreased dollars being disclosed in the NNP.  This finding highlights the continued 
uncertainty around the economic presence standard for substantial nexus and should urge 
policymakers in the direction of hearing a Supreme Court case on the issue. 
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows.  The second section 
discusses the background information associated with the MTC, NNP, and FIN 48.  The 
third section provides theory, summarizes prior research, and develops the hypotheses.  
  8
The fourth section presents the research design, including the data sources and research 
method.  The fifth section provides descriptive statistics, regression results, and 
additional analyses.  Finally, the sixth section describes the contributions and limitations 
of the study and suggests areas for future research. 
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2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION   
 
Multistate Tax Commission 
 
The Multistate Tax Commission (MTC), based in Washington, DC, established 
and currently administers the National Nexus Program (NNP).  The MTC is a 
commission of state government tax administrators created in 1967.  The Multistate Tax 
Compact, an interstate compact statute enacted by each Compact Member State, formed 
the MTC as a means to protect state tax authority.  In other words, the states wanted their 
respective legislatures to have the authority to write state tax laws.  Therefore, the MTC 
has remained an integral voice in preserving the rights of states to determine tax policy 
within the limits of the U.S. Constitution, which is essentially limited only by 
prohibitions against interfering with interstate commerce (MTC History and Purposes, 
2001).   
The MTC works on behalf of both states and taxpayers to facilitate discussions 
about tax laws in an equitable and efficient manner.  Because of the benefits gained from 
interacting with only one organization, taxpayers involved with the MTC tend to be either 
multistate or multinational firms.  The Multistate Tax Compact charges the MTC with the 
following responsibilities:  (1) facilitate the proper determination of state and local tax 
liability, including any issues with apportionment, (2) promote uniform components of 
tax systems, (3) facilitate tax convenience and compliance with the filing of tax returns 
and in the tax administration process, and (4) avoid duplicative taxation (MTC History 
and Purposes, 2001). 
  10
National Nexus Program 
 
The MTC established the NNP in December 1990 for the following purposes: (1) 
foster increased state tax compliance by businesses; (2) establish national cooperation in 
the administration of state tax issues arising in the nexus area; (3) facilitate taxpayer 
compliance through education; and (4) promote fair, even-handed, and consistent state 
tax enforcement in the nexus area.  The NNP provides firms an opportunity to 
anonymously approach states and voluntarily disclose potential income as well as sales 
and use tax liabilities resulting from prior activities.  Businesses benefit from having 
potential state tax disputes resolved in advance of any assessments of prior-year taxes, 
interest, and penalties.  Initially, the NNP consisted of 20 participating states and has 
grown to 40 states in 2008, plus the District of Columbia.  The MTC staff performs a 
significant amount of the work at no cost to the taxpayer; however, states do pay nominal 
member fees for the services (Sowa-Holmes, 1993).   
Although the NNP contains the word “nexus” in the title, firms can disclose prior 
unpaid state tax liabilities related to issues other than nexus.  However, state nexus 
remains a highly uncertain area and continues to be a common reason for NNP 
disclosure.  Nexus refers to a firm establishing a sufficient connection with a state or 
taxing jurisdiction allowing that jurisdiction to have taxing authority.  Many of the firms 
list nexus as a reason for NNP disclosure including updating a nexus study or receiving a 
nexus inquiry from a state other than the state in which the firm is making the NNP 
disclosure.  Appendix A shows examples of these NNP disclosures.   
  11
While sales and use tax nexus has relied on a physical presence standard, income 
tax nexus has varied more widely across state interpretation and historically relied on a 
substantial nexus standard.12  Physical presence in a state is established when a firm has a 
store, office location, employees, etc. located within the state.  Substantial nexus does not 
require an entity to have physical presence in the taxing jurisdiction for income tax 
purposes.  Rather, substantial nexus requires only that an entity exploit the economic 
market in the taxing jurisdiction.  The requirements for substantial nexus for income tax 
purposes have evolved and are defined through state statutes, revenue rulings, technical 
assistance advisements, court cases, etc.  While some states have specifically stated that 
physical presence in the state is required for a taxpayer to have met the substantial nexus 
standard, other states have purposefully left the definition broad.   
In recent years, some states have further broadened the definition of substantial 
nexus to include significant economic presence of a taxpayer in a state.  Economic 
presence in a state occurs when a significant amount of income is derived from sources 
within the state.  Similar to substantial nexus, economic presence connects the taxpayer 
to the state although the taxpayer has no physical presence, performs no solicitation, or is 
effectively not “doing business” in the state.  Two recent rulings in favor of the economic 
presence standard were in New Jersey and West Virginia.  Even though a trademark 
holding company had no physical presence in New Jersey and that the only connection 
was through the receipt of royalty income, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that 
                                                 
12
 In Quill Corporation v. North Dakota [112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992)], the U.S. Supreme Court held in favor of 
the taxpayer and upheld a bright-line "physical presence"12 test it had previously set forth in National 
Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue [386 US 753 (1967)].  The Quill ruling specifically applied to 
the Commerce Clause’s physical presence standard needed prior to requiring a seller to collect sales and 
use taxes.   
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substantial nexus for income tax purposes existed in Lanco, Inc. v. Director, Division of 
Taxation.13  Similarly, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals ruled in West 
Virginia v. MBNA America Bank14 that deriving income from customers in the state 
resulted in significant economic presence.  However, the Tennessee Court of Appeals, 
Texas Court of Appeals, Michigan Court of Appeals, and Missouri Supreme Court all 
support a physical presence standard.  While these states have litigated the issues of a 
physical presence versus economic presence for income tax purposes, some states have 
addressed the issue through legislation, and others have not explicitly weighed-in on the 
issue. 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on nexus requirements for income 
tax purposes, firms can rely on the guidance found in state statutes and on state income 
tax forms.  Of the 11 states that currently follow economic presence for the substantial 
nexus standard, seven of the states identify economic presence in the state statute or tax 
forms.  The remaining states have demonstrated a propensity to follow economic 
presence through tax alert discussions and case law.  In states that remain silent in the 
statutes, taxpayers must rely on the mixed rulings from various state Supreme Courts.  
Because of uncertainty in substantial nexus standards, a taxpayer may conclude that 
nexus does not exist and not file a tax return in a state.  After additional consideration, the 
taxpayer may decide that the original conclusion was potentially incorrect and choose a 
permanent tax amnesty, the NNP, for disclosure. 
                                                 
13
 908 A.2d 176 (N.J. 2006). 
14
 640 S.E.2d 226 (W.Va. 2006); cert, denied, U.S. Sup. Ct., 061228, June 18, 2007. 
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After a taxpayer decides to enter the NNP regardless of the reason, the taxpayer 
contacts the MTC staff anonymously and discloses prior actions.  The taxpayer provides 
a brief business description, the extent of operations in the states in which the taxpayer is 
seeking disclosure, and the facts and reasons giving rise to the need for disclosure.  
Again, appendix A gives examples of the reasons for disclosure in the NNP.  Using this 
information, the MTC staff advises the taxpayer of various settlement alternatives likely 
to be accepted based on their prior working knowledge and history of the states.15  In any 
state in which NNP disclosure is being sought, taxpayers must disclose whether the state 
has contacted them.  If the taxpayer has been contacted, selected for audit, or is under 
investigation, the taxpayer may not enter a NNP disclosure agreement with that state 
(Baez and Haas, 1998).   
Financial Interpretation No. 48  
 The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued the final version of 
FIN 48 in July 2006 and subsequently codified it as part of Accounting Standards 
Codification (ASC) 740.  For publicly-traded firms, the standard was effective for fiscal 
years beginning after December 15, 2006.  The primary purpose of FIN 48 is to increase 
the comparability and transparency of financial reporting of income taxes by requiring 
consistent recording and disclosure across firms.  FIN 48 applies to tax positions taken 
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 The settlement options differ based on the experiences of the MTC staff in the different states.  Historical 
knowledge of a state’s propensity to settle and the amount for which a state would settle influence these 
settlement discussions.  Unfortunately, I was not privy to these discussions. 
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and accounted for under Financial Accounting Statement No. 109, Accounting for Income 
Taxes (now ASC 740).  Therefore, it is applicable only to income taxes.16 
 To determine the amount of the FIN 48 liability, the standard uses a two-stage 
approach of recognition and measurement.  First, recognition involves evaluating whether 
the tax position taken is more-likely-than-not to prevail under audit.  Here, the term 
“more-likely-than-not” refers to a greater than 50 percent chance of occurrence.  Also, 
“prevailing under audit” means the business is successful through appeals or litigation on 
the technical merits of the tax position alone, assuming the examining jurisdiction has full 
knowledge of all facts and circumstances.17  When a tax position meets the more-likely-
than-not threshold, the firm measures the recognizable tax position as the largest amount 
of the tax benefit that exceeds the 50 percent likelihood of prevailing under audit and 
recognizes that tax benefit in the financial statements.18  Thus, a portion of the tax 
position may be recognized with the remaining portion of the tax benefit not recognized 
and disclosed as a FIN 48 liability.  For a tax position not meeting the recognition 
threshold, the full amount of the tax benefit is recorded as a FIN 48 liability.  Appendix B 
provides numerical examples of the FIN 48 liability calculation.  Firms also must include 
interest and penalties in the recorded FIN 48 liability.19 
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 Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 5, Accounting for Contingencies (FAS 5, now in ASC 
450), continues to apply to all other types of taxes including sales and use taxes, property taxes, etc. 
17
 By assuming that the taxing jurisdiction has full knowledge of the facts and circumstances, FIN 48 
effectively presumes that 100 percent of all tax positions are subject to an audit. 
18
 FIN 48 represents a benefit recognition or asset model.  Currently, the tax position must meet the more-
likely-than-not threshold before the position is recognized in the financial statements.  However, prior to 
FIN 48, FAS 5 represented a liability model meaning a firm accrued a liability when the contingency was 
probable of occurring and the amount could be reasonably estimated. 
19
 Firms accrue penalties only when a tax position does not meet the minimum statutory threshold required 
to avoid penalties.  These minimum statutory penalties refer to accuracy-related penalties described in 
Internal Revenue Code Section 6662.  When accruing penalties, firms may consider the administrative 
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 To provide additional transparency, FIN 48 also focuses on disclosure and 
presentation.  The primary part of the disclosure involves the tabular presentation 
reconciling the total amounts of the FIN 48 liability or unrecognized tax benefits at the 
beginning and end of the period.  The disclosure also requires a schedule showing the 
details of any FIN 48 liability that will expire within a one-year period.  Finally, FIN 48 
requires companies to disclose the policy for classification and the amount of interest and 
penalties included in the income statement and balance sheet.   
While reviewing NNP disclosure applications, I found that several firms linked 
their facts giving rise to the NNP disclosure to the FIN 48 implementation.  For example, 
one firm’s reason for disclosure read as follows: 
Applicant had been advised by outside advisors that no substantial income 
tax nexus existed with a state unless Applicant had employees resident in 
that state. With the adoption of FIN 48 reporting requirements, a state 
income tax review is being conducted of the Applicant's business activities. 
Based on preliminary results of the FIN 48 state income tax review, 
potential income tax liability may exist by virtue of holding limited 
partnership interests in partnerships doing business in a number of states.20 
 
After investigating the anecdotal connection with FIN 48 and the NNP disclosures in the 
applications, I charted in Figure 1 (figures and tables appear in appendix C) the number 
of income tax NNP disclosures based on the offer date quarterly from 2001 through 
2008.21    
Frischmann et al. (2008) perform a market reaction study based on event dates 
around FIN 48.  Searching The Wall Street Journal, New York Times, and the FASB 
                                                                                                                                                 
practices and precedents of a taxing authority.  This means that firms may take into account settlement 
practices and prior experiences with a taxing jurisdiction for accruing penalties.  For example, if a firm has 
prior history with a state that typically waives penalties, then the firm should not accrue penalties based on 
precedents.  Due to settlement practices and precedents, firms rarely accrue penalties in the FIN 48 liability.   
20
 Excerpt from a firm’s 2007 Disclosure Questionnaire in the NNP.  
21
 The offer date refers to the first recorded date of contact between the NNP and the firm. 
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website for extensive press coverage, they identified three dates receiving the most press 
coverage and expected to see a negative market reaction with these dates: July 14, 2005, 
when FASB issued the exposure draft for FIN 48; July 13, 2006, when FASB issued the 
final standard; and January 17, 2007, when FASB unanimously rejected a one-year delay 
in the implementation of FIN 48.  As the increased press coverage around these dates 
might result in a negative market reaction, I also would expect to see a spike in the 
number of NNP disclosures in the quarters in which these dates occur as firms begin to 
resolve uncertain tax positions to avoid recording a FIN 48 liability.  Frischmann et al. 
find a significant negative market reaction only around July 14, 2005.  Figure 1 shows 
three quarters where the spikes are above 160 agreements; these are the highest three 
spikes during the seven-year period.  The first spike occurs in 2004 Quarter 1 (Point A) 
and does not contain a date with significant press based on Frischmann et al.  Point A 
does contain March 3, 2004 in which FASB board members met with the SEC and public 
accounting firms to discuss the differences in practice around accounting for uncertain 
tax positions.   
Two of the quarters with spikes, however, do coincide with the above dates from 
the Frischmann et al. paper: July 14, 2005 (2005 Quarter 3, Point B) and January 17, 
2007 (2007 Quarter 1, Point C).  Point B coincides with FASB issuing the FIN 48 
exposure draft.  Point C occurs during the quarter when FASB rejects a one-year delay of 
FIN 48.  In general, the number of NNP disclosures increase when FASB introduces FIN 
48 (2004) through the first year of implementation (2007).  I would not expect FIN 48 to 
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result in substantial increased NNP disclosures after implementation as firms already 
have entered into the NNP and resolved prior uncertain tax positions.22   
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 Initially, NNP disclosure would result for both current and prior years’ uncertain tax positions to avoid 
the recording of a FIN 48 liability.  Disclosure after the first year of implementation of FIN 48 would occur 
for uncertain tax positions entered into during the current year.  If firms continually disclose prior years’ 
uncertain tax positions and adjust FIN 48 liabilities, audit firms are likely to require firms disclose to in the 
financial statements that the tax position represents a prior period adjustment.  Based on experience, firms 
are reluctant to behave in a manner that would result in a prior period adjustment. 
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3. THEORY, PRIOR RESEARCH, AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT   
 
Tax Evasion Literature 
 
Because tax amnesty programs assume that taxpayers evade taxes to some degree, 
one should have a brief understanding of the tax evasion literature.  The theoretical 
development of tax evasion begins with the work of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and 
Srinivasan (1973).  While the theoretical literature on tax evasion has a long history, the 
empirical research suffers due to data problems.  The theoretical framework of Allingham 
and Sandmo (1972) analyzes the taxpayer’s decision to deliberately underreport income 
and to what extent to underreport to avoid taxes.  These models base the penalty for tax 
evasion on the income understatement rather than on the tax understatement.  Yitzhaki 
(1974) highlights these differences showing that the tax rate has no effect on the level of 
tax evasion when the penalty is based on the amount of understated tax.  Later, Yitzhaki 
(1987) introduces a model involving the endogenous probability of detection.  Here, the 
probability of detection is an increasing function of the amount of income evaded.   
Much of the above seminal theoretical work uses expected utility theory.  
However, recent work uses other frameworks to resolve the empirical contradictions to 
the theoretical literature (Dhami and al-Nowaihi, 2007).  One such recent theory is that of 
cumulative prospect theory.  Kahneman and Tversky originally introduce prospect theory 
in 1979 and later advance it to cumulative prospect theory in 1992.  The central idea of 
cumulative prospect theory is that individuals frame possible outcomes relative to a 
certain outcome rather than the final outcome.  Therefore, individuals have different risk 
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perspectives about gains and losses and tend to focus more on potential losses rather than 
potential gains.  Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) use cumulative prospect theory to show 
that relative to expected utility theory it provides a better explanation of tax evasion.  
Specifically, they demonstrate that individuals are loss averse to certain incomes and tend 
to overweight small probabilities as well as underweight large probabilities.   
While the majority of the literature focuses on tax evasion for individuals or the 
taxpaying population in its entirety, limited research examines tax evasion for small 
businesses and corporations.  Due to the separation of ownership and control for 
corporations, agency theory incorporates conflicts of interest, incentive problems, and 
mechanisms for controlling incentive problems in models.  Agency theory explores the 
potential adverse effect that concentration of control in the hands of managers can have.  
Crocker and Slemrod (2005) and Chen and Chu (2005) both develop a formal model of 
corporate income tax evasion.  Crocker and Slemrod specifically focus on the issues of 
agency costs and find that tax penalties assessed on the tax officer are more effective 
against evasion than those penalties assessed on the corporation.  Chen and Chu focus on 
the dual role of the manager’s labor contract compensating the agent’s effort and 
compensating for the risk of evasion.  Chen and Chu develop the first theoretical model 
of corporate income tax evasion exploring the links between internal control and external 
evasion decisions.   
Tax Amnesty Literature 
 
 Much of the theoretical tax amnesty literature occurs in the early 1990s and 
examines the economic implications of tax amnesties (Alm and Beck, 1990; Stella, 1991; 
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Malik and Schwab, 1991).  The theoretical models of Alm and Beck (1990) begin with 
the expected utility theory of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and progress to prospect 
theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  Prospect theory provides a better setting for tax 
compliance issues because it involves low-probability, high-loss events.  Alm and Beck 
(1990) investigate an individual’s decision of reporting both the amount of past evasion 
and current income in an amnesty program.  The theoretical models of Alm and Beck 
(1990) find mixed results indicating that amnesties can have an uncertain impact on tax 
compliance.  If individuals view paying taxes as the norm and expect a future amnesty 
with tougher enforcement, tax amnesties may increase compliance and tax collections.  
However, tax compliance may decrease if taxpayers anticipate an amnesty and wait until 
the amnesty to file.  In other words, increased tax amnesty revenues may result in 
reduced future tax revenues because of decreased regular tax compliance.   
Using an overlapping-generations model, Macho-Stadler et al. (1999) demonstrate 
that, without the presence of increased enforcement accompanying the tax amnesty, the 
economy will take time to move from one steady state to the other.23  The authors show 
theoretically that amnesties are successful only if the parameters involving enforcement 
or penalties are changed.  Also, the authors demonstrate that, without parameter changes 
following the declaration of an amnesty, the effects are only transitory.  Mikesell (1986) 
supports this theoretical finding with empirical results.  During the mid-1980s, states 
experiencing the most successful amnesties either waived both penalties and part of the 
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 In addition to uncovering past evasion, amnesty programs can change the trajectory of the economy.  
Generally, this convergence to a new steady state may take time.  However, if an amnesty is accompanied 
by increased enforcement, the convergence is accelerated and may even be instantaneous.   
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interest or increased enforcement with improved computer capacity.  These states 
experienced higher per capita revenue and revenue collections between 0.5 and 1.5 
percent of tax collections in that same year.   
Much of the empirical work on state tax amnesties follows the lead of the 
theoretical work and focuses on individual income taxes and the effects of a single state 
tax amnesty program (Fisher et al., 1989; Alm et al., 1990).  Alm and Beck (1993) 
examine the 1985 Colorado amnesty using time-series models from 1980 to 1989 and 
find that the amnesty program had no long-run effect on tax collections.  Lopez-Laborda 
and Rodrigo (2003) also use time-series econometric models from 1979 to 1998 and 
examine the long-term impact of the Spanish amnesty program on individual income tax 
compliance.  Lopez-Laborda and Rodrigo find that the amnesty had no effect on either 
short-run or long-run collections.  Both of these findings seem to indicate that, in general, 
policymakers should not view tax amnesty programs as increasing tax revenues over a 
long-run period. 
Two papers provide insight into the characteristics of state tax amnesties by 
surveying and summarizing the different programs since formal amnesties began in 1982 
(Mikesell, 1986; Luna et al., 2006).  Consistent across time, the amnesty period lasts, on 
average, three months.  While the early programs typically cover amnesty for most taxes, 
recent amnesty programs target specific taxes and taxpayers.  As shown in the literature, 
amnesties are more effective when accompanied by increased enforcement.  Accordingly, 
states recently tend to introduce amnesties with either increased penalties or new 
reporting requirements (Luna et al., 2006).  To provide additional insight into the causes 
  22
of state tax amnesties, Le Borgne (2006) empirically examines the economic and political 
determinants.  He finds that amnesties are more likely to be introduced during periods of 
fiscal stress and that political factors affect the timing and introduction of these programs.   
Similarities and Differences in Voluntary Disclosure and Short-Term Tax Amnesty 
 
Voluntary disclosure24 is similar to an amnesty program.  Both programs allow 
taxpayers to receive certain benefits by disclosing tax liabilities associated with prior 
actions.  Policymakers and legislators agree that there are benefits and risks to both 
voluntary disclosure and amnesty programs.  The general argument for the programs is 
that they will increase tax revenues, clear up delinquent tax rolls, improve the tax 
department’s image as tough but fair, and enhance overall tax compliance (Fisher, 1985; 
Lerman, 1986; Fisher et al., 1989).  However, the argument against these programs is that 
honest taxpayers view them as unfair because nonfilers and those in noncompliance incur 
reduced liabilities and/or reduced penalties.  Also, these programs may signal that tax 
departments are becoming complacent in enforcement.  Some taxpayers believe that 
resources could be better spent to improve tax compliance rather than administer these 
programs (Fisher, 1985; Lerman, 1986; Mikesell, 1986). 25 
While the two programs have similarities, they differ in two fundamental 
characteristics.  First, voluntary disclosure programs usually require the payment of tax 
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 Voluntary disclosure programs are similar to permanent tax amnesty programs (i.e., NNP).  Therefore, I 
use the voluntary disclosure programs discussed in the literature to compare to short-term amnesty 
programs as a means of comparing the NNP to short-term amnesty programs. 
25
 Still another form of state tax programs is the voluntary compliance initiative (VCI).  It differs 
substantially from voluntary disclosure programs and short-term amnesties in that a VCI often is limited to 
certain types of taxes and targets taxpayers involved in tax shelter transactions, including reportable and 
listed transactions.  VCIs provide a waiver of certain tax penalties and immunity from criminal prosecution.  
However, firms often must waive their rights to appeal when entering into a VCI.   
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penalties and interest in addition to the tax liability in return for the taxing jurisdiction 
granting criminal immunity to the tax evaders.  Typically, amnesty programs waive most 
tax penalties and some or all of the interest.  Second, voluntary disclosure programs do 
not expire, thereby providing taxpayers the opportunity to take the services more than 
once.  On the other hand, amnesty programs operate for a specified limited time with 
only a single entry into the system allowed (Jackson, 1986).  With voluntary disclosure 
programs being long-term and fully anticipated, administrators typically characterize 
these programs as permanent forms of tax amnesty.  Figure 2 summarizes the differences 
between the two programs.   
As shown in the preceding sub-section, much of the academic literature has 
focused on amnesty programs rather than voluntary disclosure programs.  One key piece 
of research focuses on the desirability of permanent tax amnesties using a theoretical 
approach (Andreoni, 1991).  Andreoni (1991) finds that a permanent tax amnesty 
possibly could increase both efficiency and equity of the tax system.  The efficiency of 
the tax system often is determined by whether the tax revenues rise or fall.  An increase 
in tax revenues means that the permanent tax amnesty did not dilute economic efficiency.  
However, a decrease in tax revenues still may lead to economic efficiency because the 
permanent tax amnesty is valued as an option or type of insurance benefit among non-
compliant taxpayers.  The advantage of the insurance benefit from the NNP assumes that 
a firm uses the information and discloses prior to a taxing jurisdiction auditing and/or 
assessing additional liabilities.   
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The equity of the tax system addresses how the benefits of a permanent tax 
amnesty are distributed across taxpayers.  Ex ante, taxpayers with a higher risk of bad 
luck are more likely to disclose in the amnesty than those with little or no risk.  Ex post, 
taxpayers with higher realized bad luck will be the ones who disclose in the amnesty.  
Therefore, a permanent tax amnesty increases equity of the tax system both ex ante and 
ex post.  Without a permanent tax amnesty program, taxpayers with a bad shock would 
not have a means for tax forgiveness.  Therefore, the overall tax system would be less 
equitable.   
Financial Interpretation No. 48 and Tax Compliance Literature 
 
 With FIN 48 being effective only for publicly-traded firms in 2007, the archival 
research investigating both FIN 48 and tax compliance remains limited (Mills et al., 
2009; Gupta et al., 2009a).  Using an analytical modeling approach, Mills et al. (2009) 
investigate the change in the interaction between publicly-traded firms and taxing 
jurisdictions as a result of FIN 48.  They highlight two important findings that are 
contrary to the general business community’s perception about FIN 48.  First, the authors 
demonstrate that firms with strong tax positions experience higher expected payoffs post-
FIN 48 resulting from FIN 48 disclosures.  Second, they show that the FIN 48 liability on 
the financial statements is not necessarily an overstatement of the expected cash 
payment.26  Gupta et al. (2009a) examine whether state and local tax planning practices 
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 The benefit recognition model of FIN 48 requires taxpayers to use the expected value approach when 
measuring the uncertain tax position.  Under the expected value approach, the benefit is equal to the largest 
amount of benefit that is greater than 50 percent likely of being realized assuming that the taxing 
jurisdiction is completely aware of the tax position. 
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slowed with the implementation of FIN 48 by looking at the trend of state current 
effective tax rates.  Their paper exposes the difficulties of defining state nexus standards 
for income tax purposes and the role that this uncertainty plays in managerial decisions 
involving tax compliance.  Gupta et al. find that state effective tax rates increase 
substantially from 2006 through 2008 for tax aggressive firms.   
While archival research has been limited, a number of practitioner articles have 
highlighted FIN 48 and the associated state nexus and tax compliance issues (Ertmer and 
Sash, 2007; Wells and McFadden-Wade, 2007; Alltizer et al., 2008; Schadewald, 2008).  
Ertmer and Sash (2007) use an example to highlight complex issues that taxpayers may 
face when evaluating state tax positions through the FIN 48 lens.  One issue discussed is 
the economic presence approach that states may take to satisfy substantial nexus.  Ertmer 
and Sash (2007) and Schadewald (2008) discuss how income tax nexus standards have 
remained varied across states, often resulting in uncertainty in the amount of the FIN 48 
liability for a taxpayer.  Schadewald (2008) also shows how a decision by a taxpayer to 
not file a state tax return becomes a filing position under FIN 48.27  When a firm takes a 
filing position, the firm is required to support the position based on the technical merits at 
a more-likely-than-not threshold or record a FIN 48 liability for the unrecognized tax 
benefit.  He emphasizes that the statute of limitations does not apply if a return has not 
been filed.  Thus, the firm continues to record a FIN 48 liability for each year the firm 
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 FIN 48 (par. 4) states that the decision not to file a tax return, where a company might have nexus or a 
permanent establishment, is considered a “tax position.”  The previous FAS 5 requirements were more 
lenient than FIN 48 and only required a liability to be accrued when the liability was probable and could be 
reasonably estimated.  
  26
chooses this “tax position.”28  Wells and McFadden-Wade (2007) and Alltizer et al. 
(2008) echo similar concerns about the interplay between nexus issues and FIN 48.   
Hypotheses 
 
Prior literature shows that state tax amnesty programs have little or no impact on 
long-term tax collections without the presence of increased future enforcement efforts 
(Mikesell, 1986; Alm and Beck, 1990; Alm et al., 1990; Stella, 1991; Macho-Stadler et 
al., 1999; Martinez-Vazquez and Rider, 2005).  The literature primarily explores these 
effects using either a theoretical approach or an empirical setting focusing only on a 
limited set of amnesty programs.  As discussed earlier, Andreoni (1991) uses a theoretical 
model to explore a permanent tax amnesty and finds that a permanent amnesty actually 
can increase the efficiency and equity in the tax system.  He concludes that the effect on 
tax revenues is ambiguous because it depends critically on the level of cheating in 
existence prior to the amnesty.  If cheating prior to the permanent tax amnesty is large, 
the amnesty may generate large increases in revenues.  However, if revenues decline after 
the permanent tax amnesty, the amnesty might provide an insurance benefit because only 
the firms with risky consumption will be affected by the amnesty and will enter into the 
amnesty if they suffer a bad shock to their consumption.   
To empirically test a permanent tax amnesty program, I use the theory of 
Andreoni (1991) involving the effects of a permanent tax amnesty program on per capita 
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 The FIN 48 liability is recorded only if the tax position represents an uncertain tax position.  If it is more-
likely-than-not that the tax position would prevail under audit, no FIN 48 liability is recorded, and the 
entire tax benefit of the tax position is recorded in the financial statements.  Once the statute of limitation 
expires, a FIN 48 liability is removed from the financial statements.  However, if no return has been filed, a 
FIN 48 liability continually accrues for each year the tax position remains an uncertain tax position. 
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tax revenues and apply the theory to corporations using the NNP as an example of a 
permanent tax amnesty program.  Given that the general public is not privy to firms’ tax 
returns or to the general conversations about cheating or about entering into risky tax 
positions, I am unaware of the level of pre-existing cheating and the risky consumption 
that existed prior to the establishment of the NNP.  With pre-existing cheating and risky 
consumption by firms unobservable, I do not predict whether a long-term, fully-
anticipated form of a permanent tax amnesty (i.e., MTC’s NNP) will have a positive or 
negative impact on per capita state corporate tax revenues.  Stated formally, my 
hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H1A:  The establishment of the NNP has a significant effect on per capita state 
corporate tax revenues.   
 
 
 In addition to testing whether the broad establishment of the NNP affected per 
capita state corporate tax revenues, I also investigate whether states choosing to 
participate in the NNP impacted per capita corporate tax revenues.  Given the long time 
period in which the NNP has existed, I examine the choice of individual state 
participation in the NNP on per capita corporate tax revenues.  Similar to above, I am 
unable to observe the level of cheating and risky consumption prior to the state choosing 
to join the NNP; therefore, I do not predict the direction of the effect on per capita tax 
revenues.  Stated formally, my hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H1B:  States that joined the NNP experience significant per capita state corporate 
tax revenue effects.   
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Prior articles suggest that income tax nexus issues coupled with FIN 48’s 
definition of a “tax position” may cause taxpayers to voluntarily disclose in the NNP 
when they otherwise would have not disclosed and thereby risked audit detection in a 
state (Ertmer and Sash, 2007; Wells and McFadden-Wade, 2007; Alltizer et al., 2008; 
Schadewald, 2008).  Although the NNP disclosure may not contain a large dollar amount 
of liability, firms are disclosing to begin the statute of limitations, which is three years on 
average.  While a firm may have limited exposure in a state for a single year, FIN 48 
requires a liability to be disclosed for all open tax years.  Without initially filing or 
disclosing in the NNP, the firm must record a FIN 48 liability each year potentially 
resulting in a large financial impact over multiple years.  In a comment letter to FASB 
dated January 8, 2007, the Council on State Taxation (COST) stated that “at least one 
accounting firm has publicly suggested that businesses should consider filing and paying 
taxes in jurisdictions where they may not have nexus because the alternative under FIN 
48 is too large a dollar figure for the financial statement to bear.”29  To further link the 
nexus issues with FIN 48, COST testified before Congress on June 24, 2008 and stated 
that the uncertainty resulting from conflicting state interpretations of “substantial nexus” 
complicated the FIN 48 analysis and could potentially cause a taxpayer to fail the more-
likely-than-not threshold, resulting in a FIN 48 liability.30   
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 COST is a nonprofit trade association comprised of multistate corporations engaged in interstate and 
international business. 
30
 Council on State Taxation, Hearing on H.R. 5267, the “Business Activity Tax Simplification Act of 
2008” before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on 
Commercial and Administrative Law, June 24, 2008. 
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Using current effective tax rates, Gupta et al. (2009a) investigate whether state 
and local tax planning practices slowed due to the implementation of FIN 48.  Their 
results indicate that aggregate declining trends of state effective tax rates reverse in 2006 
through 2008 for tax aggressive firms, while state-level tax collections increased in 2006 
and 2007.  Controlling for effective tax rate changes, the cash payments of firms still 
increased from 2005 through 2008.  This evidence seems to support the belief that FIN 48 
has slowed the ability of firms to use state tax planning techniques. 
 Based on the literature, comment letters, and testimony, the implementation of 
FIN 48 likely will cause the ratio of the number of NNP disclosures in a state to GSP to 
rise.  Stated formally, the hypothesis related to the ratio of the number of NNP 
disclosures at the aggregate state level to GSP is as follows: 
 
H2:  The ratio of the number of NNP disclosures received by states from firms to 
GSP increases with the implementation of FIN 48. 
 
In the NNP disclosure, the dollar amount may be large as firms disclose all 
uncertain tax positions to avoid recording a FIN 48 liability.  On the other hand, firms 
may disclose a small dollar amount with the NNP to begin the statute of limitations.  
Given the uncertainty around states’ interpretation of nexus, beginning the statute of 
limitations will limit the number of years that a firm would have to record a FIN 48 
liability, making it reasonable that firms would disclose a small dollar amount.  However, 
given the uncertainty around state nexus, it also is possible that firms are determining the 
dollar amount of NNP disclosure based more on state nexus characteristics or other state 
tax characteristics than on FIN 48.  Based on the above discussion, I do not predict the 
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direction of the effect that FIN 48 will have on the ratio of the aggregated dollar amount 
of NNP disclosure in a state to GSP.  Stated formally, my hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H3:  The implementation of FIN 48 has a significant effect on the ratio of the 
dollar amount of NNP disclosure received by states from firms to GSP.  
 
 
With FIN 48 potentially impacting the number of NNP disclosures and the dollar 
amount of disclosure in the NNP, I empirically examine whether firm characteristics of 
size and tax aggressiveness impact the dollar amount of NNP disclosure after the 
implementation of FIN 48.  Due to the limited availability of data on privately-held firms, 
I focus my attention on publicly-traded firms for a case-level analysis.31  The case-level 
analysis allows me to control for both firm and state characteristics potentially 
influencing the dollar amount of NNP disclosure. 
Gupta and Mills (2002) find that compliance costs associated with state tax 
requirements fall disproportionately on smaller firms.  This finding indicates that perhaps 
the costs of complying with FIN 48, investigating tax filings, and understanding states’ 
nexus positions may fall unduly on smaller firms.  Therefore, smaller firms may disclose 
a large dollar amount in the NNP due to a lack of understanding and a desire to avoid 
recording a FIN 48 liability.  On the other hand, larger firms with more resources may 
have the ability to tax plan and shift income as found by Mills et al. (1998) and Hanlon et 
al. (2007).  Due to sophisticated tax planning abilities, larger firms may have larger 
potential FIN 48 liabilities resulting in these firms disclosing more dollars in the NNP.  
                                                 
31
 Again, each case consists of a unique taxpayer disclosing prior liabilities in a particular state for income 
taxes.   
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Therefore, the predicted direction of the size of the firm influencing the dollar amount of 
NNP disclosures is ambiguous.  Stated formally, the hypothesis related to FIN 48 and 
firm size is as follows: 
 
H4A:  Following the implementation of FIN 48, firm size has a significant effect 
on the dollar amount of NNP disclosure by publicly-traded firms for a particular 
case. 
 
Prior literature has shown an increase in state effective tax rates after the 
implementation of FIN 48 for firms taking aggressive tax positions, leading one to 
believe that tax planning has been slowed (Gupta et al., 2009a).  Therefore, firms that 
historically pursue aggressive tax positions increase their disclosure in the NNP after the 
implementation of FIN 48 when these aggressive positions require the accrual of FIN 48 
liabilities.  Stated formally, the hypothesis related to FIN 48 and firm tax aggressiveness 
is as follows: 
 
H4B:  Following the implementation of FIN 48, tax aggressiveness has a positive 
effect on the dollar amount of NNP disclosure by publicly-traded firms for a 
particular case. 
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4. RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Sample Selection and Data Sources 
 
The primary data source used in this study is the MTC’s NNP database.  This 
proprietary database contains information on a case-by-case basis for multistate taxpayers 
entering voluntary disclosure agreements with states from 1994 through 2008.32  Each 
case is comprised of a unique taxpayer disclosing prior liabilities in a particular state for 
income or sales and use taxes.  In this dissertation, I focus on the NNP disclosures made 
for income tax purposes.   
In the corporate state tax revenue model (Model 1), I use data on corporate state 
tax collections from 1973 through 200833 for the 45 states that have a corporate income 
tax on businesses.34  Thus, I exclude Nevada, Washington, and Wyoming.  I also exclude 
South Dakota because its corporate tax is limited to financial institutions and Texas 
because it only imposes a franchise tax on earned surplus.35  I collect corporate state tax 
revenue data from the World Tax Database and the U.S. Census Bureau, Government 
Finance Statistics.36  I obtain data on when a state joined the NNP from the MTC.  I 
                                                 
32
 Although the NNP began in December 1990, detailed data records by taxpayer and type of tax only go 
back to 1994. 
33
 I selected the time period to have a balanced period of 18 years both without (years 1973 through 1990) 
and with (years 1991 through 2008) the establishment of the NNP. 
34
 I rely on the definition of the corporate income tax as used by the Federation of Tax Administrators. 
35
 In May 2007, the Texas Legislature passed a law changing the Texas franchise tax from a tax based on 
net income or taxable capital to a gross margin tax.  Because some view the historical Texas franchise tax 
to be similar to a corporate income tax, I test Models 2, 3, and 4 retaining the Texas observations and find 
consistent results.  I am unable to include Texas in Model 1 because the U.S. Census Bureau does not 
report the Texas franchise tax revenues separately but rather shows the Texas corporate tax revenues as 
zero. 
36
 The World Tax Database is created and maintain by the University of Michigan, Ross School of Business 
(http://www.bus.umich.edu/otpr/otpr/introduction.htm).  As the U.S. Census Bureau only contains data 
from 1992 through 2008, the earlier data must be obtained from another source. 
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collect state tax policy variables from the Federation of Tax Administrators (FTA) and 
Commerce Clearing House (CCH) State Tax Handbooks.  Other state control variables 
are gathered from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS), and U.S. Department of Energy.  Table 1 describes the data sources for each 
variable in the state corporate tax revenue model (Model 1). 
In the NNP database, the MTC compile the name of the taxpayer, address, 
employer identification number (EIN), type of entity form, type of paid preparer, how the 
taxpayer became aware of the NNP, the reason for disclosure, and the amount of liability 
paid to a state associated with the NNP disclosure.  While the NNP contains unique and 
proprietary data, the MTC did not collect taxpayer characteristic variables.  Therefore, I 
use various other data sources to verify and enhance the MTC’s NNP data.  First, I use 
EIN Finder to verify the exact name and address of a taxpayer from the NNP’s listing 
using the firm’s EIN.37  The verified name and address enables matching with the 
Corporate Affiliations database available through the University of Tennessee.  This 
process details whether the taxpayer disclosing with the NNP is a common parent or a 
lower-tiered subsidiary.  If the taxpayer is a lower-tiered subsidiary, I obtain the 
associated common parent, thereby enabling further matching to Compustat data.  While 
this process seems tedious and overly detailed, it is necessary as the disclosing firm might 
not be the ultimate common parent but rather a subsidiary.  Although the firm disclosing 
with the NNP might be a lower-tiered subsidiary, the decisions for disclosure purposes 
and tax preparation purposes are likely made at a consolidated or common parent level.  
                                                 
37
 EIN Finder is an online database of U.S. Employer Identification Numbers (EINs) and includes more 
than six million EINs for all entity forms. 
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Therefore, it is necessary to collect taxpayer characteristic variables at the common 
parent level.38   
To further enhance the research, I use state tax policy variables collected from 
FTA, CCH State Tax Handbooks, National Association of State Budget Officers, World 
Tax Database, and BLS for Models 2 and 3 (see Table 2 for a detailed description of the 
variables and sources).  For Model 4 that focuses on case-level NNP disclosures, the 
Corporate Affiliations database and Compustat provide additional data (Table 3 contains 
a detailed description of the variables and sources).  While I am using various data 
sources to verify and enhance proprietary data obtained from the MTC, no proprietary 
data is being compromised or revealed through the process of matching. 
Method 
State Corporate Tax Revenue Model (Hypotheses 1A and 1B) 
 In developing a model to examine the long-run effect of a permanent tax amnesty 
program on per capita state corporate tax revenues, I follow an approach similar to Alm 
and Beck (1993).  Alm and Beck use a time-series approach to analyze the effect of the 
1985 Colorado amnesty on individual tax collections.39  Here, I use a panel-data approach 
with 45 states over 36 years (1973 through 2008) to evaluate the effect of the NNP on per 
capita state corporate tax revenues.  Due to omitted variables, I expand Alm and Beck’s 
                                                 
38
 While data is being collected on the common parent, as this is likely the level where decisions are made, 
this data is only used for some of the independent or control variables.  The data obtained from the MTC 
represents the subsidiary-level firm and is always used as the dependent variable.   
39
 Alm and Beck (1993) use a simple time trend model of Yt = b0 + b1T1 + et, where Yt represents individual 
income tax collections by month, T1 is the numeric representation of the month, and et represents the error 
term. 
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model to investigate the effect of the MTC’s NNP on per capita corporate tax revenues.  
Thus, I will use the following model:40 
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where Rit is the corporate tax revenues in state i at year t and GSPit is the GSP in state i at 
year t resulting in per capita corporate tax revenues in state i at year t.41  In 1991, the first 
full year of establishment, 20 states, plus the District of Columbia, joined the NNP.  The 
indicator variable, e, represents 1991 and afterwards because states could participate in 
the NNP during this period.42  I include the e variable because effects in revenues may be 
felt from the establishment of the program prior to a state choosing to participate in the 
program.  The establishment of the NNP could affect corporate tax revenues of a state 
that has not joined the NNP by impacting tax compliance through disclosure or locational 
decisions of a firm.43  Through this variable, I also examine whether a break occurs the in 
per capita state corporate tax revenues and the direction of the break.  I am using this 
variable in the spirit of a Chow test and recognize that the coefficient on this variable is 
                                                 
40
 With state fixed effects and the time trend included, I will be able to run a one-way fixed-effects ordinary 
least squares regression model. 
41
 The dependent variable (the ratio of state corporate tax revenues to gross state product) and the matrix 
controlling for state economic activity are in natural logarithm form in the regression analysis.  When tax 
revenues were plotted against the variables in the economic activity control matrix (employment, wages, 
and energy cost), the data showed that the log-log model was the most appropriate.  The transformation 
also aids in the interpretation of the tax policy control variables with dummy variable specifications. 
42
 While the NNP was established in December 1990, no states joined the program until 1991.  Therefore, I 
define the establishment variable as one beginning in 1991 and future years with all prior years defined as 
zero. 
43
 Because et and nit are the same for the 21 states that joined the NNP in 1991 and the correlation 
coefficient for these two variables is 0.726, I re-estimate the model excluding et and adding time fixed 
effects in the additional analysis section for Model 1. 
  36
detecting changes due to the establishment of the NNP as well as other changes after 
1991 that are not controlled for in the model.  This variable allows me to test hypothesis 
H1A.  
The indicator variable, n, is defined as one when a state joins the NNP and all 
subsequent years that the state participated in the NNP.  The variable j represents the first 
year the state joins the NNP and is defined as one only in the year the state chooses to 
participate.44  The n variable allows me to capture the effect on per capita revenues of a 
state choosing to participate in the NNP and continuing its participation (permanent 
effects).  However, the j variable captures the effects on per capita revenue in the first 
year of participation (transitory effects).  To test whether a state’s choice of participation 
in the NNP impacted per capita state corporate tax revenues (hypothesis H1B), I evaluate 
the significance of n and j.  Similar to the prediction on e, these effects on revenues are 
ambiguous as the level of cheating prior to the establishment of the NNP and the level of 
risky tax strategies by firms are unobservable.  Figure 3 shows the participation of the 
states in the NNP from 1991 through 2008. 
Two control matrices also are included.  The matrix Tkit-1 represents tax policy 
variable k in state i at year t-1, and the matrix Clit-1 represents control variable l impacting 
economic activity in state i at year t-1.  The model also includes an eighth order 
polynomial time trend (tmt),45 state fixed effects (θi),46 and an error term (εit).   All 
variables are defined in Table 1.  
                                                 
44
 For New Hampshire and New Mexico that drop out of the NNP in 2006 and 2002, respectively, and 
rejoin in 2008, I only code the initial year of joining the NNP as one. 
45
 While year fixed effects would allow me to control for unobserved macro / policy shocks in each year, I 
am unable to use this approach due to the lack of variation across time because of the e variable, 
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First, the tax policy variables control for the historical tax decisions made by 
policymakers within the state that may impact the level of state corporate tax revenues.  
These policy variables include state amnesty programs, voluntary compliance initiatives 
(VCIs), economic presence, combined reporting, interest and royalty addbacks, 
throwback rules, sales apportionment, personal income tax rates, and corporate income 
tax rates.  Again, state amnesty programs provide taxpayers the ability to pay prior 
unpaid taxes without owing penalties during a limited window of opportunity.  However, 
VCIs are limited to certain types of taxes and target taxpayers involved in tax shelter 
transactions, including reportable and listed transactions.  While the prior literature 
investigates the effects of amnesty programs, research has traditionally not used 
amnesties or VCIs as control variables.  I include state amnesty programs and VCIs 
because they offer firms other opportunities for disclosure outside the NNP potentially 
impacting per capita tax revenues.  State tax amnesty programs and VCIs might increase 
tax compliance resulting in an associated increase in per capita tax revenues.  However, if 
these programs are introduced without being accompanied by sufficient enforcement, as 
the literature has shown, amnesties have no impact on long-term per capita revenues 
(Mikesell, 1986; Alm and Beck, 1990; Macho-Stadler et al., 1999).  The literature has yet 
                                                                                                                                                 
establishment of NNP.  The time trend is actually contained within year fixed effects as well as other policy 
changes occurring in each year.  As the state revenue data demonstrates multiple inflection points, I include 
an ordered polynomial time trend.  The order of time trend was determined based on experimentation 
through successfully adding higher order polynomials ceasing when higher orders were no longer 
significant.  The eighth order was the highest order polynomial still showing significance.  As a robustness 
check, I estimate the model without the time trend and the e variable and include fixed effects.  These 
findings are reported in the additional analysis section for Model 1. 
46
 I ran a Hausman test to determine whether the model should include state fixed or random effects.  The 
insignificant p-value on the test indicated that fixed or random effects were appropriate.  Because fixed 
effects always result in consistent estimators and are more prevalent in panel data analysis, I chose to 
include state fixed effects in the model (Wooldridge, 2006). 
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to empirically examine the impact of VCIs on per capita tax revenues.  Therefore, I make 
no directional prediction on either state tax amnesty programs or VCIs.   
Due to the uncertainty in how states define nexus, I include a variable to capture 
states defining substantial nexus as economic presence rather than physical presence.  
States may be turning toward economic presence to increase tax revenues through 
broadening the tax base (Ertmer and Sash, 2007; Schadewald, 2008).  Therefore, I predict 
that economic presence will have a positive impact on per capita tax revenues.  I 
determine this variable through analyzing state statutes and case law on CCH.  For states 
that were silent in either the statues or case law, I examine state revenue department 
websites seeking information and guidance through tax alerts and forms.  Although the 
variable contains measurement error due to states defining nexus on a continuum, to my 
knowledge this represents the first attempt to classify states as either economic presence 
or physical presence states and to use this definition empirically. 
In general, combined reporting requires firms to combine profits and losses from 
all related subsidiaries prior to determining the portion of the profits and/or losses taxable 
in a particular state.47  Although the impact of combined reporting on revenues is mixed, 
I control for the effect of this state tax policy (Pennsylvania Dept. of Revenue, 2005; 
Bruce et al., 2007; Iowa Dept. of Revenue, 2007; Rhode Island Dept. of Revenue, 2008; 
Fox et al., 2009).  States may require combined reporting as a mechanism for broadening 
the tax base resulting in higher per capita tax revenues.  On the other hand, when 
                                                 
47
 Combined reporting is defined as one for states that require combined reporting.  Although some states 
allow firms to voluntarily combine profits and losses, states that allow the choice may not have the same 
impact on revenues because firms might naturally chose what is most advantageous for the firm.  To not 
introduce another state choice, I rely on the definition using required combined reporting. 
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combining profits and losses of a unitary group under combined reporting, decreased per 
capita tax revenues also may result.  Therefore, I make no directional prediction.   
States also may adopt interest and royalty addbacks as a means of attempting to 
close tax loopholes, particularly those related to passive investment companies.48  
Generally, states introduce addbacks to increase tax compliance and broaden the tax base 
resulting in a positive effect on revenues.  Some states impose throwback rules to capture 
“nowhere” sales.  Generally, if a firm has sales that are not taxed by any state due to the 
lack of nexus, those sales are “thrown back” to the originating state with nexus and 
included in the sales factor numerator for apportionment purposes.  I include a dummy 
variable to capture states with throwback rules as these rules typically result in positive 
per capita state corporate tax revenues due to states broadening the tax base (Lightner, 
1999; Gupta and Hofmann, 2003; Bruce et al., 2007).   
I include three dummy variables to proxy for the weighting of the sales factor in 
the apportionment calculation.49,50  Each variable is given a one if the sales factor weight 
                                                 
48
 If a firm were required to file and pay taxes in a separate reporting state, then the firm may choose to 
place intangible property such as trademarks, patents, and so forth into a holding company incorporated in 
Delaware or another state that does not impose a tax on income derived from these types of properties. The 
operating entity located in a non-combined reporting state then deducts these royalty payments resulting in 
the income generated from the intangible escaping taxation.  Both combined reporting and addbacks are 
enacted by states to try and prevent this type of transaction from occurring.  
49
 Traditionally, income taxes are apportioned to states based on the level of property, payroll, and sales in 
a particular state relative to all other states.   
50
 As a robustness check, I tested the model using five dummy variables for sales factor apportionment with 
one being omitted to avoid perfect collinearity.  Each variable is defined as one when the sales factor is less 
than or equal to 33 percent, 50 percent, greater than or equal to 60 percent and less than or equal to 75 
percent, greater than or equal to 80 percent and less than or equal to 95 percent, and 100 percent, 
respectively.  All of the test variables and control variables remain significant with consistent coefficients 
to the main model.  Of the new specifications of the sales factor apportionment dummy variables, only the 
dummy variable for the factor greater than or equal to 60 percent and less than or equal to 75 percent is 
insignificant.  The other variables are all positive and significant.  Similar to the main model, the magnitude 
of the coefficient on the double-weighted sales variable is larger than the coefficient for the single-weighted 
sales variable, 0.136 and 0.094, respectively. 
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falls within the following ranges, respectively, or zero otherwise: 0 to 33, 34 to 66, and 
67 to 100.51  I include variables to control for the weight of the sales factor apportionment 
as this variable has changed substantially over time and may impact per capita state 
corporate tax revenues (Lightner, 1999; Goolsbee and Maydew, 2000; Mazerov, 2001; 
Edmiston, 2002; Edmiston and Arze, 2006).  Prior literature (Mazerov, 2001; Edmiston 
and Arze, 2006) has found that increasing the sales factor weight leads to reduced 
revenues.  Thus, firms tend to reduce in-state sales when a heavy tax burden is placed on 
these sales indicating a negative response between per capita tax revenues and sales 
factors used in the apportionment formula.   
To control for tax planning, I include personal income tax rates and corporate 
income tax rates.  I control for both personal and corporate income tax rates in the model 
by including the highest marginal tax rate (Gupta et al., 2009b; Bruce et al., 2007; 
Wasylenko and McGuire, 1985).  The highest marginal personal tax rate is included to 
control for organizational form tax planning as well as an additional level of income tax 
burden facing firm owners.  Personal income tax rates higher than corporate income tax 
rates may drive firms to incorporate resulting in higher per capita corporate tax revenues.  
Also, higher personal income tax rates may result in privately-held firms paying lower 
wages and increase the corporate income tax base resulting in higher per capita corporate 
tax revenues.  The highest marginal corporate income tax rate is included to control for 
corporate tax planning occurring as well as firm locational decisions.  As the corporate 
tax rate increases, I would generally expect per capita revenues to increase.  To control 
                                                 
51
 To prevent perfect collinearity, I drop the dummy variable with the sales apportionment weight range 
from 0 to 33.  Thus, the other two coefficients are interpreted with respect to this reference category.  
  41
for the simultaneity bias inherent in a model examining revenues, I use a one-year lag on 
the tax policy control variables. 
Second, the state characteristic variables control for the general economic activity 
within a state.  These variables include employment, wages, and energy cost.  Wasylenko 
(1997) provides a review of the prior literature on economic development and taxation, 
which is informative in identifying control variables.  Employment, representing the 
number of non-farm employees in millions, is collected from BLS.  Wages, in billions of 
dollars, are obtained from BEA and are the non-farm wage and salary disbursements.  
The energy cost is defined as the total energy prices in dollars per million Btu.  Again, 
based on the plotted data and to aid in interpretation, these variables underwent a natural 
logarithm transformation for the regression analysis.  To control for potential issues with 
endogeneity, I also use a one-year lag on the economic activity variables.   
Aggregated State Models for FIN 48 Analysis (Hypotheses 2 and 3) 
Number of NNP Disclosures by State (Hypothesis 2) 
 Previous research has tended to explore the effect of amnesty programs on 
individual tax collections rather than focus on the number of amnesty disclosures.  Here, I 
examine the effect of FIN 48 on the ratio of the number of NNP disclosures at the 
aggregate state level to GSP.  Firms may be joining the NNP at greater rates suggesting 
an overall increase in tax compliance.  Therefore, I test whether the ratio of the number of 
NNP disclosures to GSP increase with FIN 48.  As firms are reluctant to record a FIN 48 
liability on the financial statements and potentially provide information on an uncertain 
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tax position to both shareholders and taxing jurisdictions, firms may increase disclosure 
in the NNP resulting in an overall increase in a firm’s tax compliance.  I use the limited 
empirical and theoretical research and rely on the descriptive work to develop the 
following model that examines the impact of FIN 48 on the ratio of the NNP disclosures 
aggregated to the state level to GSP from 1994 through 2008:52 
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where Fit is the number of firms that disclose with the NNP in state i at year t and GSPit is 
the GSP in state i at year t.  The dependent variable is the ratio of aggregated state NNP 
disclosures to GSP to control for the effect that relative state size has on the number of 
NNP disclosures.53  The test variable, s, is equal to one when FIN 48 became effective for 
publicly-traded firms (defined further below).  To test H2, I look for positive statistical 
significance on s.54,55  Two control matrices are included in the model.  The matrix Tjit-1 
represents tax policy variable j in state i at year t-1, and the matrix Ckit-1 represents 
control variable k controlling for the size of state i at year t-1.  To control for the 
simultaneity bias inherent in a model where firms’ actions may be in response to a policy 
                                                 
52
 Although the NNP began in December 1990, the record keeping and data on firms joining the NNP and 
individual case record data did not become detailed until 1994.  Therefore, I use the period from 1994 
through the currently available data of 2008. 
53
 An ordinary least squares regression is still appropriate as less than eight percent of the observations are 
truncated at zero. 
54
 Due to the potential for firms to act and disclose in anticipation of FIN 48 becoming effective, I will run 
the model with FIN 48 defined in three different forms as described below. 
55
 While FIN 48 represents a financial statement pronouncement that was implemented and discussed 
within the financial statement arena, it might also have interactive implications with state tax policy issues.  
Therefore, I re-estimate the Models 2 and 3 including all the interactions with FIN 48 and the state tax 
policy variables.  The interaction variables here are not broadly significant in either model.  In fact, in 
Model 2, the main effect of FIN 48 loses its significance in all the different specifications.  Therefore, I 
conclude that the interaction model is not effective at explaining the impact of FIN 48 on the number of 
NNP disclosures. 
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enacted in the prior period, I use a one-year lag on the tax policy and state size control 
variables.  The model also includes a fourth order polynomial time trend (ttn), 56 state 
fixed effects (θi),57 and an error term (εit).  All the variables are defined in Table 2, Panel 
A.   
Without a state joining the NNP, firms cannot participate in the NNP in that state.  
Therefore, the above ordinary least squares regression must be run conditional on the 
state choosing to join the NNP.  Until a state joins the NNP, the state is not included in 
the regression.  Models 2, 3, and 4 are estimated using a conditional ordinary least 
squares regression model.  In all these models, sample selection exists due to the 
nonrandom sample of states choosing to participate in the NNP.  Although the sample 
selection may be of concern, I am not generalizing the results to states outside the sample 
– states not choosing to participate in the NNP (Wooldridge, 2006; Kennedy, 2008).  
While it may be an interesting research question to investigate the determinants of states 
choosing to participate in the NNP, developing a first-stage model to allow for 
generalizability of the results to non-participating states is not necessary to address the 
research questions being investigated here.  The research questions in Models 2, 3, and 4 
                                                 
56
 Because the FIN48 variable represents a state-invariant variable, I am unable to run a two-way fixed 
effects model.  With the FIN48 variable and time fixed effects contained in the model, I would have 
multicollinearity.  Therefore, I replace the time fixed effects with the alternative of a fourth order 
polynomial time trend.  The order of time trend was determined based on experimentation through 
successfully adding higher order polynomials ceasing when higher orders were no longer significant.  With 
the use of the time trend, I am still able to include state fixed effects and run a one-way fixed-effect 
ordinary least squares regression.  As a robustness check, I estimate the model without the time trend and 
the s variable and include fixed effects and find broadly similar results.   
57
 The insignificant p-value on the Hausman test indicated that fixed or random effects were appropriate.  
Because fixed effects always result in consistent estimators and are more prevalent in panel data analysis, I 
chose to include state fixed effects in the model (Wooldridge, 2006). 
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focus on the impact that FIN 48 has on firm disclosure in states that have already chosen 
to join the NNP. 
In Model 2, the first matrix of control variables represents tax policy variables 
including amnesty programs, VCIs, economic presence, combined reporting, interest and 
royalty addbacks, throwback rules, sales apportionment, audit risk probability, statute of 
limitations, underpayment interest rate, corporate income tax rate, and streamlined sales 
tax member.  In addition to firms disclosing in the NNP, firms also might chose to 
participate an amnesty program and/or a VCI.  To control for other outlets for disclosure, 
I include these variables in the model.  Because states typically advertise these short-term 
programs, I expect firms to seek them for disclosure rather than the NNP, resulting in a 
negative effect on the ratio of the number of NNP disclosures to GSP.  The economic 
presence variable controls for whether a state follows physical presence or economic 
presence for the substantial nexus standard.  For states following economic presence, 
firms generally have increased uncertainty around the level of presence required to 
constitute nexus.  Therefore, I predict that economic presence will have a positive effect 
on the ratio of the number of NNP disclosures to GSP.   
In addition to the recent trend of economic presence, states have continually 
sought opportunities to increase tax compliance and broaden the tax base.  Examples of 
these opportunities include combined reporting, addbacks, and throwback rules.  One 
method used by states to close loopholes and generate additional state tax revenues has 
been to enact combined reporting (Pomp, 1986).  In states adopting combined reporting, 
firms may be slow in changing tax reporting practices leading to incorrect tax filings 
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resulting in firms disclosing prior unpaid tax liabilities and increasing disclosure in the 
NNP.  With firms relying on passive investment companies and other types of transfer 
pricing for tax planning opportunities for several years, states are beginning to close these 
loopholes and require an addback of the interest and royalty expenses (Bruce et al., 
2007).  Again, in states where addbacks are required firms may be uncertain about the 
law change or slow in adapting reporting practices resulting in increased NNP disclosure 
of prior unpaid tax liabilities relative to GSP.  Another attempt at capturing corporate 
profits includes enacting throwback rules.  Due to the complexity of multistate taxpayers 
and software used to calculate throwback sales, firms may again be slow in response to 
these rule changes resulting in increased NNP disclosure relative to GSP.  States also 
may be changing the sales factor weight in the apportionment formula.  If firms are slow 
in adjusting to these changes in apportionment, these changes may result in increased 
NNP disclosure relative to GSP.  Because states typically increase sales-factor 
apportionment, I expect a positive relation.58  In general, these state tax policy variables 
also proxy for state tax complexity.  As complexity increases, I predict an increase in the 
ratio of NNP disclosure to GSP.   
Fisher et al. (1989) describe expected characteristics of an individual amnesty 
participant including the perception of detection and the feeling of guilt that drives 
                                                 
58
 As a robustness check, I tested Models 2 and 3 using five dummy variables for sales factor 
apportionment with one being omitted to avoid perfect collinearity.  Each variable is defined as one when 
the sales factor is less than or equal to 33 percent, 50 percent, greater than or equal to 60 percent and less 
than or equal to 75 percent, greater than or equal to 80 percent and less than or equal to 95 percent, and 100 
percent, respectively.  In Model 2, the test variable and all of the control variables remain significant with 
consistent coefficients to the main model.  In Model 3, consistent with the main model, combined reporting 
is the only variable that remains significant.  None of the new specifications of the sales factor 
apportionment dummy variables are significant in either model. 
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disclosure in an amnesty.  Due to data limitations, I am able to proxy for the perception 
of audit risk only by using the estimated general fund of each state.  The higher the 
perceived audit risk the greater the ratio of the number of NNP disclosures to GSP.  The 
estimated general fund proxies for the perceived audit risk because as a state increases its 
general fund the state will be able to employ more auditors increasing the risk of audit.   
The model includes two tax policy variables that are similar to Dubin (2007).  
First, I include the number of years in the assessment period of a state.  The assessment 
period refers to the number of tax years open in a state at a particular time.  As the 
assessment period increases, I expect firms to increase NNP disclosure relative to GSP 
due to the increased risk of audit with additional open periods.  On the other hand, 
additional open tax years may make the disclosure more costly.  Second, I want to 
include the interest rate associated with underpayment of taxes and the penalty rate by 
state associated with the failure to file.  However, no information exists regarding the 
penalty imposed because the calculation is highly dependent on the facts and 
circumstances of the firm and the infraction.  Therefore, I use the state’s interest rate on 
underpayment of a tax liability to capture the relative additional cost of not disclosing 
between states.  I predict that, as the interest rate increases, firms will enter NNP 
disclosure at a higher rate.   
To proxy for the cost of not disclosing related to the tax liability, I include the 
highest marginal corporate tax rate.  Prior literature typically uses the corporate income 
tax rate as a control in other settings (Goolsbee and Maydew, 2000; Bruce et al., 2007; 
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Gupta et al., 2009b).  As the corporate income tax rate increases, the potential cost of not 
disclosing increases resulting in an increase in the ratio of NNP disclosure to GSP.   
In the NNP, firms may disclose both prior income tax and sales and use tax 
liabilities at the same time.  Therefore, I include whether a state is a full member of the 
Streamlined Sales Tax Program to proxy for whether disclosure for both taxes may occur 
at the same time.  I expect this variable to have a positive relation with the ratio of the 
number of NNP disclosures to GSP. 
The second matrix of variables controls for the variation in the size of the states.  
Corporate tax revenues capture the overall level of corporate profit occurring in the state.  
This measure controls for the relative size of business within a state.  As another means 
of controlling for the variation in state size influencing the ratio of the aggregated number 
of NNP disclosures to GSP, I include the number of non-farm employees in a state.  As 
these variables are used as relative size control measures, I do not predict a direction. 
Dollar Amount of NNP Disclosure by State (Hypothesis 3) 
 Similar to the model above, I use the limited empirical literature to develop the 
following model that investigates the impact of FIN 48 on the ratio of the dollar amount 
of NNP disclosure at the aggregated state level to GSP: 
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where all variables are defined the same as in the above Model 2 except for the dependent 
variable, Dit ,which represents the aggregated dollar amount of NNP disclosure that firms 
pay to states upon settlement of an agreement in the NNP in state i at year t, and GSPit, 
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which is the GSP in state i at year t.  Similar to Model 2, the dependent variable is the 
ratio of aggregated state NNP disclosure dollar amount to GSP to control for the effect 
that relative state size has on the dollar amount of NNP disclosure.59  All the variables are 
defined in Table 2, Panel B.  Again, the ordinary least squares regression is run 
conditional on the state choosing to join the NNP.   
The dollar amount of NNP disclosure includes any tax liabilities, penalties, and 
interest associated with prior tax avoidance or evasion that the firm desires to disclose 
and reveal to the state.  To test H3, I look for statistical significance on s.60  FIN 48 may 
result in an increased dollar amount of NNP disclosure relative to GSP due to firms 
increasing their NNP disclosure activity and the corresponding dollar amount as a means 
to avoid accruing a FIN 48 liability in the financial statements.  However, the response 
may be negative due to firms simply filing NNP disclosure agreements with little or no 
dollar amount to begin the statute of limitations and being cautious with the uncertainty 
around states’ definitions of nexus.  Therefore, I do not look for directional significance 
but rather whether FIN 48 impacted the dollar amount of NNP disclosure. 
Case Model for FIN 48 Analysis (Hypotheses 4A and 4B) 
Similar to the aggregated state models, previous literature rarely addresses the 
characteristics of individuals that enter into amnesty programs, much less corporate 
taxpayer characteristics.  Using only the case-level data on publicly-traded firms from 
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 An ordinary least squares regression is still appropriate as less than eight percent of the observations are 
truncated at zero. 
60
 Due to the potential for firms to act and disclose in the NNP in anticipation of FIN 48 becoming 
effective, I run sensitivity tests with FIN 48 defined in three different forms as described in a subsequent 
section. 
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1994 to 2008,61 I examine whether the characteristics of firms influencing the dollar 
amount of NNP disclosure change following the implementation of FIN 48.  I use a 
multivariate analysis with the following model based on the limited theoretical and 
empirical literature:62,63 
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where CDxit is the dollar amount of NNP voluntary disclosure paid by firm x in state i at 
year t.  The indicator variable, st, is one when FIN 48 becomes effective for publicly-
traded firms.64,65  The model also includes a fourth order polynomial time trend (ttn), state 
fixed effects (θi),66 and an error term (εxit).  Because the model contains case observations 
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 Again, this time period is used as it reflects the period after the establishment of the NNP when detailed 
data records on cases were available. 
62
 Here, x is defined for each firm, i is defined for each state, and t is defined for the year in which firm x 
discloses in the NNP.  In the preliminary review of the data, less than one percent of the sample discloses 
with the NNP in more than one year.  Therefore, these observations will be eliminated to avoid a lack of 
independence between the observations.  However, as a firm discloses in more than one state, observations 
are clustered by firm to eliminate independence issues between the observations.   
63
 Similar to the aggregated state models, I am unable to run a time fixed-effects model.  With the FIN48 
variable and time fixed effects contained in the model, I would have multicollinearity.  Therefore, I replace 
the time fixed effects with a third order polynomial time trend.  This order of time trend was determined 
based on experimentation through successfully adding higher order polynomials ceasing when higher 
orders were no longer significant.  As a robustness check, I estimate the model without the time trend and 
the s variable and include fixed effects finding broadly similar results.  Using the ordered polynomial time 
trend, I run the regression with time trends and include state fixed effects.  Therefore, I run a one-way 
fixed-effect ordinary least squares regression. 
64
 FIN 48 is defined and tested using three different definitions as described in the next section. 
65
 I examine the impact of the interaction between FIN 48 and the state tax policy variables to determine 
whether these interactive effects influence the dollar amount of NNP disclosure.  The results are generally 
consistent with the main results for the state tax policy control variables.  In four of the interaction models, 
the interaction between FIN 48 and firm size results in a significant negative response.  However, the 
interaction between FIN 48 and firm tax aggressiveness results in a significant positive response.  These 
findings provide additional support for smaller firms and tax aggressive firms disclosing larger dollar 
amounts in the NNP after the implementation of FIN 48. 
66
 I ran a Hausman test to determine whether the model should include state fixed or random effects.  The 
insignificant p-value on the test indicated that fixed or random effects were appropriate.  Because fixed 
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defined by firm, by state, and by year, I should include three levels of effects for firm, 
state, and time.  Due to the econometric complexities of including three types of effects, I 
include two types of effects – state fixed effects and polynomial time trends.  To control 
for the firm observations lacking independence as firms disclose in multiple states in a 
single year, I allow for clustered standard errors.  All variables are defined in Table 3.   
Based on anecdotal evidence and findings from Gupta and Mills (2002), size may 
be negatively related to the number of NNP disclosures because the costs of complying 
with state rules falls disproportionately on smaller firms.  However, Mills et al. (1998) 
and Hanlon et al. (2007) find that larger firms with more sophisticated tax departments 
and tax advisors shift income and engage in tax planning leading one to believe that size 
may have a positive relation with the dollar amount of NNP disclosure.  Therefore, the 
directional effect of size on the dollar amount of NNP disclosure is ambiguous.  To proxy 
for the size of a firm, I separately test three definitions of size:  sales revenue, total assets, 
and net income.  These variables are described in Table 3, Panel B.  To test H4A, I 
evaluate statistical significance of the interaction of st, FIN 48, and fsxt-1, firm size.  Firm 
size is lagged because the size of the firm in the prior year could influence the cost of 
complying with state rules and tax planning which influence the dollar amount of NNP 
disclosure.  
Gupta et al. (2009a) find that firms with aggressive state tax positions increase 
their state effective tax rates following the implementation of FIN 48.  Also, Alexander et 
al. (2009) find that aggressive tax positions are positively associated with aggressive tax 
                                                                                                                                                 
effects always result in consistent estimators and are more prevalent in panel data analysis, I chose to 
include state fixed effects in the model (Wooldridge, 2006). 
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reporting.  Therefore, more tax aggressive firms, using tax aggressive reporting proxies, 
will disclose larger dollar amounts in the NNP due to aggressive tax positions, resulting 
in a positive relation between the dollar amount of NNP disclosure and the interaction of 
tax aggressiveness with FIN 48.  Prior studies use different measures of tax 
aggressiveness due to the difficulty in measurement.  To proxy for tax aggressiveness, I 
separately test three definitions of tax aggressiveness: effective tax rate, cash effective tax 
rate, and book-tax differences.  Table 3, Panel C describes these variables in more detail.  
To test H4B, I seek positive statistical significance on the interaction of st, FIN 48, and 
taxt-1, tax aggressiveness.  I lag tax aggressiveness because the level of tax aggressiveness 
impacting the decision to disclose in the NNP was the prior year level of tax 
aggressiveness. 
A firm’s effective tax rate measures corporate tax burden and is widely used in 
prior studies (Zimmerman, 1983; Gupta and Newberry, 1997).  The effective tax rate is 
defined as the total tax expense divided by pre-tax book income less special items.  
Dyreng et al. (2008) introduced the cash effective tax rate as a measure of tax 
aggressiveness.  This measure uses cash taxes paid rather than current expense in the 
numerator and eliminates the bias associated with changes in tax contingencies.  A firm’s 
cash effective tax rate is measured as cash taxes paid divided by pre-tax book income less 
special items.  Several studies indicate that book-tax differences can signal tax 
aggressiveness (Mills, 1998; Wilson, 2009).  Book-tax differences are measured using 
pre-tax book income less taxable income.  Taxable income is defined as current federal 
tax expense divided by the federal statutory tax rate. 
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The model includes a matrix, FClxt, of characteristics of firm x at year t.  These 
control variables include the two-digit industry code, whether the paid preparer of the 
disclosure in the NNP was a big-four public accounting firm, and the number of entities 
included in a firm.  Using Joulfaian and Rider (1998) and Dubin (2007), I include firm 
characteristics variables.  I include the industry NAICS variable to proxy for the industry 
in which the disclosing firm is conducting business and the level of risk the firm may 
take.  For more risky or volatile industries (i.e., petroleum or technology firms), I would 
expect that prior tax evasion has been larger and that, with the implementation of FIN 48, 
these firms disclose larger amounts in the NNP.  The type of public accounting firm 
aiding in the NNP disclosure may influence the dollar amount.  While the tax literature 
has yet to explore the impact of the type of tax provider on firm decisions, the corporate 
governance literature uses this measure extensively (Blouin et al., 2007; Fortin and 
Pittman, 2007; Louis, 2005).  Therefore, I explore what, if any, impact the tax provider 
may have on the dollar amount of NNP disclosure.  A big-four public accounting firm 
may be more stringent in disclosing prior unpaid liabilities and influence a firm to 
disclose a larger amount.  However, a big-four public accounting firm may be the 
preparer because the big-four firm is more sophisticated at reducing the dollar amount of 
NNP disclosure.  Finally, the number of entities may indicate a level of complexity 
within the group generating a higher dollar amount of NNP disclosure.   
Similar to the aggregated state models, I include a state characteristics control 
matrix, SCjit.  To control for the simultaneity bias inherent in a model where firms’ 
actions of NNP disclosure may be in response to a policy enacted in the prior period, I 
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use a one-year lag on the tax policy variables.  The state tax policy control variables are 
the same as those used in the aggregated state models.  I also include two variables to 
control for state size.  To control for potential issues with endogeneity, I also use a one-
year lag on the state size or economic activity variables.  All of these variables are 
defined in the above sections.   
 Similar to the above aggregated state models, this model is run conditional on a 
state joining the NNP.  Due to data limitations associated with privately-held firms, I 
include only publicly-traded firms in the case model for FIN 48 analysis.  Therefore, this 
model uses the population of publicly-traded firms that chose to disclose in the NNP from 
1994 through 2008.     
Defining FIN 48 (Variable Used in Models 2, 3, and 4) 
Models 2, 3, and 4 contain the variable st taking a value equal to one when FIN 48 
was implemented for publicly-traded firms and zero otherwise.  I limit my variable 
definition of FIN 48 to the broad period of implementation due to the short window of 
requirement after implementation (limited to 2008).  Although FIN 48 became effective 
for calendar year-end firms in 2007, the final standard was issued in 2006 with 
preliminary discussions of the new standard beginning as early as 2004.  Therefore, I 
define and test Models 2, 3, and 4 using three different definitions of FIN 48.67  I rely on 
Frischmann et al. (2008) to aid in the definitions of FIN 48.   
                                                 
67
 The Models 2 and 3 use case-level data aggregated to the state level with Model 4 using individual case-
level data.  All the data was obtained from the MTC beginning in 1994 as this was when the MTC began 
collecting and maintaining detailed data records. 
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With FIN 48, firms are likely to disclose in anticipation of the pronouncement 
rather than in response.  If a firm were to adjust a FIN 48 liability established in a prior 
period without a change in facts, public accounting firms would classify this change as a 
prior period adjustment.  The possibility of a prior period adjustment coupled with the 
desire to not record a FIN 48 liability will likely result in firms disclosing prior to or in 
the year that FIN 48 became effective.  As the FIN 48 variable precludes me from using 
time fixed effects, I exclude the FIN 48 variable from the models and add time fixed 
effects to determine whether any of the control results are driven by the collinearity with 
time.  Because my FIN 48 variable is a grouping of time periods, I add dummy variables 
for 2005, 2006, and 2007 together and each separately to evaluate whether these results 
are consistent with my FIN 48 variable. 
First, I test using the variable st, FIN 48, coded as one for 2007 with all other years 
coded as zero.  I chose this option to define the variable because FIN 48 was effective for 
fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2006.  Therefore, for calendar year-end firms, 
the first effective year will be 2007.  During this first year of implementation, firms 
needing to accrue additional FIN 48 liabilities recorded these liabilities in retained 
earnings rather than the income statement.  This requirement of FIN 48 and the desire to 
resolve uncertain tax positions should result in firms disclosing in the NNP in 2007 rather 
than waiting until 2008. 
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Second, I code the variable st as one for 2006 and 2007 with all other years coded 
as zero.  Because the final FIN 48 standard was issued on July 13, 2006,68 I include 2006 
in the definition under the assumption that firms have entered the NNP disclosure in 
anticipation of FIN 48 becoming effective.  Lastly, relying again on evidence from 
Frischmann et al. (2008), I define the variable st to include 2005 as well as 2006 through 
2007.  The authors describe market reaction to 11 events associated with FIN 48 and find 
that only one of the events is significant and negative, specifically July 14, 2005, the date 
the FASB issued the exposure draft.  With increased exposure draft press coverage, firms 
are made more aware of the restrictive nature of recognizing tax benefits under FIN 48 
and the ability of taxing jurisdictions to use this knowledge when auditing taxpayers.   
Again, firms may act in anticipation of the adoption of the new standard and seek NNP 
disclosure.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
68
 According to Frischmann et al. (2008), this date received significant press coverage from the Wall Street 
Journal and the New York Times. 
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5. RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Information about the National Nexus Program 
 
Throughout the past 18 years, the NNP has been involved with over 700 taxpayers 
and processed over 9,000 cases.  Of these cases, income taxes comprise approximately 37 
percent, and sales and use taxes comprise 62 percent.  Table 4 illustrates some general 
descriptive statistics about the NNP.  Once a firm enters into the NNP, a case is opened 
and remains open until it is settled/accepted, rejected, or withdrawn.  On average, there 
are 280 days between when an income tax case is opened and when the decision of the 
agreement becomes effective.69   
While the NNP is free to taxpayers, a state pays nominal member fees of, on 
average, approximately $15,500 per year.  Over the 18 years since the NNP has been 
established, state corporate tax revenues average $715.8 million per state per year.  
Therefore, a state is paying less than 0.003 percent in corporate tax revenues to 
participate in the NNP.  In contrast to the nominal fee, a state receives, on average, 
$43,578 per year, or 0.006 percent of tax revenues, in additional tax collections from 
firms participating in the NNP income tax disclosures.  The average tax collections per 
income tax case are approximately $35,859, or 0.005 percent of tax revenues. 
Since its establishment in December 1990, the NNP has drastically increased the 
number of agreements from over 200 in 1991 to slightly less than 800 in 2008.  Figure 4 
shows the trend of the number of agreements based on the date a firm enters into the 
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 A settlement becomes effective after the MTC staff prepares the settlement agreement, the company 
reviews the agreement, and the taxing jurisdiction accepts the finalized agreement with the schedule of 
potential liabilities.   
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agreement.  Until 2000, the number of agreements remained rather constant (total trend).  
Beginning in 2000, the total trend increased with the peak around 2003 and 2004 
coinciding with more states offering tax amnesty programs.  In 2002 and 2003, the 
number of state tax amnesty programs was at the highest level since 1982.  The figure 
also shows the trend in agreements for both income tax and sales and use tax.  For sales 
and use tax, the number of agreements spike in 2002 coinciding with the approval vote of 
the Streamlined Sales Tax Project in November 2002 (Hardt et al., 2004).  For income 
tax, the spike in 2006 seems to coincide with the discussion and implementation of FIN 
48.  This spike also represents the first time that income tax NNP disclosures exceeded 
than sales and use tax NNP disclosures. 
Results for State Corporate Tax Revenue Model (Model 1) 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics of the Model 1 data.  Table 6 shows the 
correlation coefficients for the variables used in the state corporate tax revenue model.  
The mean state corporate tax revenues were $133.6 million, $451.5 million, and $1,175.6 
million in 1974, 1991, and 2007, respectively.  On average, the GSP in all states was 
$25.7 billion in 1974 increasing drastically to $234.1 billion in 2007.  The average ratio 
of state corporate tax revenues to gross state product was 4.5 in 1974 and 5.2 in 2007.   
Of the 45 states in the sample in 2007, 35 participate in the NNP with no state 
joining the NNP during 2007.  In this sample, 18 additional states above the original 18 
join the NNP from 1992 through 2008 as shown in Figure 3.  Only one state in the 
sample offered an amnesty program in 2007. States adopting combined reporting almost 
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doubled from 1974 to 2007 when 18 states, or 40 percent, require combined reporting.  
Similarly, only one state required addbacks in 1991 with 18 requiring addbacks in 2007.  
On average, 22 percent of the states, or 10 states, used an economic presence standard 
rather than a physical presence standard in 2007.  In comparison, no states followed an 
economic presence approach in 1974 or 1991 for income tax purposes.  Approximately 
51 percent of the states enacted throwback rules in 2007.  In 1974, two percent of the 
states used the double weighted sales apportionment factor; however, in 2007, 50 percent 
of the states used this sales factor.  The average corporate income tax rate is 7.4 percent 
in 2007 up from 6.7 percent in 1974.  The personal income tax rate followed the opposite 
trend going from 7.4 percent in 1974 to 6.0 percent in 2007. 
In 2007, the 45 states in the sample employed 2.697 million non-farm employees 
earning $124.0 billion in wages.  In contrast, the same states in 1974 employed 1.599 
million non-farm employees earning $15.5 billion in wages.  Energy costs averaged 
$18.5 per million BTUs in 2007 increasing from $3.0 per million BTUs in 1974.   
Regression Results 
The results from the regression of the state corporate tax revenue model are 
presented in Table 7.70  Of the main test variables, all three are statistically significant.  
The establishment of the NNP variable, e, has a highly significant negative effect on per 
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 The modified Wald statistic used for panel data indicates that there is heteroscedasticity in the model.  
Therefore, I re-estimate the models to control for heteroscedasticity using robust standard errors.  These 
results are presented in the tables.  Again, I perform a natural logarithmic transformation on state corporate 
tax revenues and the control variables impacting economic activity to increase interpretability of the 
coefficients and based on plotting the data.  The literature has yet to address unspecified autocorrelation 
issues associated with panel data.  Therefore, this model may not perfectly account for any unspecified 
autocorrelation issues. 
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capita revenues. Based on the model, per capita state corporate tax revenues declined 
19.8 percent in the years of the NNP existence.  After controlling for state tax policies 
and economic activity, per capita state corporate tax revenues are 19.8 percent lower 
from 1991 through 2008 than during 1973 through 1990.  This finding is directionally 
consistent with the ratio of state and local taxes derived from corporate profits to 
corporate profits decreasing 34.7 percent from 1991 through 2008.  Although the model 
contains state fixed effects and time trends, I am still unable to control for differences 
between states that vary across time.  Also, while the coefficient on the e variable reflects 
the decline in per capita state corporate tax revenues from 1991 through 2008, I am 
unable to disentangle the exact magnitude effect of the establishment of the NNP.  
Despite these limitations, the negative statistical significance on the e variable is still in 
support H1A. 
The indicator variable, n, capturing the permanent effects of states joining the 
NNP is highly significant and negative meaning that as a state joins the NNP the state’s 
per capita corporate tax revenues tend to decline by 12.4 percent.  In the first year of 
joining the NNP, the transitory effect, j, is significant.  Overall, the net effect in the first 
year remains negative with per capita corporate tax revenues falling by a net 3.7 percent.  
Therefore, the net effect in the first year is less negative than in future years.  Based on 
the theoretical model of Andreoni (1991), the negative permanent NNP effect on per 
capita revenues indicates that the NNP provides an insurance benefit for firms in the 
long-run.  Again, the insurance benefit refers to a firm’s ability to take advantage of the 
NNP when that firm experiences a bad shock (i.e., the firm discovers nexus exists in a 
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state in which the firm has never filed an income tax return).  However, in the short-run, 
the less negative per capita revenue effect suggests that cheating prior to the adoption of 
the NNP in a state may have been relatively high.  Again, due to unobservable 
differences between states that vary across time, I am more focused on the directional 
finding than the magnitude of the coefficient.  These findings support H1B indicating that 
a state’s decision to join the NNP impacts per capita tax revenues in both the year of 
joining and all future years. 
Of the state tax policy control variables, VCIs, combined reporting, throwback 
rules, sales apportionment, and corporate income tax rate increase per capita state 
corporate tax revenues when enacted into legislation.  However, the personal income tax 
rate results in decreased per capita state corporate tax revenues.  All of these control 
effects except sales apportionment and personal income tax rate are in the predicted 
direction.   
VCIs result in a 14.6 percent increase in per capita state corporate tax revenues.  
This variable is similar to a fixed effect for the year in which the VCI is enacted and may 
also be detecting other significant changes occurring during the year.  Here, I find that 
combined reporting increases per capita tax revenues by 9.5 percent resulting in an 
overall effect of broadening the tax base.  Consistent with Gupta el al. (2009), who find 
states with throwback rules to have a 16 percent increase in revenues, I find that the use 
of the throwback rule results in higher per capita tax revenues.  In fact, states enacting 
throwback rules have 11.8 percent higher per capita revenues.  Contrary to some prior 
research (Mazerov, 2001; Edmiston and Arze, 2006; Gupta et al., 2009b) but consistent 
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with Edmiston (2002), I find that higher weights on the sales factor in the apportionment 
formula lead to increased per capita state corporate tax revenues.  States moving to a 
sales factor weighted between 34 percent and 66 percent experience a 13.7 percent 
increase in tax revenue. However, states moving from a sales factor weighted less than 33 
percent to a sales factor weighted greater than 67 percent experience only an 11.3 percent 
increase.  Consistent with Mazerov (2001), this finding indicates that, although moving to 
a more heavily weighted sales factor (34 percent to 66 percent) increases per capita 
revenues, moving to an even more heavily weighted sales factor apportionment formula 
(greater than 67 percent) may result in lost per capita revenues.  This finding highlights 
that single-factor apportionment is business friendly only to firms with high property and 
payroll in a state relative to sales.   
The personal income tax rate is statistically significant indicating that as the tax 
rate increases by one percentage point, (i.e., 6 percent to 7 percent), per capita state 
corporate tax revenues decrease by 1.4 percent.  This finding is contrary to the literature 
(Bruce et al., 2007) and inconsistent with the prediction.  The finding indicates that 
increased personal income tax rates are not driving firms to incorporate or pay lower 
wages for privately-held firms.  On the other hand, the corporate income tax rate is highly 
significant and positive.  When a state increases the corporate income tax rate by one 
percentage point, per capita corporate tax revenues increase by 5.6 percent.  This finding 
is broadly consistent with Gupta et al. (2009b) who find an 11 percent effect.  The 
coefficients for employment, wages, and energy costs were all highly significant at 
p<0.01.   
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Additional Analyses 
 To test both the specification of variables as well as the general model 
specification, I run several additional analyses.  First, as the variable related to the 
establishment of the NNP prevents me from being able to run a time fixed-effects model, 
concerns may exist as to whether the results on the n and j variables are driven by the 
time trends included in the main model.  Therefore, I drop the e variable and include time 
fixed-effects in the model.  These results are included in Table 8.  Even with fixed-
effects, n continues to be significant and negative.  However, j becomes marginally 
significant and remains positive.  The magnitude of the coefficients is consistent with the 
main model.  In this model, however, the voluntary compliance initiatives and energy 
costs are no longer significant.  
Second, although the analysis above allowed me to use time fixed-effects, the 
analysis was at the expense of removing the e variable.  Therefore, I perform two tests to 
evaluate the robustness of the e variable.  Here, I test whether the results on the e variable 
are driven by the business cycles and the specification of the e variable.  To begin, I limit 
my 36-year time period to test various business cycle periods based on the peaks and 
troughs described by the National Bureau of Economic Research.71  Based on these time 
periods, I run the main model limiting the model to the following four time periods: 1975 
through 2007, 1980 through 2007, 1982 through 2007, and 1982 through 2001.  The 
results are broadly consistent. However, after limiting the time period to 1980 and on, a 
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 www.nber.org/cycles.html.  I use the website to determine the various business cycles that occurred 
around the establishment of the NNP and focus on maintaining the same number of peaks as troughs in the 
model to ensure that neither a peak nor a trough is driving the results in the main model. 
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state enacting throwback rules no longer has a significant impact on per capita tax 
revenues.  The magnitude of the e variable coefficient fluctuates from having a negative 
13.3 percent effect on per capita state corporate tax revenues when the time period is 
defined as 1975 through 2007 to a 19.8 percent effect when the period is 1982 through 
2007.  Throughout all business cycle specifications, the e variable remains statistically 
significant and negative.  As the number of peaks and troughs remain equal, the 
fluctuation in the coefficient may be detecting the magnitude of recessionary periods.   
To investigate the time period being captured by the e variable and whether the 
coefficient is perhaps less negative than it otherwise would have been as a result of the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86), I define the e variable as one for five different time 
periods.  The results of the e variable are contained in Table 9.  For each of these 
specifications, I define eit as one for the initial year and all future years with the years 
prior to the initial year defined as zero.  The establishment variable is positive and 
significant for 1986, 1987, and 1988 perhaps capturing the base-broadening effects of 
TRA86.  When the establishment variable is defined as one for 1990 and future years, the 
variable is negative and significant.  These results along with the main analysis seem to 
indicate that TRA86 is not impacting the magnitude of the coefficient on the e variable in 
the main analysis.  Perhaps the results in the main analysis are partially detecting the 
recession occurring from July 1990 through March 1991 resulting in lower per capita 
state corporate tax revenues.   
 Finally, it may be possible that policy endogeneity exists in the sense that tax 
revenues might affect state choices to join the NNP.  For example, in years when state 
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corporate tax revenues are lower, states may join the NNP as a means to increase 
revenues.  To at least partially account for policy endogeneity, I include a lag of state 
corporate tax revenues on the right-hand side of the model.  The lagged dependent 
variable allows me to investigate the effect of NNP participation on this year’s revenues 
while holding last year’s revenues constant.  After including the lagged variable in the 
model, the main test variables all remain significant and consistent with the main 
analysis.  The control variables also are broadly consistent.  Therefore, I conclude that 
policy endogeneity is not driving the results. 
To control for the endogeneity issues potentially associated between the per capita 
corporate tax revenues and a state choosing to participate in the NNP, I lag all of the main 
test variables of NNP establishment, NNP permanent effects, and NNP transitory effects.  
Here, the NNP transitory effects become insignificant.  However, the NNP establishment 
and NNP permanent effects remain highly significant and negative.  Using this 
specification, the magnitude of the coefficients decreases to 13.6 percent and 10.9 
percent, respectively.      
Aggregated State Models for FIN 48 Analysis (Models 2 and 3) 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 10 presents descriptive statistics of the data used in the two aggregated state 
models.  Table 11 shows the correlation coefficients for the variables used in the 
aggregated state models.  The mean of state income tax NNP disclosures was 2.5, 5.8, 
and 9.4 in 1995, 2001, and 2007, respectively.  The mean ratio of state NNP disclosures 
to GSP was 0.044, 0.075, and 0.091 in 1995, 2001, and 2007, respectively.  The mean 
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state dollar amount of NNP disclosure was $404,226; $91,038; and $122,065 in 1995, 
2001, and 2007, respectively.  The mean ratio of state dollar amount of NNP disclosure to 
GSP was $6,466; $710; and $688 in 1995, 2001, and 2007, respectively. 
Of the states in the sample in 2007 or those states choosing to join the NNP, only 
one state offered an amnesty program. However, in 2001, seven states offered one-time 
amnesty programs.  In 2007, eight states in the sample followed economic presence 
rather than physical presence for the substantial nexus standard.  This increased from one 
state in 1995 to four states in 2001.  Combined reporting remained relatively constant 
increasing from 13 states in 1995 to 14 states in 2007.  From 1995 to 2007, states using 
addbacks to broaden the tax base increased dramatically from one state to 12 states.  
States using throwback rules in the sample increased from 16 states in 1995 to 20 in 2001 
and then decreased to 17 states in 2007.  Fifty percent of the states, or 17 states, in the 
sample had a sales factor weight ranging between 34 percent and 66 percent; however, 
slightly less than 12 percent of the states, or four states, had a sales factor apportionment 
weight greater than 67 percent.  For the states in the sample, the average estimated 
general fund is $680.2 million in 2007.  The average statute of limitations is 3.3 years and 
remains relatively constant over the years.  On average, taxpayers incur a 9.9 percent 
interest rate on the underpayment of taxes in 2007.  This rate decreased slightly from 
1995 and 2001.  The average corporate income tax rate of the states choosing to join the 
NNP is 7.3 percent in 2007.  Of the states in 2007, approximately 38 percent, or 13 states, 
are full Streamlined Sales Tax members.  On average, corporate tax revenues are $1.1 
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billion for the states in the sample in 2007.  The states in the sample employed 2.5 
million non-farm employees in 2007.   
Regression Results for Model 2 
The regression results from the aggregated state model using the ratio of NNP 
disclosure count to GSP as the dependent measure are presented in Table 12.72  This table 
shows the regression results conditional on a state joining the NNP and uses all three 
definitions of FIN 48.  In the model defining FIN 48 as one in 2007, FIN 48 is not 
significant suggesting that FIN 48 did not prompt firms to disclose in 2007.  This finding 
indicates that firms may already have anticipated FIN 48 and disclosed in prior years.  In 
the other definitions of FIN 48 that include 2006 and 2005, respectively, FIN 48 does 
become significant and positive indicating that FIN 48 may have influenced an increase 
in the number of NNP disclosures relative to GSP in states joining the NNP prior to 
implementation of FIN 48.  These findings are consistent with the market reaction study 
done by Frischmann et al. (2008).  They identified three dates with extensive press 
coverage.  Two of the dates occurred in 2005 and 2006 coincide with the finding here.73  
However, Frischmann et al. find a significant negative market reaction only around July 
14, 2005.  The findings in this dissertation indicate that, on average, FIN 48 resulted in 
one to two additional NNP disclosures in a state depending on the definition of FIN 48.  
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 The modified Wald statistic used for panel data indicates that there is heteroscedasticity in the model.  
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autocorrelation issues.   
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 July 14, 2005 when FASB issued the exposure draft for FIN 48 and July 13, 2006 when the final standard 
was issued 
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These additional NNP disclosures translate into an increase in disclosure between 20 and 
30 percent.  Therefore, I find moderate support of H2, indicating that the passage of FIN 
48 results in an increase in the number of NNP disclosures filed relative to the period 
prior to the FIN 48 effective date.   
In each of these three models, VCIs and addbacks are statistically significant and 
negative.  VCIs are in the predicted direction.  As a state adopts a VCI, firms seek the 
VCI for disclosure rather than the NNP.  On the other hand, addbacks are not in the 
predicted direction.  The negative statistical significance here may indicate that in states 
adopting addbacks firms are increasing tax compliance and disclosing less in the NNP.  
The underpayment interest rate is statistically significant and positive in all the models, 
indicating that as the cost of not disclosing and being caught increases so does the ratio of 
NNP disclosures to GSP.  The only state economic activity control variable that is 
significant is the employment variable that is statistically significant and negative.  
Throughout all of the models, the fourth order polynomial time trend remains significant. 
Additional Analyses for Model 2 
I run several tests to examine the robustness of the main model.  First, I exclude 
the FIN 48 variable and run a time fixed-effects model to resolve uncertainty around the 
effect of the polynomial time trend on the control variables.  I also run the model using 
separate time variables for the years FIN 48 was being implemented (2005, 2006, and 
2007) rather than the dummy variables as defined in the previous section.  Table 13 
summarizes these results.  In the full fixed-effects model, the results are consistent with 
the main models with VCI, addbacks, and state underpayment interest rate all being 
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statistically significant.  In this model, all time fixed-effects variables are highly 
significant with the exception of the variables for 1996, 2003, 2004, and 2008.  As 
another method to proxy for FIN 48, I run the model controlling only for 2005, 2006, and 
2007 together and then each year separately.  Even without the time fixed-effects or time 
trends as controls in the model, the results are broadly consistent.  In the model including 
a dummy variable for 2005, 2006, and 2007, only the control variables amnesty and VCI 
are significant.  However, all three of the time dummy variables are statistically 
significant and positive.  Consistent with the main model results, the time dummy 
variables are only significant for 2005 and 2006 in the models including a dummy for a 
specific year.  Between these two models, 2006 has the larger magnitude of response with 
increasing the ratio of NNP disclosures to GSP.  This result is consistent with July 13, 
2006 being the date when FASB issued the final FIN 48 standard.   
Second, although I examined the robustness of the results around the control 
variables above and included specific year dummy variables for the time period involving 
the implementation of FIN 48, I was unable to retain the test variable for FIN 48, st, in the 
models.  Therefore, I further test whether the results are driven by a time period that does 
not include an equal number of peaks and troughs.  This analysis allows me to retain the 
FIN 48 test variable.  Here, I use the National Bureau of Economic Research to determine 
the business cycles and restrict the sample to a period when the number of peaks equals 
the number of troughs.74  Based on this information, the appropriate time period within 
my general examination period of 1994 to 2008 to test is 2001 through 2007.  These 
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results are broadly consistent.  FIN 48 is significant only when defined as one for 2006 
and 2007.  The variable remains positive; however, the coefficient has increased slightly 
to approximately 0.022.  The state tax policy variable amnesty becomes significant and 
positive in all three definitions of FIN 48.  The finding on the control variable is not in 
the predicted direction and seems to indicate that although states adopt amnesty programs 
firms still seek to disclose in the NNP. 
Third, in using the aggregated state model, the dependent variable that includes 
the number of NNP disclosures in a given state is perhaps not independent in the sense 
that the underlying firms making the NNP disclosures choose to disclose in multiple 
states.  Therefore, a state is not independent of another state due to firms multiple state 
NNP disclosures.  As a means to capture and control for the possible lack of 
independence between states, I count the number of states with underlying related 
disclosures and include an index variable as a control.  In all specifications of FIN 48, the 
control variables are consistent with the main model.  However, the FIN 48 variable 
becomes insignificant in all models with the newly added control index having a positive 
and significant effect on the ratio of NNP disclosures to GSP.  In future research, I will 
continue to investigate econometric methods to control for the potential lack of 
independence between the observations. 
Finally, given the limitation in most data to investigate differences between 
publicly-traded and privately-held firms, I take advantage of the depth of this proprietary 
data and separate the data into publicly-traded and privately-held firms to determine 
whether the implementation of FIN 48 and state tax policy variables influence the firms 
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differently.  Again, this is particularly interesting given that during this time period, FIN 
48 was only mandatory for publicly-traded firms.  Table 14 summarizes the publicly-
traded firm models, and table 15 shows the privately-held firm models.  Contrary to 
initial expectations, FIN 48 has a positive and statistically significant influence on NNP 
disclosure for privately-held firms; however, FIN 48, when defined as one for 2005 
through 2007, has a negative and highly significant impact on NNP disclosures for 
publicly-traded firms.  On the other hand, when FIN 48 is defined as one for 2006 and 
2007 combined and separately for 2007, the impact is statistically significant and 
positive.  The negative coefficient on FIN 48 for publicly-traded firms may be driven by 
the smaller sample of publicly-traded firms as compared to privately-held firms.  
Individual firm characteristics also may be driving the results.  The results may indicate 
that publicly-traded firms were slower in response to FIN 48.  These firms did not act 
until it was imminent that FIN 48 would be passed.  The finding on publicly-traded firms 
indicates that understanding the differences between publicly-traded and privately-held 
firms remains an area for future research using additional data from future years and 
possibly acquiring data on firms who do not disclose in the NNP.   
Regression Results for Model 3 
The regression results from the second aggregated state model are presented in 
Table 16.75  Here the dependent measure is the ratio of the dollar amount of NNP 
                                                 
75
 The modified Wald statistic used for panel data indicates that there is heteroscedasticity in the model.  
Therefore, I re-estimate the models to control for heteroscedasticity using robust standard errors.  These 
results are presented in the tables.  The literature has yet to address unspecified autocorrelation issues 
associated with panel data.  Therefore, this model may not perfectly account for any unspecified 
autocorrelation issues.   
  71
disclosure to GSP in state i for year t.  These results are consistent across the definitions 
for st.  FIN 48 is not driving the dollar amount associated with disclosing in the NNP.  
Rather, the dollar amount of disclosure is influenced by a state adopting combined 
reporting.  Therefore, I fail to find results for my third hypothesis and reject H3, which 
states that FIN 48 has a significant impact on the ratio of the state aggregated dollar 
amount of NNP disclosure to GSP.   
Combined reporting is in the predicted direction and is statistically significant and 
positive.  Depending on the definition of FIN 48, a state adopting combined reporting 
increases the dollar amount of NNP disclosures in a state by a range of approximately 
$199,000 to $213,000 conditional on the state joining the NNP.  The increase in NNP 
disclosures translates to an average 0.03 percent increase in state corporate tax revenues.  
Again, the significance on combined reporting may also proxy for state tax complexity 
that results in larger dollar amounts of NNP disclosure.   
In this aggregated state model, none of the other state policy control variables are 
significant.  Also, none of the state size control variables are significant.  However, 
throughout all three of the main models, the fourth order polynomial time trend remains 
significant.   
Additional Analyses for Model 3 
In a manner similar to Model 2, I test the overall robustness of the model.  I 
conclude by analyzing the main model separately for publicly-traded and privately-held 
firms.   First, to evaluate the effect on the control variables of using the polynomial time 
trend, I omit the FIN 48 variable and add time fixed-effects.  Table 17 shows the results.  
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Unlike the main model, the underpayment interest rate is significant and positive 
indicating that a one percentage point increase in the underpayment interest rate results in 
an approximately $30,000 increase in the dollar amount of NNP disclosure in a state.  
The increase in NNP disclosure amount in a state translates to a 0.004 percent increase in 
state corporate tax revenues.  With time fixed effects, a state adopting combined 
reporting is no longer significant in predicting the ratio of the dollar amount of NNP 
disclosures to GSP.  In this model, only the time fixed effects for 1995 and 1997 are 
significant.  To further test the model, I include only time controls for 2005, 2006, and 
2007 all together and each separately.  Consistent with the main analysis using the FIN 
48 variable, these single year controls are insignificant.  Similar with the full fixed-effects 
model, the underpayment interest rate is positive and significant only when the single 
time control for 2006 is included.  In all these additional specifications controlling for 
2005, 2006, and 2007 together and separately, employment is significant and negative.  
While these last models control for the time period FIN 48 is being implemented, no time 
trend or time fixed effects are included. 
Second, to further investigate the FIN 48 variable, I examine the effects of the 
business cycle on the results by ensuring that the number of peaks in the model equals the 
number of troughs.  Although the above analysis using time fixed-effects eliminates the 
uncertainty around the effects of business cycles, it does so at the expense of removing 
the FIN 48 variable.  This analysis allows me to retain the FIN 48 variable for 
examination.  Similar to Model 2, I based this determination on the National Bureau of 
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Economic Research.76  The business cycle begins with 2001 and ends with 2007.  I find 
that once again these results are broadly similar with FIN 48 remaining insignificant 
throughout all three definitions of FIN 48.  Contrary to the main model, combined 
reporting becomes insignificant.  Also, the statute of limitations becomes positive and 
significant indicating that as the number of open tax years increases firms have an 
increased risk of audit detection resulting in a larger dollar amount of disclosure. 
Third, for the aggregated state model, the dependent variable that includes the 
aggregated dollar amount of NNP disclosure in a given state is perhaps not independent 
in the sense that the underlying firms making the NNP disclosures choose to disclose in 
multiple states.  By construction of the variable, a state is not independent of another state 
due to firms making multiple state NNP disclosures.  As a means to capture and control 
for the possible lack of independence between states, I include an index variable that 
counts the number of states with underlying related disclosures.  In all specifications of 
FIN 48, the only control variable that is significant is combined reporting.  Consistent 
with the main model, the FIN 48 variable remains insignificant in all models.  Unlike 
Model 2, here the index variable remains insignificant in all specifications of FIN 48.  
Future research will investigate other econometric tools to control for the potential lack 
of independence between the observations. 
Finally, to fully utilize the uniqueness of the data and to provide additional insight 
into the differences between publicly-traded and privately-held firm, I divide the sample 
to determine whether the results are consistent across two distinctly different groups of 
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firms.  Table 18 provides the results for publicly-traded firms, and table 19 shows the 
results for privately-held firms.  Regardless of the definition, FIN 48 is not significant for 
the publicly-traded firms.  Contrary to initial intuition, FIN 48 is positive and highly 
significant for the privately-held firms.  These results may indicate that publicly-traded 
firms are more responsive to FIN 48 and to the effects of a large FIN 48 liability on the 
financial statements than originally thought.  The finding here is contrary to the intuition 
that privately-held firms are more concerned with cash payments than financial 
statements.  For both publicly-traded and privately-held firms, none of the control 
variables are significant.   
Case Model for FIN 48 Analysis (Model 4) 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 20 presents descriptive statistics for the data used in the case-level model 
examining the effects of FIN 48 on the dollar amount of NNP disclosure for publicly-
traded firms disclosing in the NNP.  Table 21 provides the correlation coefficients for the 
variables used in the case-level model.  Due to only knowing the population of the firms 
who choose to disclose in the NNP, the results must be interpreted conditional on a state 
joining the NNP and a firms choosing to disclose in the NNP.  The mean dollar amount 
of income tax disclosure by firm choosing to disclose in the NNP was $17,706; $17,943; 
and $14,699 in 2001, 2004, and 2007, respectively.  The average sales increased from 
$7.4 million in 2001 to $11.7 million in 2004 and then declined to $9.9 million in 2007.  
On average, the publicly-traded firms disclosing in the NNP had $7.4 million in assets; 
$13.1 million in assets; and $41.5 million in assets in 2001, 2004, and 2007, respectively.  
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During this period, average net income for the firms selecting to disclose in the NNP 
ranged between $1 million and $2 million.  Overall, the effective tax rate declined 
dramatically from 36.4 percent in 2001 to 12.9 percent in 2007 reflecting permanent tax 
saving resulting from presumably tax planning.  The cash effective tax rate for publicly-
traded firms was 54.8 percent, 20.0 percent, and 9.2 percent in 2001, 2004, and 2007, 
respectively.  This substantial decline reflects a drop in cash taxes paid.  For these firms, 
book-tax differences varied widely from $568,357 to $85,164 to $246,289.    
Approximately, 14 percent of the firms disclosing in the NNP in 2007 used a big-
four public accounting firm to aid in the disclosure.  However, in 2001 and 2004, this 
usage was closer to 50 percent.  Perhaps the decline provides evidence of publicly-traded 
firms separating audit and tax services.  On average, the firms had 16 entities in their 
corporate structure in 2007 compared to over 50 entities in 2001 and 2004.   
Of the states where firms are choosing to disclose in 2007, 4.8 percent of the 
states, which is down from over 10 percent in 2001 and 2004, offered amnesty programs.  
Over 30 percent of the states adopted combined reporting.  Approximately, 22.6 percent 
of the states followed economic presence rather than physical presence for their 
substantial nexus standard.  In 2001 and 2004, only 13 percent of the states followed 
economic presence.  The percentage of states in the sample requiring the throwback of 
sales dropped from 48.3 percent to 38.7 percent.  However, states requiring addbacks 
increased from 3.4 percent to 35.5 percent.  On average, 60 percent of the states in 2007 
had a sales factor in the apportionment formula weighted between 34 and 66 percent with 
less than 15 percent of the states having a sales factor weight greater than 67 percent.  
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The average estimated general fund, which is used to proxy for audit risk, was $597.7 
million in 2007, rising from $151.3 million in 2001.  The average statute of limitations 
remained relative constant around years throughout the sample period.  On average, 
publicly-traded firms disclosing in the NNP incurred a 9.6 percent interest rate on the 
underpayment of taxes in 2007.  This state interest rate on the underpayment of taxes was 
slightly higher at 10.4 percent in 2001.  The average corporate income tax rate for states 
in which publicly-traded firms were disclosing in the NNP was 7.4 percent in 2007.  
Again, the corporate income tax rate was higher in 2001 at 7.9 percent.  Of the states that 
publicly-traded firms choose to disclose in, approximately 37 percent are full Streamlined 
Sales Tax members in 2007.   
Regression Results 
Tables 22, 23, and 24 present the regression results from the case-level analysis of 
FIN 48.77  In this model, three variables are defined using three different definitions (FIN 
48, firm size, and firm tax aggressiveness).  While defining variables in different manners 
adds to the complexity of running models and reporting results, it also substantiates the 
findings across different variable specifications.  The results remain highly consistent 
across the different variable specifications for firm size (assets, sales, and net income).  
Therefore, these results are not presented in tables.  This model varies from the 
aggregated state model using the dollar amount of NNP disclosure because it allows for 
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firm-level controls in addition to state-level controls providing more insight into the 
variables impact NNP disclosure for publicly-traded firms. 
Table 22 presents the results for firm size defined as assets and tax aggressiveness 
defined as the effective tax rate.  Table 23 presents the results for firm size defined as 
assets and tax aggressiveness defined as the cash effective tax rate.  Table 24 presents the 
results for firm size defined as assets and tax aggressiveness defined as book-tax 
differences.  Regardless of the definitions used for FIN 48, firm size, or firm tax 
aggressiveness, neither of the test variables, fsxt-1 * st or taxt-1 * st, are significant for 
publicly-traded firms choosing to disclose in the NNP for states that also chose to join the 
NNP.  Therefore, I reject both H4A and H4B and conclude that firm size and firm tax 
aggressiveness did not impact the dollar amount of disclosure in the NNP either prior to 
or after the implementation of FIN 48. 
Interestingly, two state policy control variables are consistently significant across 
all models, VCIs and economic presence.  Consistent with predictions, when a state has a 
VCI, firms disclose approximately $24,000 to $35,000 less in the NNP.  In other words, 
this decreased disclosure amount in the NNP decreases state corporate tax revenues by 
0.004 to 0.006 percent.  Contrary to expectations, for states with a physical presence 
standard, firms disclose from $12,000 to $14,000 more, depending on the definitions of 
FIN 48, firm size, and firm tax aggressiveness, than in states with an economic presence 
standard.  This translates to 0.002 percent additional state corporate tax revenues for 
states with a physical presence standard.  From this evidence, I conclude that firms may 
be disclosing more in states following physical presence than those following economic 
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presence because firms are willing to risk audit detection and litigation in the states with 
economic presence where the level of activity constituting a substantial nexus standard is 
less defined.  Firms perhaps believe that without a clearer definition of the substantial 
nexus standard options exist to negotiate any future tax liabilities if faced with audit.  In 
fact, based on this evidence, FIN 48 was not even powerful enough to change behavior.78  
This finding highlights the impact that the definition of substantial nexus has on NNP 
disclosure further supporting the need for the Supreme Court to hear a case regarding 
economic presence for income tax purposes.   
In the two models using effective tax rates and cash effective tax rates, both 
addbacks and sales factor apportionment defined as one when the weight is between 34 
and 66 were significant.  Contrary to expectations, addbacks were significant and 
negatively associated with the dollar amount of NNP disclosure indicating that this 
measure of tax complexity reduces the dollar amount of disclosure.  While the dollar 
amount of disclosure decreases, the effect on NNP disclosure behavior is not clear.  
Therefore, it is difficult to disentangle whether firms are simply disclosing a small 
amount to begin the statute of limitations.  Again, contrary to predictions, sales 
apportionment was positive and significant.  Throughout these models, the fourth order 
polynomial time trend remains significant. 
Additional Analyses 
 To further test the robustness of this model, I examine time fixed effects and 
business cycles.  First, I eliminate the FIN 48 variable and the time trends.  I also exclude 
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firm size, firm tax aggressiveness, and the interaction of these variables with FIN 48 and 
include time fixed effects in the model to resolve concern about whether the results on 
the state policy variables are driven by the polynomial time trend.  I find results 
consistent with the main model.  Here, VCIs, economic presence, addbacks, and 
throwback rules are all significant and negatively associated with the dollar amount of 
NNP disclosure.   
Second, I use information from the National Bureau of Economic Research to 
investigate the number of peaks and troughs contained within the data.79  I limit the 
sample to 2001 through 2007 to ensure that the number of peaks equals the number of 
troughs.  The results are broadly consistent with the main result findings with the 
exception of state throwback rules having a significant and negative relation with the 
dollar amount of NNP disclosure for publicly-traded firms.  This finding is contrary to 
expectations but again reflects the inability of the model to disentangle whether the firm 
simply disclosed a smaller dollar amount to begin the statute of limitations.   
In addition to state throwback rules becoming significant, two models result in 
significance in the test variables.  The results are limited to FIN 48 being defined as one 
for 2006 and 2007.  In the model using sales and the cash effective tax rate, the 
interaction of FIN 48 and sales is significant and negative; however, the interaction of 
FIN 48 and the cash effective tax rate is significant and positive.  In the model using 
assets and the cash effective tax rate, the interaction of FIN 48 and assets is significant 
and negative.  Again, in this model, the interaction of FIN 48 and the cash effective tax 
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rate is significant and positive.  These findings provide limited support that smaller firms 
are disclosing a larger dollar amount in the NNP and that more tax aggressive firms are 
increasing the dollar amount of NNP disclosure. 
   
6. CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The NNP data collected by the MTC has not previously been used for academic 
research purposes.  This data offers the ability to better understand the decisions of 
multistate taxpayers.  Generally, research on multistate taxpayers has been limited due to 
the lack of data and the fact that no central repository of data on such taxpayers exists.  
This data offers a unique and significant contribution to the literature in beginning to 
understand these taxpayers.   
Using the concept of a permanent tax amnesty program and the theoretical 
background provided by Andreoni (1991), I explore the effects of a permanent tax 
amnesty program on state corporate tax revenues and conclude that tax revenues are 
lower when comparing 1991 through 2008 to 1973 through 1990.  I further investigate 
the NNP and determine that it had a negative permanent effect on revenues perhaps 
because firms view the NNP as an insurance benefit available when a bad shock occurs.  
Although less negative than in future year, the net effect in the first year remains negative 
when considering the permanent and transitory effects in conjunction.  This finding 
indicates that firms may enter the NNP initially because cheating was elevated prior to 
the adoption of the NNP.   
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Historically, the United States and other countries have used long-term, fully 
anticipated, forms of tax amnesties.  Therefore, knowledge of the effects could be used 
by other taxing jurisdictions as well as the MTC to increase the effectiveness of their 
programs.  Overall, policymakers should realize that enacting a permanent tax amnesty 
program similar to the NNP likely will not result in increased tax revenues.  Rather, 
based on this empirical evidence, taxpayers tend to view a permanent tax amnesty as an 
insurance benefit and not disclose until encountering a negative experience.   
In addition to expanding the literature on the effectiveness of the NNP on per 
capita state corporate tax revenues, the dissertation also provides insights into the ability 
of FIN 48 to affect tax compliance and revenues.  While states have struggled with this 
effort over many years, tax compliance may be increased due to the unintended 
consequences of the issuance of a financial accounting standard.  In investigating the 
impact of FIN 48 on both the ratio of the number of NNP disclosures to GSP and the ratio 
of the dollar amount of NNP disclosure to GSP from a state aggregated perspective, I find 
that FIN 48 resulted in increasing the number of disclosures in states that had chosen to 
join the NNP but had no impact on the dollar amount of disclosure.  In fact, in states 
choosing to join the NNP, only adopting combined reporting had a positive and 
significant effect on increasing the dollar amount of NNP disclosure relative to GSP. 
While at the case-level analysis I do not find broad results that FIN 48 or the 
interaction of FIN 48 and firm size or tax aggressiveness impacts the dollar amount of 
disclosure in the NNP, I do find that economic presence impacts the dollar amount of 
disclosure.  When investigating publicly-traded firms using data at the individual case 
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level, I find that two state policy control variables, VCIs and economic presence, have 
significant and negative effects on the dollar amount of NNP disclosure.  Although the 
finding on economic presence is negative, which is contrary to intuition, I suspect that 
firms may be disclosing larger dollar amounts in states defining the substantial nexus 
standard as physical presence because firms are willing to risk audit detection and 
litigation in states defining the standard as economic presence.  With the uncertainty 
around economic presence, firms may simply be disclosing a smaller amount in these 
states to begin the statute of limitations waiting for more determination on the definition 
of what constitutes economic presence.  This finding provides policymakers with an 
initial empirical examination of the impact that the uncertainty in the substantial nexus 
standard, specifically economic presence, may have on state tax compliance and 
associated tax revenues.   
Various groups have testified before Congress stating that the lack of clarity may 
result in additional FIN 48 liabilities for firms and potentially cause an undue filing 
burden.  Comment letters have been written to FASB linking FIN 48 and the nexus issue 
as a reason for delaying implementation.  While I do not find support for this anecdotal 
evidence and general conjectures in my interaction models, I do find that the uncertainty 
around the definition of what constitutes substantial nexus impacts the dollar amount of 
NNP disclosure for publicly-traded firms when evaluated on an individual case basis.  
Therefore, this finding highlights the impact that the definition of the substantial nexus 
standard has on NNP disclosure, providing support for the Supreme Court to hear a case 
regarding economic presence for income tax purposes.   
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Although the NNP data are unique, the data also has limitations as no taxpayer 
characteristic variables are included.  This limitation results in having to merge data from 
multiple sources based on name and address rather than EIN as this information is 
propriety.  Future research should seek to match the MTC data with IRS corporate tax 
return data to gather more specific matches.  Future research should also investigate the 
determinants of a state choosing to join the NNP.  
As discussed earlier, the case-level model results that examine FIN 48 are limited 
to only firms who select to disclose in the NNP and are not be generalizable to the entire 
population.  One method of overcoming this limitation would be to obtain data from a 
sampling of states on firms who did not chose to disclose in the NNP allowing the use of 
a two-stage selection model.  I plan to contact several states in an attempt to obtain this 
data.  This case method of investigation may result in future research in this area. 
 
  
  84
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
  
  85
Alexander, Raquel Meyer, Michael Ettredge, Mary S. Stone, and Lili Sun. 2009. 
Assessing Uncertain Tax Benefit Aggressiveness. The University of Kansas.  
Working Paper. 
 
Allingham, Michael G. and Agnar Sandmo. 1972. Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical 
Analysis. Journal of Public Economics 1 (3/4):323-338. 
 
Alltizer, Richard L., Brian P. McAllister, and Bill D. Jarnagin. 2008. FIN 48: Accounting 
and Auditing Implications. CPA Journal 78 (8):44-47. 
 
Alm, James. 1998. Tax Policy Analysis: The Introduction of a Russian Tax Amnesty. 
Georgia State University International Studies Program.  Working Paper. 
 
Alm, James and William Beck. 1990. Tax Amnesties and Tax Revenues. Public Finance 
Quarterly 18 (4):433-453. 
 
———. 1993. Tax Amnesties and Compliance in the Long-Run: A Time-Series 
Analysis. National Tax Journal 46 (1):53-60. 
 
Alm, James, Michael McKee, and William Beck. 1990. Amazing Grace: Tax Amnesties 
and Compliance. National Tax Journal 43 (1):23-37. 
 
Andreoni, James. 1991. The Desirability of a Permanent Tax Amnesty. Journal of Public 
Economics 45 (2):143-159. 
 
Baez, H. Beau and June Summers Haas. 1998. Multistate Voluntary Disclosures: 
Clearing Up State Tax Liabilities. National Public Accountant 43 (6):28-29. 
 
Blouin, J., B.M. Grein, and B.R. Rountree. 2007. An Analysis of Forced Auditor Change:  
The Case of Former Arthur Andersen Clients.  The Accounting Review (May):  
621-650. 
 
Bruce, Donald, John Deskins, and William F. Fox. 2007. On the Extent, Growth, and 
Consequences of State Business Tax Planning. In Corporate Income Taxation in 
the 21st Century, edited by Alan Auerbach, James R. Hines and Joel Slemrod, 
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 226-256. 
 
Chen, Kong-Pin and C.Y. Cyrus Chu. 2005. Internal Control Versus External 
Manipulation: A Model of Corporate Income Tax Evasion. RAND Journal of 
Economics 36:151-164. 
 
Council on State Taxation, National Association of Manufacturers, and National Marine 
Manufacturers. 2007. Associations File Amicus Brief in U.S. Supreme Court in 
Support of Physical Presence Nexus Rule. State Tax Notes 44 (10):757-765. 
  86
Crocker, Keith J. and Joel Slemrod. 2005. Corporate Tax Evasion with Agency Costs. 
Journal of Public Economics 89 (9/10):1593-1610. 
 
Cronin, John J., Dan Bucks, Bruce Daigh, and Charles W. Drury. 2002. State Tax Trends. 
Taxes: The Tax Magazine 80 (11):15-41. 
 
Dhami, Sanjit and Ali al-Nowaihi. 2007. Why Do People Pay Taxes? Prospect Theory 
Versus Expected Utility Theory. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 
64:171-192. 
 
Dyreng, Scott D., Michelle Hanlon, and Edward L. Maydew. 2008. Long-Run Corporate 
Tax Avoidance. The Accounting Review 83 (1): 61-82. 
 
Dubin, Elliott. 2007. Trends in State Corporate Income Taxes Revisited. Multiststate Tax 
Commission Review 20 (1):7-14. 
 
Dubin, Jeffrey A. 2007. Criminal Investigation Enforcement Activities and Taxpayer 
Noncompliance. Public Finance Review 35 (4):500-529. 
 
Edmiston, Kelly D. 2002. Strategic Apportionment of the State corporate Income Tax: 
An Applied General Equilibrium Analysis. National Tax Journal 55 (2):239-62. 
 
Edmiston, Kelly D. and F. Javier Arze. 2006. Economic Effects of Apportionment 
Formula Changes: Results from a Panel of Corporate Income Tax Returns. Public 
Finance Review 34 (5):483-504. 
 
Ertmer, Brian and Robert Sash. 2007. State of the States: FIN 48--Uncertain Tax 
Positions in the State Arena. Journal of State Taxation 25 (2):15-48. 
 
Fisher, Ronald C., John H. Goddeeris, and James C. Young. 1989. Participation in Tax 
Amnesties: The Individual Income Tax. National Tax Journal 42 (1):15-27. 
 
Fisher, Vickie L. 1985. Recent Innovations in State Tax Compliance Programs. National 
Tax Journal 38 (3):365-371. 
 
Fortin, Steve and J. Pittman. 2007. The Role of Auditor Choice in Debt Pricing in Private 
Firms. Contemporary Accounting Research 24 (3):859-96. 
 
Fox, William F. and LeAnn Luna. 2002. State Corporate Tax Revenue Trends: Causes 
and Possible Solutions. National Tax Journal 55 (3):491-508. 
 
Fox, William F., LeAnn Luna, Ann Boyd Davis, Rebekah McCarty, and Zhou Yang. 
2009. An Evaluation of Combined Reporting for Tennessee. State Tax Notes 54 
(6):397-426. 
  87
Fox, William F., LeAnn Luna, and Matthew N. Murray. 2005. How Should a Subnational 
Corporate Income Tax on Multistate Businesses Be Structured? National Tax 
Journal 58 (1):139-159. 
 
Frischmann, Peter J., Terry Shevlin, and Ryan Wilson. 2008. Economic consequences of 
increasing the conformity in accounting for uncertain tax benefits. Journal of 
Accounting & Economics 46 (2/3):261-278. 
 
Goolsbee, Austan and Edward L. Maydew. 2000. Coveting thy neighbor’s 
manufacturing: The Dilemma of State Income Apportionment. Journal of Public 
Economics 75 (1):125-143. 
 
Gupta, Sanjay and Mary Ann Hofmann. 2003. The Effect of State Income Tax 
Apportionment and Tax Incentives on New Capital Expenditures. The Journal of 
the American Taxation Association 25 (Supplement):1-25. 
 
Gupta, Sanjay and Lillian Mills. 2002. Corporate Multistate Tax Planning: Benefits of 
Multiple Jurisdictions. Journal of Accounting & Economics 33 (1):117-139. 
 
Gupta, Sanjay, Lillian F. Mills, and Erin Towery. 2009a. Did FIN 48 Arrest the Trend in 
Multistate Tax Aggressiveness? University of Texas at Austin. Working Paper. 
 
Gupta, Sanjay, Jared Moore, Jeffrey Gramlich, and Mary Ann Hofmann. 2009b. 
Empirical Evidence on the Revenue Effects of State Corporate Income Tax 
Policies. National Tax Journal 62 (2): 237-267. 
 
Gupta, Sanjay and Kay Newberry. 1997. Determinants of the Variability in Corporate 
Effective Tax Rates: Evidence from Longitudinal Study. Journal of Accounting 
and Public Policy 16 (1):1-34. 
 
Hanlon, Michelle, Lillian Mills, and Joel Slemrod. 2007. An Empirical Examination of 
Corporate Tax Noncompliance.  In Taxing Corporate Income in the 21st Century, 
edited by Alan Auerbach, James R. Hines, Jr., and Joel Slemrod. Cambridge, 
U.K.: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hardt, Diane L., Douglas L. Lindholm, and Stephen P. B. Kranz. 2004. A Lawmaker’s 
Guide to the Streamlined Sales Tax Project. Journal of State Taxation 22 (2):1-29. 
 
Iowa Department of Revenue. 2007. Combined Reporting: An Option for Apportioning 
Iowa Corporate Income Tax. 
 
Jackson, Ira A. 1986. Amnesty and Creative Tax Administration. National Tax Journal 
39 (3):317-323. 
 
  88
Joulfaian, David, and Mark Rider. 1998. Differential Taxation and Tax Evasion by Small 
Business. National Tax Journal 51 (4):675-687. 
 
Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1979. Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk. Econometrica 47 (2):263-291. 
 
Kennedy, Peter. 2008. A Guide to Econometrics, Sixth Edition Malden: Blackwell 
Publishing. 
 
Le Borgne, Eric. 2006. Economic and Political Determinants of Tax Amnesties in the 
U.S.  International Monetary Fund. Working Paper. 
 
Lerman, Allen H. 1986. Tax Amnesty: The Federal Perspective. National Tax Journal 39 
(3):325-332. 
 
Lightner, Teresa. 1999. The Effect of the Formulary Apportionment System on State-
level Economic Development and Multijurisdictional Tax Planning. The Journal 
of the American Taxation Association 21 (Supplement):42-57. 
 
Louis, Henock. 2005. Acquirers’ abnormal returns and the non-Big 4 auditor clientele 
effect. Journal of Accounting and Economics 40 (1-3):75-99. 
 
Lopez-Laborda, J. and F. Rodrigo. 2003. Tax Amnesties and Income Tax Compliance: 
The Case of Spain. Fiscal Studies 24 (1):73-96. 
 
Luna, LeAnn, Michael Brown, Katrina L. Mantzke, Ralph B. Tower, and Lorraine 
McClenny Wright. 2006. State Tax Amnesties: Forgiveness is Divine - and 
Possibly Profitable. State Tax Notes 41 (8):497-511. 
 
Macho-Stadler, Ines, Pau Olivella, and David Perez-Castrillo. 1999. Tax Amnesties In A 
Dynamic Model of Tax Evasion. Journal of Public Economic Theory 1 (4):439-
463. 
 
Malik, Arun S. and Robert M. Schwab. 1991. The Economics of Tax Amnesties. Journal 
of Public Economics 46 (1):29-49. 
 
Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge and Mark Rider. 2005. Multiple Modes of Tax Evasion: Theory 
and Evidence. National Tax Journal 58 (1):51-76. 
 
Mazerov, Michael. 2001. The Single-Sales-Factor: A boon to Economic Development or 
a Costly Give-away? State Tax Notes 20 (21): 1775-1807. 
 
Mikesell, John L. 1986. Amnesties for State Tax Evaders: The Nature of and Response to 
Recent Programs. National Tax Journal 39 (4):507-525. 
  89
 
Mills, Lillian. 1998. Book-Tax Differences and Internal Revenue Service Adjustments. 
Journal of Accounting Research 36 (2):343-356. 
 
Mills, Lillian, Merle M. Erickson, and Edward L. Maydew. 1998. Investments in Tax 
Planning. Journal of American Taxation Association 20 (1):1-20. 
 
Mills, Lillian F., Leslie Robinson, and Richard C. Sansing. 2009. FIN 48 and Tax 
Compliance. The Accounting Review, forthcoming. 
 
MTC History and Purposes. 2001. Multistate Tax Commission Review 2001 (1):3. 
 
Pennsylvania Department of Revenue. 2005. The Impact of Combined Reporting on the 
Corporate Net Income Tax. 
 
Pomp, Richard. 1986. Restructuring a State Income Tax in Response to the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986. Tax Notes 36: 1195-1207. 
 
Rhode Island Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation. 2008. Report to the General 
Assembly on Combined Reporting of the Corporate Income Tax. 
 
Schadewald, Michael S. 2008. FIN 48 Forces Companies to Wrestle with Uncertain State 
Nexus Standards. CPA Journal 78 (5):42-44. 
 
Sowa-Holmes, Marcella. 1993. MTC Nexus Program - Voluntary Settlement Process. 
The Tax Adviser 24 (12):776-778. 
 
Srinivasan, T. N. 1973. Tax Evasion: A Model. Journal of Public Economics 2 (4):339-
346. 
 
Stella, Peter. 1991. An Economic Analysis of Tax Amnesties. Journal of Public 
Economics 46 (3):383-400. 
 
Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman. 1992. Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative 
Representation of Uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5 (4):297-232. 
 
Wasylenko, Michael. 1997. Taxation and Economic Development: The State of the 
Economic Literature. New England Economic Review (March-April): 37-52. 
 
Wasylenko, Michael and Therese McGuire. 1985. Jobs and Taxes: The Effect of Taxes 
on States’ Employment Growth Rates. National Tax Journal 38 (4):497-514. 
 
Wells, Jean T. and Gwendolyn McFadden-Wade. 2007. Nexus and FIN 48: States of 
Flux. Journal of Accountancy 204 (3):80. 
  90
 
Wilson, Ryan. 2009. An Examination of Corporate Tax Shelter Participants.  The 
Accounting Review 84 (3):969-999. 
 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 2006. Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach. 
Cincinnati: Southwestern College Publishing. 
 
Yitzhaki, Shlomo. 1974. Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis. Journal of Public 
Economics 3 (2):201-202. 
 
———. 1987. On the Excess Burden of Tax Evasion. Public Finance Quarterly 15 
(2):123-137. 
 
Zimmerman, Jerold L. 1983. Taxes and Firm Size. Journal of Accounting and Economics 
5 (2): 119-149. 
 
 
 
  
  91
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A: EXAMPLES OF NNP DISCLOSURES 
 
  92
The following are examples of NNP disclosures: 
 
1. The applicant has become aware that the visits of independent contractors can 
constitute nexus for purposes of sales tax and has reconsidered its sales/use tax 
compliance in the light of this fact.  The applicant has been in compliance with 
regards to sales/use tax in its home state for as many years as current staff can 
remember or can document through company records. 
 
2. Acquisition of a potentially non-compliant entity.  The taxpayer's acquisition due 
diligence by outside professional firms did not property disclose possible nexus 
creating activities which may cause potential past exposure.  Any potential failure 
to register, file or remit was due to reasonable cause in reliance on the information 
provided by the taxpayer's professional advisors and not due to any negligence or 
intentional disregard of the law.  The taxpayer restructured its business at the 
beginning of XXXX, and no longer has nexus creating activities in its remote 
retail sale line of business.  However, the taxpayer supports the Streamlined Sales 
Tax Project and would like to pursue an appropriate remedy through the SSTP for 
any potential past exposure. 
 
3. It has come to our attention that we have obtained nexus within the state due to 
demo/evaluation tangible property, salesperson presence, and sales made to the 
state.  Our nexus status within states can change due to the movement of demo 
and evaluation and leased inventory as well as changes in salespersons employed.  
We want to be proactive and correct this situation. 
 
4. Based on the growth of the business, XXX was hired to perform a nexus study 
and determine the taxability of the Company's products/services.  From these 
findings, the Company wishes to enter into a voluntary disclosure and be in 
compliance with all applicable tax laws on a prospective basis.   
 
5. XXX has recently expanded the business activities to include the coordination of 
the delivery of equipment to our customers in your state.  XXX used to only 
provide installs or repairs through local independent contractors.  Previously, our 
professional advice and own research on the matter did not indicated sufficient 
nexus in your state, and therefore were not obligated to register.  Due to the 
expansion, XXX would like to take the position of voluntarily registering. 
 
XXX has always been registered to do business in state A and has been in 
compliance with the sales/use tax law.  Possibility of nexus resulting in income 
tax liability arose after state B inquiry into activities within state B.  Therefore, 
XXX is disclosing income tax liabilities in state A. 
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Example 1: Recognition and Measurement Threshold 
 
Facts 
Company A is a manufacturing firm with income tax nexus in Tennessee, Georgia, and 
Pennsylvania.  This manufacturing firm derives a majority of their income from 
customers located within the state of Missouri.  Currently, Company A files income tax 
returns in Tennessee, Georgia, and Pennsylvania.  Although the firm has economic 
presence in the state of Missouri, Company A has never filed an income tax return in 
Missouri as it has no physical presence in the state.  It is estimated that the tax benefit 
associated with not filing an income tax return in Missouri is approximately $1.6 million 
in 2007. 
 
Issue 
Does the $1.6 million in non-filing of a Missouri return for Company A represent a FIN 
48 liability in 2007?  If so, what is the amount of liability following the approach of 
recognition and measurement? 
 
Conclusion 
Under FIN 48, non-filing of a tax return is a decision made by the firm becoming a tax 
position.  Since the definition of nexus varies greatly across states, the determination of 
whether the tax position of not filing a Missouri income tax return meets the more-likely-
than-not recognition threshold is complicated.  FIN 48 states that when evaluating the 
recognition threshold that the taxpayer will litigate to the court of last resort.  In the case 
here, the court of last resort is the U.S. Supreme Court.  As the U.S. Supreme Court has 
never heard a case on nexus, it is difficult to be more than 50 percent certain how an issue 
will be decided.  However, it is possible to rely on widely accepted administrative 
practices in a state.  For Missouri, the Missouri Supreme Court has supported the position 
of physical presence.  Therefore, Company A can be more-likely-than-not to prevail 
under audit meaning that Company A meets the recognition threshold for the non-filing 
position of a Missouri income tax return. 
 
After meeting the recognition threshold, Company A must measure the tax position at the 
largest amount of the tax benefit that is greater than the 50 percent likelihood of 
prevailing under audit.  The firm calculated the following schedule showing the 
distribution of the potential outcomes: 
 
Potential Benefit Individual Probability Cumulative Probability 
$1.6 million 25 % 25 % 
$1.1 million 30 % 55 % 
$0.7 million 35 % 90 % 
$0.4 million 10 % 100 % 
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Therefore, Company A will recognize $1.1 million of tax benefit and $0.5 million of FIN 
48 liability.  As Company A has never filed in Missouri and no statute of limitations 
exists, the FIN 48 liability of $0.5 million will remain on the financial statements 
indefinitely and continue to grow each year when the tax position is reevaluated 
assuming the facts remain similar. 
 
 
Example 2: Recognition Threshold Only 
 
Facts 
Company A is a manufacturing firm with income tax nexus in Tennessee, Georgia, and 
Pennsylvania.  Currently, Company A files income tax returns in Tennessee, Georgia, 
and Pennsylvania.  Company B, a subsidiary of Company A, manages the royalties of 
Company A.  Company B operates as an intercompany royalty company incorporated in 
Delaware and does not file any state income tax returns.   
 
As historically Tennessee, Georgia, and Pennsylvania have never required the addback of 
intercompany royalty payments, Company A has retained the full benefit of the tax 
planning strategy.  When the laws changed in Tennessee, Company A complied with the 
disclosure of intangible expenses required for years beginning on or after January 1, 
2004.  However, Company A never incorporated the law change in Georgia that required 
an addback for intangible expenses and interest related to the use of intangibles for years 
beginning on or after January 1, 2006.  It is estimated that the tax benefit of the 
intercompany royalty expenses for Company A in Georgia is $1 million for 2007. 
 
Issue 
Does the $1 million in royalty expense addback for Company A in Georgia represent a 
FIN 48 liability in 2007?  If so, what is the amount of liability following the approach of 
recognition and measurement? 
 
Conclusion 
Since Company A neglected to follow the law change in Georgia for intercompany 
addbacks of intangible royalty expenses, it is unlikely that this tax position will prevail 
under audit.  Therefore, this tax position does not meet the recognition threshold of more-
likely-than-not.   
 
When a tax position does not meet the recognition threshold, the full amount of the tax 
benefit is recorded as a FIN 48 liability.  Therefore, the amount of the FIN 48 liability for 
Company A is $1 million. 
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Figure 1: Number of Income Tax Voluntary Disclosure Agreements Using 
Quarterly Data  
 
Source: Multistate Tax Commission from National Nexus Program 
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  Type of Tax Program80 
  
Voluntary Disclosure 
Program81 Short-Term Tax Amnesty 
Type of Payment 
Tax Liability 
Interest 
Penalties 
Tax Liability 
Interest 
Duration Permanent 3 months, on average 
 
Figure 2: Summary of Differences between Voluntary Disclosure and Short-Term 
Tax Amnesty 
 
Source: Jackson, Ira A. 1986. Amnesty and Creative Tax Administration. National Tax 
Journal 39 (3):317-323. 
  
                                                 
80
 Voluntary compliance initiatives (VCI) differ from both voluntary disclosure programs and short-term 
amnesties.  A VCI is often limited in scope to certain types of taxes and targets taxpayers involved in tax 
shelter transactions, including reportable and listed transactions.   
81
 Voluntary disclosure programs are highly similar to permanent tax amnesty programs (i.e., NNP).  In 
general, the literature describing the types of tax programs uses the terminology of voluntary disclosure 
programs. 
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Figure 3: Participation of States in the NNP82 
 
Source: Multistate Tax Commission from National Nexus Program 
  
                                                 
82
 The total number of states participating in the NNP is higher than the number of states in my sample as I 
exclude the District of Columbia, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming.  Initially, the 
District of Columbia, Texas, and Washington join the NNP.  Also, New Hampshire and New Mexico drop 
out of the NNP in 2006 and 2002, respectively.  Both of these states join the NNP again in 2008.  Maine 
drops out of the NNP in 2006 and never rejoins during my sample period.  All of the remaining states join 
and participate throughout my sample period. 
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Figure 4: Counts of Voluntary Disclosure Agreements (Based on Offer Date) 
 
Source: Multistate Tax Commission from National Nexus Program 
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Table 1: Variable Definitions for State Corporate Tax Revenue Model (Model 1) 
Model 1: 
 
 
 
Years: 1973 - 2008 
Variable Definition Source 
Rit / GSPit 
Tax Revenues 
 / GSP
 
 the corporate tax revenues (in millions) divided by 
the total gross state product less gross state product 
from the government sector (in billions) in state i for 
year t. 
 World Tax Database   
U.S. Census Bureau 
Bureau of Economic Analysis 
et Establish of NNP  indicator variable, 1=for 1991 and years after in year t. 
 
 
nit NNP - Permanent 
 indicator variable, 1=state joined NNP and/or 
participated in program for state i in year t. 
 
Multistate Tax Commission 
jit NNP - Transitory   indicator variable, 1=state initially joined NNP for state i in year t. 
  
Multistate Tax Commission 
Tkit-1 Amnesty 
 indicator variable, 1=state i had an amnesty program 
in year t-1. 
 
Federation of Tax Administrators 
 
VCI 
 indicator variable, 1=state i had a voluntary 
compliance initiative in year t-1. 
 
CCH Tax Research Network 
 
Nexus 
 indicator variable, 1=significant economic presence 
standard followed for nexus in state i for year t-1. 
 
State Codes / State Case Law 
 
CombReport 
 indicator variable, 1=combined reporting required  
for state i in year t-1. 
 
CCH State Tax Handbooks 
 
 
iti
m
m
m
tm
l
l
l
itl
k
k
k
itkitittitit tCTjneGSPR εθρδβαααα ++++++++= ∑∑∑
==
−
=
−
11
1
1
13210 ln)/ln(
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Table 1: Continued 
 
Variable Definition Source 
 
Addbacks 
 indicator variable, 1=state i has an addback 
provision for related party interest and/or royalty 
expenses for year t-1. 
 
CCH State Tax Handbooks 
 
Throwback  indicator variable, 1=state i has a throwback rule for year t-1. 
 
CCH State Tax Handbooks 
 
SalesApport1  indicator variable, 1=state i has a sales factor 
weight between 0 and 33 for year t-1. 
 
CCH State Tax Handbooks 
 
SalesApport2  indicator variable, 1=state i has a sales factor 
weight between 34 and 66 for year t-1. 
 
CCH State Tax Handbooks 
 
SalesApport3  indicator variable, 1=state i has a sales factor 
weight between 67 and 100 for year t-1. 
 
CCH State Tax Handbooks 
 
PIT Rate  highest marginal personal tax rate for state i in year t-1. 
 CCH State Tax Handbooks 
  CIT Rate 
  highest marginal corporate tax rate for state i in 
year t-1. 
  
CCH State Tax Handbooks 
Clit-1 Employment 
 the number of non-farm employees (in millions) 
in state i in year t-1.  Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Wages 
 non-farm wage and salary disbursements (in 
billions) in state i in year t-1.  Bureau of Economic Analysis 
  
Energy 
  total energy prices in dollars per million Btu in 
state i in year t-1.   U.S. Department of Energy 
tt
m
 
  the linear and non-linear numeric representation 
of year t from 1 to eight. 
 
θi   state fixed effects.  
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Table 2: Variable Definitions for Aggregated State NNP Disclosure and Dollar Amount Models (Models 2 and 3) 
 
Panel A:  
Model 2: 
 
 
Years: 1994 - 2008 
Variable Definition Source 
Fit / GSPit NNPNum / GSP 
 the number of firms that disclose with the NNP 
divided by the total gross state product less gross 
state product from the government sector (in billions) 
in state i for year t. 
 
Multistate Tax Commission 
Bureau of Economic Analysis 
st FIN 48 
  indicator variable, 1=standard (FIN 48) required for 
year t. 
  
See Defining FIN 48 Section. 
Tjit-1 Amnesty 
 indicator variable, 1=state i had an amnesty program 
in year t-1. 
 
Federation of Tax Administrators 
 
VCI 
 indicator variable, 1=state i had a voluntary 
compliance initiative in year t-1. 
 
CCH Tax Research Network 
 
Nexus 
 indicator variable, 1=significant economic presence 
standard followed for nexus in state i for year t-1. 
 
State Codes / State Case Law 
 
CombReport  indicator variable, 1=combined reporting required for 
state i in year t-1. 
 
CCH State Tax Handbooks 
 
Addbacks 
 indicator variable, 1=state i has an addback provision 
for related party interest and/or royalty expenses for 
year t-1. 
 
CCH State Tax Handbooks 
 
Throwback 
 indicator variable, 1=state i has a throwback rule for 
year t-1. 
 
CCH State Tax Handbooks 
iti
n
n
n
tn
j
j
k
k
k
itk
j
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Table 2: Continued 
 
Variable Definition Source 
 
SalesApport1  indicator variable, 1=state i has a sales factor 
weight between 0 and 33 for year t-1. 
 
   CCH State Tax Handbooks 
 
SalesApport2  indicator variable, 1=state i has a sales factor 
weight between 34 and 66 for year t-1. 
 
   CCH State Tax Handbooks 
 
SalesApport3  indicator variable, 1=state i has a sales factor 
weight between 67 and 100 for year t-1. 
 
   CCH State Tax Handbooks 
AuditProb the estimated general fund (in millions) in state i for year t-1.  
   National Association of State  
   Budget Officers 
 
SOL   the assessment period in years in state i for year t-1. 
 
   CCH State Tax Handbooks 
 
UnderpmtIntRate 
 the underpayment interest rate in state i for year t-
1. 
 
   CCH State Tax Handbooks 
 
CIT Rate 
 highest marginal corporate tax rate for state i in 
year t-1. 
 
   CCH State Tax Handbooks 
  SSTM 
  indicator variable, 1=state i is a full member for 
year t-1. 
  
   Streamlined Sales Tax  
   Governing Board, Inc. 
Ckit-1 CorpRev 
 the corporate tax revenues (in millions) in state i 
for year t-1.  
   World Tax Database and  
   U.S. Census Bureau 
  
Employment   the number of non-farm employees (in millions) in 
state i in year t-1.      Bureau of Labor Statistics 
tt
n
 
  the linear and non-linear numeric representation of 
year t from 1 to four. 
 
θi   state fixed effects.  
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Table 2: Continued 
Panel B:  
 
 
Model 3: 
Years: 1994 - 2008 
Variable Definition Source 
Dit / GSPit NNPDol / GSP 
 the aggregated dollar amount (in millions) of 
voluntary disclosure that firms pay when entering the 
NNP divided by the total gross state product less 
gross state product from the government sector (in 
billions) in state i for year t. 
 
Multistate Tax Commission 
Bureau of Economic Analysis 
st FIN 48 
 indicator variable, 1=standard (FIN 48) required for 
year t. 
 
See Defining FIN 48 Section. 
all other variables are as previous defined in Model 2 
above. 
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Table 3: Variable Definitions for NNP Dollar Amount Model using NNP Cases of Publicly-Traded Firms (Model 4) 
 
Panel A:  General Model 
Model 4: 
 
 
Years: 1994 - 2008 
Variable Definition Source 
CDxit NNPCase 
 
the dollar amount of voluntary disclosure paid when 
entering the NNP for firm i in state x during year t.  Multistate Tax Commission 
st FIN 48 
 
indicator variable, 1=standard (FIN 48) required for 
year t.  See Defining FIN 48 Section. 
fsxt-1 Size 
 
the size of firm i in year t-1.  See details in Panel B. 
 
Compustat 
fsxt-1*st FIN 48*Size 
 
the size of firm i in year t-1 given that FIN 48 is 
required.  Compustat 
taxt-1 TaxAgg 
 
the level of tax aggressiveness of firm i in year t-1.  
See details in Panel C.  Compustat 
taxt-1*st FIN 48*TaxAgg   
the level of tax aggressiveness of firm i in year t-1 
given that FIN 48 is required.   Compustat 
FClxt NAICS 
 
variable controlling for the industry for firm i in 
year t using the first two-digits of the NAICS code.  Corporate Affiliations 
 
Big Four 
 
indicator variable, 1=Big-four public accounting 
firm is the paid preparer of the NNP disclosure for 
firm i in year t.  
Multistate Tax Commission 
  
NumofEnt   the number of entities for firm i in year t.   Corporate Affiliations 
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Table 3: Continued 
 
Variable Definition Source 
SCjit-1 Amnesty 
 indicator variable, 1=state x had an amnesty 
program in year t-1. 
 
Federation of Tax Administrators 
 
VCI  
 indicator variable, 1=state x had a voluntary 
compliance initiative in year t-1. 
 
CCH Tax Research Network 
 
Nexus 
 indicator variable, 1=significant economic 
presence standard followed for nexus in state x for 
year t-1. 
 
State Codes / State Case Law 
 
CombReport  indicator variable, 1=combined reporting required for state x in year t-1. 
 
CCH State Tax Handbooks 
 
Addbacks 
 indicator variable, 1=state x has an addback 
provision for related party interest and/or royalty 
expenses for year t-1. 
 
CCH State Tax Handbooks 
 
Throwback 
 indicator variable, 1=state x has a throwback rule 
for year t-1. 
 
CCH State Tax Handbooks 
 
SalesApport1 
 indicator variable, 1=state i has a sales factor 
weight between 0 and 33 for year t-1. 
 
CCH State Tax Handbooks 
 
SalesApport2  indicator variable, 1=state i has a sales factor 
weight between 34 and 66 for year t-1. 
 
CCH State Tax Handbooks 
 
SalesApport3  indicator variable, 1=state i has a sales factor 
weight between 67 and 100 for year t-1. 
 
CCH State Tax Handbooks 
 
AuditProb the estimated general fund (in millions) in state x for year t-1.  
National Association of State 
Budget Officers 
 
SOL   the assessment period in years in state x for year t-1. 
 CCH State Tax Handbooks 
 
UnderpmtIntRate  the underpayment interest rate in state x for year t-1. 
 CCH State Tax Handbooks 
  108
Table 3: Continued 
 
 
Variable Definition Source 
 
CIT Rate  highest marginal corporate tax rate for state x in year t-1. 
 CCH State Tax Handbooks 
  SSTM 
  indicator variable, 1=state x is a full member for 
year t-1. 
  Streamlined Sales Tax Governing 
Board, Inc. 
 
CorpRev 
 the corporate tax revenues (in millions) in state i 
for year t-1. 
 World Tax Database and  
U.S. Census Bureau. 
  Employment   the number of non-farm employees (in millions) in state i in year t-1. 
  
Bureau of Labor Statistics 
tt
n
 
  the linear and non-linear numeric representation 
of year t from 1 to four.   
θi   state fixed effects. 
  
 
 
Panel B:  Definitions for Firm Size used in Sensitivity Tests 
 Variable Definition Source 
fsxt-1 Sales  the amount of sales revenue (in thousands) for firm i in year t-1. 
 Compustat 
 
Assets  the amount of total assets for firm (in thousands) i in year t-1. 
 Compustat 
 
NI  the amount of net income for firm (in thousands)i in year t-1. 
 Compustat 
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Table 3: Continued 
 
 
Panel C:  Definitions for Tax Aggressiveness used in Sensitivity Tests 
 Variable Definition Source 
taxt-1 ETR  
 
the effective tax rate (total tax expense divided by 
pre-tax book income less special items) for firm i in 
year t-1. 
 
Compustat 
 
CETR 
 
the cash effective tax rate (cash taxes paid divided 
by pre-tax book income less special items) for firm i 
in year t-1. 
 
Compustat 
 
BTD 
 
the book-tax differences (pre-tax book income less 
taxable income – taxable income is current federal 
tax expense divided by the federal statutory tax rate) 
for firm i in year t-1. 
 
Compustat 
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Table 4: General Statistics about the NNP83 
 
Types of Taxes Involved in Disclosure:84 
Firms Percentage Cases Percentage 
   Income Tax 398 42.89%               3,339  37.19% 
   Sales & Use Tax 508 54.74%               5,538  61.68% 
   Other Taxes 22 2.37%                  102  1.14% 
   Total 928 100.00%               8,979  100.00% 
Of the Agreements with No Effective Date:  Income Tax  Sales & Use Tax 
Cases Percentage Cases Percentage 
   Withdrawn / By Default               523  26.20%                  846  23.86% 
   Pending               629  31.51%                  695  19.60% 
   Stale               145  7.26%                  366  10.32% 
   Rejected                 46  2.30%                    85  2.40% 
   Total            1,343  67.28%               1,992  56.18% 
Of the Effective Agreements:85  Income Tax  Sales & Use Tax 
Cases Percentage Cases Percentage 
   Accepted            1,937  97.04%               3,399  95.85% 
   Rejected                 35  1.75%                    83  2.34% 
   Stale                 19  0.95%                    59  1.66% 
   Withdrawn / By Default / Pending                   5  0.25%                      5  0.14% 
   Total            1,996  100.00%               3,546  100.00% 
                                                 
83
 Data is based on a case.  A case is comprised of a unique taxpayer disclosing prior liabilities in a particular state for income, sales and use, or other 
taxes.  These calculations are based on the 18 year history of the NNP beginning in 1991 through 2008. 
84
 Cases for which no offer date is established are dropped (243 observations). 
85
 For the cases that do not become accepted, no taxpayer identity is revealed to the MTC. 
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Table 4: Continued 
 
Average Data Across All Types of Taxes (Effective Agreements Only): 
 Income Tax  Sales & Use Tax 
   Days between Offer Date and Effective Date 281.23  266.75  
   Number of States per Firm  6.86 states  9.74 states 
   Tax Collections by State by Year  $     43,578.11   $      161,347.70  
   Tax Collections by Case  $     35,858.97   $        98,410.19  
   Tax Collections by Year  $     45,707.64   $      111,140.40  
   Member Fee by State by Year across both taxes 
 
$15,529.84  
Analysis of Income Tax Disclosures: 
 Firms   Cases  
Income Tax Firms                   398  3,339  
Duplicate Firms                     (4) (31) 
Firms with no EIN from MTC                 (108) (713) 
Firms with no match in EINFinder or CorpAffil                   (79) (234) 
Total Firms                   207  2,361  
Internationally-Traded Firms                     26  738 
Publicly-Traded Firms                     48  456 
Privately-Held Firms                   133  1167 
Total Firms                   207  2,361  
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for State Corporate Tax Revenue Model 
 
 
 Panel A: 1974  (n=45 states) Panel B: 1991  (n=45 states) 
 
 Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
 
Rit Tax Revenues 133.627 208.563 8.024 1,046.031 451.518 732.180 27.387 4,440.479 
GSPit GSP 25.676 29.699 2.252 137.378 100.930 125.276 9.502 701.882 
Rit / GSPit Tax Revenues / GSP 4.528 1.842 0.477 8.289 4.288 2.175 1.733 14.348 
et Establish of NNP 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
nit NNP - Permanent 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.422 0.499 0.000 1.000 
jit NNP - Transitory 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.422 0.499 0.000 1.000 
Tkit-1 Amnesty 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 VCI  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Nexus 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 CombReport 0.222 0.420 0.000 1.000 0.289 0.458 0.000 1.000 
 Addbacks 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.149 0.000 1.000 
 Throwback 0.489 0.506 0.000 1.000 0.533 0.505 0.000 1.000 
 SalesApport1 0.978 0.149 0.000 1.000 0.622 0.490 0.000 1.000 
 SalesApport2 0.022 0.149 0.000 1.000 0.289 0.458 0.000 1.000 
 SalesApport3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.089 0.288 0.000 1.000 
 PIT Rate 7.436 4.531 0.000 19.800 6.296 2.941 0.000 12.000 
 CIT Rate 
  6.650 1.831 2.750 12.000   7.629 1.875 2.350 12.250 
Clit-1 Employment 1.599 1.710 0.128 7.210 2.161 2.282 0.243 12.400 
 Wages 15.500 18.200 1.340 83.300 55.800 67.500 5.120 370.000 
 Energy 2.978 0.542 1.753 4.110 8.446 1.393 5.583 11.509 
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Table 5: Continued 
 
 Panel C: 2007  (n=45 states) 
 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
 
Rit Tax Revenues 1,175.577 1,818.044 83.362 11,157.900 
GSPit GSP 234.093 282.884 21.249 1,596.044 
Rit / GSPit Tax Revenues / GSP 5.181 3.236 1.944 22.045 
et Establish of NNP 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
nit NNP - Permanent 0.756 0.435 0.000 1.000 
jit NNP - Transitory 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Tkit-1 Amnesty 0.022 0.149 0.000 1.000 
 VCI  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Nexus 0.222 0.420 0.000 1.000 
 CombReport 0.400 0.495 0.000 1.000 
 Addbacks 0.400 0.495 0.000 1.000 
 Throwback 0.511 0.506 0.000 1.000 
 SalesApport1 0.356 0.484 0.000 1.000 
 SalesApport2 0.511 0.506 0.000 1.000 
 SalesApport3 0.133 0.344 0.000 1.000 
 PIT Rate 6.003 2.663 0.000 12.000 
 CIT Rate 7.375 1.733 1.900 12.000 
Clit-1 Employment 2.697 2.751 0.308 15.200 
 Wages 124.000 148.000 11.700 821.000 
 Energy 18.465 2.831 13.216 25.195 
 
 
          
  114
Table 6: Correlation Matrix for State Corporate Tax Revenue Model86 
 
 
Variable 
lnTaxRev 
/ GSP 
Establish 
of NNP 
NNP - 
Permanent 
NNP - 
Transitory Amnesty VCI  Nexus 
Comb 
Report 
Add- 
backs 
lnTaxRev / GSP 1.000 
Establish of NNP -0.171 1.000 
NNP - Permanent -0.180 0.726 1.000 
NNP - Transitory -0.013 0.157 0.216 1.000 
Amnesty -0.074 0.040 0.046 -0.035 1.000 
VCI  -0.012 0.102 0.086 -0.015 0.037 1.000 
Nexus -0.006 0.205 0.257 -0.031 -0.002 0.056 1.000 
CombReport 0.073 0.099 0.196 0.026 -0.027 0.021 0.132 1.000 
Addbacks -0.080 0.262 0.232 -0.020 0.052 0.141 0.045 -0.146 1.000 
Throwback 0.035 0.019 0.052 0.014 -0.030 -0.050 -0.008 0.396 -0.112 
SalesApport1 -0.028 -0.502 -0.402 -0.039 -0.088 -0.109 -0.121 0.038 -0.294 
SalesApport2 -0.032 0.380 0.260 0.026 0.101 0.071 -0.043 -0.108 0.286 
SalesApport3 0.045 0.255 0.275 0.025 -0.010 0.084 0.273 0.127 0.048 
PIT Rate -0.016 -0.146 -0.055 -0.001 0.000 0.002 0.047 0.132 -0.042 
CIT Rate -0.028 0.002 -0.048 0.026 0.040 0.022 0.002 0.086 -0.046 
lnEmployment -0.095 0.144 0.061 -0.008 0.057 0.106 -0.062 -0.084 0.156 
lnWages 0.262 0.336 0.208 -0.003 0.083 0.181 0.000 -0.009 0.266 
lnEnergy -0.049 0.610 0.507 0.012 0.086 0.181 0.223 0.085 0.384 
  
                                                 
86
 Correlation matrix includes 1,620 observations for 45 states over 36 years (1973-2008). 
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Table 6: Continued 
 
 
Variable 
Throw 
back 
Sales 
Apport1 
Sales 
Apport2 
Sales 
Apport3 
PIT 
Rate 
CIT 
Rate 
lnEmploy- 
ment lnWages lnEnergy 
Throwback 1.000 
SalesApport1 0.163 1.000 
SalesApport2 -0.108 -0.817 1.000 
SalesApport3 -0.120 -0.415 -0.185 1.000 
PIT Rate 0.111 0.144 -0.082 -0.115 1.000 
CIT Rate -0.138 -0.076 0.235 -0.241 0.303 1.000 
lnEmployment -0.158 -0.336 0.329 0.053 -0.119 0.060 1.000 
lnWages -0.113 -0.429 0.375 0.140 -0.124 0.014 0.899 1.000 
lnEnergy -0.015 -0.471 0.308 0.317 -0.223 -0.102 0.195 0.407 1.000 
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Table 7: State Corporate Tax Revenue Model 
 
Variable   Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard 
Error t-stat p-value 
eit Establish of NNP -0.198 0.047 -4.240 0.000 *** 
nit NNP - Permanent -0.124 0.025 -4.950 0.000 *** 
jit NNP - Transitory 
  0.087 0.038 2.310 0.021 ** 
 
 
Tjit-1 Amnesty -0.012 0.028 -0.420 0.672 
 
VCI  0.146 0.066 2.230 0.026 ** 
 
Nexus -0.046 0.057 -0.810 0.417 
 
CombReport 0.095 0.055 1.740 0.082 * 
 
Addbacks 0.005 0.037 0.130 0.897 
 
Throwback 0.118 0.034 3.520 0.000 *** 
 
SalesApport2 0.137 0.024 5.630 0.000 *** 
 
SalesApport3 0.113 0.037 3.020 0.003 *** 
 
PIT Rate -0.014 0.005 -2.590 0.010 ** 
  CIT Rate 
  0.056 0.012 4.870 0.000 *** 
  ln Clit-1 ln Employment 1.586 0.180 8.810 0.000 *** 
ln Wages 
-1.509 0.167 -9.050 0.000 *** 
  
ln Energy 
  -0.247 0.092 -2.690 0.007 *** 
 
Intercept 5.534 2.314 2.390 0.017 ** 
Rho 
 
0.726 
R2 
 
0.360 
n 
 
1,620 
 
Regression contains state fixed effects and an eighth order polynomial time trend.     
Dependent variable is the natural log of the ratio corporate tax revenues to gross state product. 
Regression uses 45 states over 36 years (1973-2008). 
***, **, * represent statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.10, respectively. 
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Table 8: State Corporate Tax Revenue Model, Time Fixed Effects 
 
Variable Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard 
Error t-stat p-value 
nit NNP - Permanent -0.122 0.025 -4.960 0.000 *** 
jit NNP - Transitory 
  0.067 0.037 1.790 0.073 * 
 
 
Tjit-1 Amnesty 0.017 0.027 0.640 0.523 
 
VCI  0.088 0.071 1.240 0.214 
 
Nexus -0.052 0.053 -0.970 0.330 
 
CombReport 0.116 0.053 2.200 0.028 ** 
 
Addbacks 0.019 0.037 0.510 0.607 
 
Throwback 0.124 0.033 3.700 0.000 *** 
 
SalesApport2 0.140 0.024 5.820 0.000 *** 
 
SalesApport3 0.117 0.036 3.260 0.001 *** 
 
PIT Rate -0.014 0.005 -2.640 0.008 *** 
  CIT Rate 
  0.061 0.011 5.460 0.000 *** 
  ln Clit-1 ln Employment 1.528 0.184 8.300 0.000 *** 
ln Wages 
-1.498 0.167 -8.980 0.000 *** 
  
ln Energy 
  -0.161 0.119 -1.350 0.177 
 
Intercept 7.230 2.280 3.170 0.002 *** 
Rho 
 
0.732 
R2 
 
0.400 
n 
 
1,620 
 
Regression contains fixed effects for states and years.         
Dependent variable is the natural log of the ratio of corporate tax revenues to gross state product. 
Regression uses 45 states over 36 years (1973-2008). 
***, **, * represent statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.10, respectively. 
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Table 9: State Corporate Tax Revenue Model, Establishment Variable Analysis 
 
Variable 
Initial 
Year   Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard 
Error t-stat p-value 
Main Model Analysis: 
eit Establish of NNP 1991 
  -0.198 0.047 -4.240 0.000 *** 
 
  
Additional Analyses: 
 
eit Establish of NNP 1990 -0.222 0.044 -5.070 0.000 *** 
eit Establish of NNP 1989 0.026 0.043 0.610 0.542 
eit Establish of NNP 1988 0.085 0.041 2.100 0.036 ** 
eit Establish of NNP 1987 0.105 0.041 2.590 0.010 ** 
eit Establish of NNP 1986 
  0.152 0.040 3.750 0.000 *** 
  
Regressions all contain fixed effects for states and an eighth order polynomial time trend.       
Initial year refers to the year in which the establishment variable begins being defined as one. 
Dependent variable is the natural log of the ratio of corporate tax revenues to gross state product. 
Regressions use 45 states over 36 years (1973-2008). 
***, **, * represent statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.10, respectively. 
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Table 10: Descriptive Statistics for Aggregated State Models for FIN 48 Analysis  
 
 
 Panel A: 1995  (n=26 states) 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
Fit NNPNum 2.500 1.100 1.000 5.000 
Dit NNPDol 
  404,226 571,891 525 2,127,200   
GSPit GSP 118.851 159.372 11.995 798.832 
Fit / GSPit NNPNum / GSP 0.044 0.029 0.007 0.128 
Dit / GSPit NNPDol / GSP 6,465.947 7,783.350 4.785 24,938.600 
st Fin 48 - 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Fin 48 - 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Fin 48 - 3 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Tjit-1 Amnesty 0.077 0.272 0.000 1.000 
 
VCI  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Nexus 0.038 0.196 0.000 1.000 
 
CombReport 0.500 0.510 0.000 1.000 
 
Addbacks 0.038 0.196 0.000 1.000 
 
Throwback 0.615 0.496 0.000 1.000 
 
SalesApport1 0.385 0.496 0.000 1.000 
 
SalesApport2 0.462 0.508 0.000 1.000 
 
SalesApport3 0.154 0.368 0.000 1.000 
 
AuditProb 188.385 245.212 -3.000 898.000 
 
SOL  3.519 0.700 3.000 5.000 
 
UnderpmtIntRate 10.000 2.093 7.000 15.000 
 
CIT Rate 7.390 2.000 2.300 10.500 
  SSTM 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ckit-1 CorpRev 606.000 1,140.000 47.300 5,750.000 
Employment 2.217 2.553 0.302 12.400 
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Table 10: Continued 
 
Panel B: 2001  (n=35 states) 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
Fit NNPNum 5.829 2.514 2.000 11.000 
Dit NNPDol 91,038 99,942 0.000 338,058 
GSPit GSP 153.816 203.028 15.567 1,155.223 
Fit / GSPit NNPNum / GSP 0.075 0.051 0.003 0.225 
Dit / GSPit NNPDol / GSP 710.061 605.990 0.000 2,389.412 
st Fin 48 - 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Fin 48 - 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Fin 48 - 3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Tjit-1 Amnesty 0.200 0.406 0.000 1.000 
 
VCI  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Nexus 0.114 0.323 0.000 1.000 
 
CombReport 0.429 0.502 0.000 1.000 
 
Addbacks 0.143 0.355 0.000 1.000 
 
Throwback 0.571 0.502 0.000 1.000 
 
SalesApport1 0.371 0.490 0.000 1.000 
 
SalesApport2 0.514 0.507 0.000 1.000 
 
SalesApport3 0.114 0.323 0.000 1.000 
 
AuditProb 348.400 1,104.866 0.000 6,557.000 
 
SOL  3.243 0.427 3.000 4.000 
 
UnderpmtIntRate 10.289 2.243 7.000 15.000 
 
CIT Rate 7.511 1.876 2.000 12.000 
  SSTM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ckit-1 CorpRev 624.000 1,180.000 60.500 6,900.000 
Employment 2.338 2.644 0.289 14.600 
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Table 10: Continued 
 
 
 
Panel C: 2007  (n=34 states) 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
Fit NNPNum 9.412 3.183 2.000 16.000 
Dit NNPDol 122,065 142,285 1,039 597,125 
GSPit GSP 215.840 280.262 21.249 1,596.044 
Fit / GSPit NNPNum / GSP 0.091 0.083 0.006 0.380 
Dit / GSPit NNPDol / GSP 688.485 511.215 27.178 2,035.296 
st Fin 48 - 1 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
 
Fin 48 - 2 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
  Fin 48 - 3 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Tjit-1 Amnesty 0.029 0.171 0.000 1.000 
 
VCI  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Nexus 0.235 0.431 0.000 1.000 
 
CombReport 0.412 0.500 0.000 1.000 
 
Addbacks 0.353 0.485 0.000 1.000 
 
Throwback 0.500 0.508 0.000 1.000 
 
SalesApport1 0.382 0.493 0.000 1.000 
 
SalesApport2 0.500 0.508 0.000 1.000 
 
SalesApport3 0.118 0.327 0.000 1.000 
 
AuditProb 680.206 844.645 0.000 3,198.000 
 
SOL  3.309 0.522 3.000 5.000 
 
UnderpmtIntRate 9.916 2.567 7.000 18.000 
 
CIT Rate 7.290 1.817 1.900 12.000 
  SSTM 0.382 0.493 0.000 1.000 
Ckit-1 CorpRev 1,100.000 1,900.000 83.400 11,200.000 
Employment 2.537 2.767 0.308 15.200 
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Table 11: Correlation Matrix for Aggregated State Models87 
 
Variable 
NNPNum 
/ GSP 
NNPDol 
/ GSP 
Fin 48  
- 1 
Fin 48  
- 2 
Fin 48  
- 3 Amnesty VCI  Nexus 
Comb 
Report 
Add- 
backs 
NNPNum / GSP 1.000 
NNPDol / GSP 0.180 1.000 
Fin 48 – 1 0.074 -0.034 1.000 
Fin 48 – 2 0.248 0.023 0.683 1.000 
Fin 48 – 3 0.319 -0.005 0.538 0.787 1.000 
Amnesty -0.013 -0.002 -0.044 -0.030 -0.024 1.000 
VCI  0.028 0.009 -0.040 0.059 0.176 0.040 1.000 
Nexus 0.232 0.038 0.121 0.148 0.150 -0.022 0.032 1.000 
CombReport 0.273 0.100 0.024 0.026 0.022 -0.050 0.014 0.167 1.000 
Addbacks -0.116 -0.036 0.205 0.276 0.309 0.050 0.116 -0.018 -0.269 1.000 
Throwback 0.214 0.029 -0.011 -0.016 -0.021 -0.047 -0.080 -0.018 0.470 -0.181 
SalesApport1 0.220 0.037 -0.011 -0.025 -0.028 -0.062 -0.083 -0.011 0.058 -0.237 
SalesApport2 -0.150 -0.010 0.029 0.034 0.046 0.092 0.034 -0.178 -0.162 0.236 
SalesApport3 -0.072 -0.032 -0.024 -0.013 -0.026 -0.042 0.074 0.251 0.165 -0.005 
AuditProb -0.182 -0.058 0.153 0.221 0.194 0.008 0.078 0.062 0.042 0.110 
SOL  -0.243 -0.006 -0.012 -0.017 -0.022 0.025 0.002 0.084 -0.017 0.060 
UnderpmtIntRate 0.043 0.072 0.050 0.026 -0.046 0.016 -0.122 0.077 -0.180 -0.119 
CIT Rate 0.106 0.067 0.040 0.063 0.081 0.056 0.020 0.012 0.074 -0.128 
SSTM 0.236 -0.040 0.235 0.312 0.382 -0.008 0.181 0.286 -0.008 0.165 
CorpRev -0.293 -0.077 0.092 0.115 0.112 0.033 0.128 -0.056 0.040 0.117 
Employment -0.438 -0.097 0.018 0.025 0.028 0.063 0.125 -0.132 -0.095 0.158 
                                                 
87
 Correlation matrix includes 455 observations conditional on states joining the NNP over 15 years (1994-2008). 
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Table 11: Continued 
 
Variable 
Throw- 
back 
Sales 
Apport1 
Sales 
Apport2 
Sales 
Apport3 
Audit 
Prob SOL  
Underpmt 
IntRate 
CIT  
Rate SSTM 
Corp 
Rev 
Employ- 
ment 
Throwback 1.000 
SalesApport1 0.284 1.000 
SalesApport2 -0.181 -0.711 1.000 
SalesApport3 -0.154 -0.349 -0.411 1.000 
AuditProb -0.094 -0.163 0.070 0.118 1.000 
SOL  -0.173 -0.231 0.094 0.174 0.052 1.000 
UnderpmtIntRate 0.014 0.187 -0.056 -0.168 -0.034 -0.160 1.000 
CIT Rate -0.079 0.035 0.279 -0.417 -0.025 0.009 0.025 1.000 
SSTM -0.093 -0.098 -0.087 0.243 0.027 0.068 -0.054 -0.157 1.000 
CorpRev -0.042 -0.289 0.216 0.087 0.481 0.244 -0.213 -0.003 0.013 1.000 
Employment -0.186 -0.349 0.314 0.033 0.420 0.300 -0.275 -0.018 -0.052 0.888 1.000 
 
 
  124
Table 12: Aggregated State Model, NNP Disclosure Count 
 
Fin 48 - 1 / 2007 Fin 48 - 2 / 2006-2007 Fin 48 - 3 / 2005-2007 
Variable Coefficient 
Robust 
Std. 
Error   Coefficient 
Robust 
Std. 
Error   Coefficient 
Robust 
Std. 
Error   
st Fin 48 
  -0.014 0.010     0.014 0.008 *   0.022 0.007 *** 
Tjit-1 Amnesty 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.009 0.006 
 
VCI  
-0.026 0.008 *** -0.028 0.010 *** -0.032 0.010 *** 
 
Nexus 0.002 0.009 0.004 0.009 0.003 0.009 
 
CombReport 0.006 0.046 0.004 0.047 0.007 0.046 
 
Addbacks 
-0.017 0.006 ** -0.016 0.007 ** -0.016 0.007 ** 
 
Throwback 
-0.003 0.007 -0.003 0.007 -0.003 0.007 
 
SalesApport2 
-0.007 0.008 -0.005 0.009 -0.005 0.009 
 
SalesApport3 
-0.012 0.015 -0.019 0.015 -0.018 0.015 
 
AuditProb 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
SOL  
-0.006 0.009 -0.007 0.009 -0.007 0.009 
 
UnderpmtIntRate 0.003 0.002 ** 0.003 0.001 * 0.003 0.001 ** 
 
CIT Rate 
-0.003 0.002 * -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002 
  SSTM 
  0.014 0.014     0.008 0.014     0.011 0.014   
Ckit-1 CorpRev 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
Employment 
  -0.028 0.013 **   -0.026 0.013 *   -0.025 0.013 * 
Intercept 
 
31.410 8.050 *** -22.241 7.145 *** -14.004 7.929 * 
Rho 
 
0.757 0.741 0.736 
R2 
 
0.366 0.367 0.372 
n 
 
455 455 455 
Regressions contain state fixed effects and a fourth order polynomial time trend.                   
Dependent variable is the number of NNP disclosures divided by gross state product by state by year. 
Regression uses states conditional on joining the NNP over 15 years (1994-2008). 
***, **, * represent statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.10, respectively.               
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Table 13: Aggregated State Model, NNP Disclosure Count with Time Fixed Effects 
 
Time Fixed Effects Years 2007-2005 Control 
Variable Coefficient 
Robust 
Std. 
Error   Coefficient 
Robust 
Std. 
Error   
Tjit-1 Amnesty 0.015 0.006 ** 0.019 0.007 *** 
 
VCI  
-0.031 0.010 *** -0.035 0.010 *** 
 
Nexus 0.002 0.009 0.015 0.009 
 
CombReport 0.018 0.046 0.015 0.043 
 
Addbacks 
-0.014 0.006 ** -0.001 0.006 
 
Throwback 
-0.003 0.006 -0.007 0.007 
 
SalesApport2 
-0.007 0.009 -0.010 0.008 
 
SalesApport3 
-0.015 0.015 -0.021 0.016 
 
AuditProb 0.000 0.000 * 0.000 0.000 
 
SOL  
-0.009 0.008 -0.013 0.009 
 
UnderpmtIntRate 0.003 0.001 ** -0.001 0.001 
 
CIT Rate 
-0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.001 
  SSTM 
  0.007 0.013   0.006 0.012 
Ckit-1 CorpRev 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
Employment 
  -0.028 0.014 **   -0.001 0.008 
Time 
Controls 
Time Fixed 
Effects 
          Included in Model 
year2007 0.032 0.009 *** 
year2006 0.075 0.013 *** 
year2005 0.050 0.007 *** 
Intercept 
 
0.129 0.053 ** 0.127 0.048 *** 
Rho 
 
0.785 0.640 
R2 
 
0.433 0.468 
n 
 
455 455     
Regressions contain fixed effects for states and time.         
Dependent variable is the number of NNP disclosures divided by gross state product by state by year. 
Regression uses states conditional on joining the NNP over 15 years (1994-2008). 
***, **, * represent statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.10, respectively.       
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Table 13: Continued 
 
 
Year 2007 Control Year 2006 Control   Year 2005 Control 
Variable Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Error   Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Error     Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Error   
Tjit-1 Amnesty 0.016 0.008 ** 0.019 0.008 ** 0.016 0.007 ** 
 
VCI  
-0.007 0.010 -0.015 0.012 -0.015 0.010 
 
Nexus 0.020 0.010 ** 0.020 0.009 ** 0.016 0.010 
 
CombReport 
-0.008 0.056 0.010 0.050 -0.001 0.052 
 
Addbacks 0.009 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.006 
 
Throwback 
-0.008 0.008 -0.009 0.007 -0.007 0.008 
 
SalesApport2 
-0.014 0.009 -0.012 0.008 -0.014 0.009 
 
SalesApport3 
-0.010 0.017 -0.011 0.015 -0.006 0.017 
 
AuditProb 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
SOL  
-0.018 0.010 * -0.016 0.009 * -0.018 0.010 * 
 
UnderpmtIntRate 
-0.005 0.001 *** -0.003 0.001 *** -0.003 0.001 ** 
 
CIT Rate 
-0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 
  SSTM 0.020 0.016   0.008 0.011   0.029 0.015 * 
Ckit-1 CorpRev 
-0.001 0.000 * -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
  
Employment 6.471 1.088 *   6.105 1.108   0.009 0.007 
Time Controls year2007 0.009 0.010 
year2006 0.058 0.013 *** 
year2005 0.033 0.007 *** 
Intercept 
 
0.168 0.056 *** 0.145 0.051 *** 0.152 0.055 *** 
Rho 
 
0.765 0.723 0.734 
R2 
 
0.156 0.224 0.156 
n   455       455       455     
 Regressions contain fixed effects for states and time. 
Dependent variable is the number of NNP disclosures divided by gross state product by state by year. 
Regression uses states conditional on joining the NNP over 15 years (1994-2008). 
***, **, * represent statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.10, respectively.             
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Table 14: Aggregated State Model, NNP Disclosure Count, Publicly-Traded Firms 
 
Fin 48 - 1 / 2007 Fin 48 - 2 / 2006-2007 Fin 48 - 3 / 2005-2007 
Variable Coefficient 
Robust 
Std. 
Error   Coefficient 
Robust 
Std. 
Error   Coefficient 
Robust 
Std. 
Error   
st Fin 48 
  0.011 0.005  **   0.015 0.006 **    -0.030 0.008 *** 
Tjit-1 Amnesty 0.008 0.006 0.009 0.006 0.010 0.005 * 
 
VCI  
-0.011 0.004 ** -0.006 0.005 -0.002 0.006 
 
Nexus 0.001 0.008 0.002 0.009 0.004 0.009 
 
CombReport 0.027 0.019 0.032 0.020 0.027 0.019 
 
Addbacks 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 
 
Throwback 0.001 0.006 -0.001 0.006 0.007 0.007 
 
SalesApport2 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.006 
 
SalesApport3 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.006 
 
AuditProb 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
SOL  0.011 0.009 0.013 0.011 0.015 0.008 * 
 
UnderpmtIntRate 
-0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 
CIT Rate 0.010 0.008 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.007 
  SSTM 
  -0.004 0.005     -0.006 0.005     -0.007 0.005   
Ckit-1 CorpRev 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
Employment 
  0.019 0.018     0.022 0.019     0.025 0.020   
Intercept 
 
142.188 61.941 ** 218.210 90.586 ** -125.905 54.099 ** 
Rho 
 
0.923 0.936 0.953 
R2 
 
0.302 0.305 0.401 
n 
 
143 143 143 
Regressions contain state fixed effects and a fourth order polynomial time trend.                 
Dependent variable is the number of NNP disclosures divided by gross state product by state by year for publicly-traded firms. 
Regression uses states conditional on joining the NNP over 15 years (1994-2008). 
***, **, * represent statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.10, respectively.               
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Table 15: Aggregated State Model, NNP Disclosure Count, Privately-Held Firms 
Fin 48 - 1 / 2007 Fin 48 - 2 / 2006-2007 Fin 48 - 3 / 2005-2007 
Variable Coefficient 
Robust 
Std. 
Error   Coefficient 
Robust 
Std. 
Error   Coefficient 
Robust 
Std. 
Error   
st Fin 48 
  -0.004 0.004     0.010 0.003 ***   0.009 0.004 ** 
Tjit-1 Amnesty 
-0.005 0.003 * -0.004 0.002 ** -0.004 0.002 * 
 
VCI  
-0.007 0.005 -0.007 0.006 -0.009 0.005 * 
 
Nexus 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.004 
 
CombReport 0.032 0.020 0.033 0.014 ** 0.030 0.016 * 
 
Addbacks 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003 
 
Throwback 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.005 
 
SalesApport2 
-0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.003 
 
SalesApport3 
-0.009 0.007 -0.014 0.005 *** -0.013 0.006 ** 
 
AuditProb 0.000 0.000 * 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
SOL  0.003 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.004 
 
UnderpmtIntRate 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 
CIT Rate 
-0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
  SSTM 
  0.007 0.005     0.003 0.005     0.006 0.005   
Ckit-1 CorpRev 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
Employment 
  0.007 0.007     0.002 0.007     0.003 0.007   
Intercept 
 
-5.641 4.188 2.857 3.531 3.175 4.440 
Rho 
 
0.809 0.649 0.674 
R2 
 
0.131 0.156 0.141 
n 
 
318 318 318 
Regressions contain state fixed effects and a fourth order polynomial time trend.                 
Dependent variable is the number of NNP disclosures divided by gross state product by state by year for privately-held firms. 
Regression uses states conditional on joining the NNP over 15 years (1994-2008). 
***, **, * represent statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.10, respectively.               
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Table 16: Aggregated State Model, NNP Disclosure Amount 
 
Fin 48 - 1 / 2007 Fin 48 - 2 / 2006-2007 Fin 48 - 3 / 2005-2007 
Variable Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Error   Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Error   Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Error   
st Fin 48 
  -508.474 574.270     465.696 801.954     -154.362 544.556   
Tjit-1 Amnesty 
-249.306 225.828 -215.221 225.216 -264.735 219.504 
 
VCI  
-511.150 413.499 -581.897 442.663 -503.076 471.417 
 
Nexus 230.048 849.650 296.190 892.106 254.226 863.116 
 
CombReport 2,107.956 1,022.850 ** 2,026.273 959.999 ** 1,981.005 974.416 ** 
 
Addbacks 387.339 497.437 396.957 491.083 384.363 489.354 
 
Throwback 
-449.625 538.751 -456.138 544.476 -448.391 537.926 
 
SalesApport2 
-667.343 1073.277 -626.909 1,090.583 -660.816 1,080.730 
 
SalesApport3 
-1272.124 968.201 -1,511.906 1,017.251 -1,385.839 984.141 
 
AuditProb 
-0.056 0.098 -0.100 0.096 -0.071 0.094 
 
SOL  
-493.237 726.892 -504.962 735.732 -495.333 741.614 
 
UnderpmtIntRate 301.854 194.133 279.226 179.828 291.959 184.783 
 
CIT Rate 70.774 68.704 78.771 65.547 69.911 67.156 
  SSTM 
  158.093 405.589   -31.138 616.542   129.805 448.889 
Ckit-1 CorpRev 0.068 0.183 0.023 0.193 0.054 0.182 
  
Employment 
  -216.603 1,126.168   -149.157 1,076.907     -184.767 1085.204   
Intercept 
 
-649,520.000 825,141.200 -341,985.200 638,426.200 -667,873.200 754,637.900 
Rho 
 
0.166 0.151 0.154 
R2 
 
0.167 0.167 0.164 
n 
 
455 455 455 
Regressions contain state fixed effects and a fourth order polynomial time trend.                   
Dependent variable is the dollar amount of NNP disclosures divided by gross state product by state by year. 
Regression uses states conditional on joining the NNP over 15 years (1994-2008). 
***, **, * represent statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.10, respectively.                   
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Table 17: Aggregated State Model, NNP Disclosure Amount with Time Fixed Effects 
 
 
Time Fixed Effects Years 2007-2005 Control 
Variable Coefficient 
Robust 
Std. Error   Coefficient 
Robust 
Std. Error   
Tjit-1 Amnesty 
-107.652 231.829 -96.934 241.756 
 
VCI  
-417.800 576.748 -314.154 613.976 
 
Nexus 225.293 821.956 -222.561 1,026.424 
 
CombReport 1,159.934 778.553 1,598.474 1,031.183 
 
Addbacks 274.735 458.695 347.567 369.214 
 
Throwback 
-391.716 411.017 -513.945 523.690 
 
SalesApport2 136.574 932.563 -1,067.659 1,061.756 
 
SalesApport3 
-531.540 838.447 -1,401.277 1,007.234 
 
AuditProb 
-0.050 0.087 -0.053 0.097 
 
SOL  
-713.666 806.254 -733.753 700.966 
 
UnderpmtIntRate 293.131 162.235 * 258.026 159.210 
 
CIT Rate 90.343 64.404 82.704 66.469 
  SSTM 
  -195.378 727.611     -437.882 593.695   
Ckit-1 CorpRev 0.096 0.236 0.235 0.247 
  
Employment 
  -886.940 1,091.521   -1,791.141 745.922 ** 
Time 
Controls 
Time Fixed 
Effects Included in Model 
year2007 263.385 387.664 
year2006 1,749.137 1,648.680 
year2005 376.372 597.798 
Intercept 
 
1,995.462 4,044.584 1,082,950.000 697,757.000 
Rho 
 
0.413 0.677 
R2 
 
0.188 0.130 
n 
 
455 455     
Regressions contain fixed effects for states and time.             
Dependent variable is the dollar amount of NNP disclosures divided by gross state product by state by year. 
Regression uses states conditional on joining the NNP over 15 years (1994-2008). 
***, **, * represent statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.10, respectively.         
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Table 17: Continued 
 
Year 2007 Control Year 2006 Control Year 2005 Control 
Variable Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Error   Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Error   Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Error   
Tjit-1 Amnesty 
-175.582 212.027 -97.810 236.637 -176.232 213.787 
 
VCI  136.701 396.811 -157.646 540.758 100.818 434.283 
 
Nexus 
-158.844 1,062.081 -172.596 1,046.621 -166.680 1,062.733 
 
CombReport 1,156.182 1,013.226 1,562.298 1,031.184 1,109.256 985.666 
 
Addbacks 511.838 362.533 412.698 372.392 483.787 335.469 
 
Throwback 
-515.751 512.175 -527.743 521.066 -510.966 512.445 
 
SalesApport2 
-1,145.313 1,023.668 -1,087.400 1,042.506 -1,133.883 1,022.382 
 
SalesApport3 
-1,141.538 1,053.770 -1,319.873 1,014.025 -1,216.560 1,065.410 
 
AuditProb 0.037 0.077 -0.033 0.085 0.026 0.071 
 
SOL  
-807.190 771.445 -745.741 707.386 -807.742 774.274 
 
UnderpmtIntRate 191.549 125.023 237.161 142.387 * 191.862 133.109 
 
CIT Rate 88.336 67.985 86.535 67.428 86.681 67.036 
  SSTM 39.455 284.673 -420.659 548.717   -4.688 305.171 
Ckit-1 CorpRev 0.187 0.250 0.224 0.257 0.177 0.238 
  
Employment 
-1,601.136 671.039 ** -1,726.980 728.304 ** -1,612.573 662.121 ** 
Time Controls year2007 -223.241 277.766 
year2006 1,612.246 1,530.867 
year2005 32.826 540.342 
Intercept 
 
5,294.430 3,960.273 4,727.790 3,625.888 5,356.408 4,070.542 
Rho 
 
0.618 0.660 0.623 
R2 
 
0.121 0.130 0.120 
n   455     455     455     
Regressions contain fixed effects for states and time. 
Dependent variable is the number of NNP disclosures divided by gross state product by state by year. 
Regression uses states conditional on joining the NNP over 15 years (1994-2008). 
***, **, * represent statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.10, respectively.           
  132
Table 18: Aggregated State Model, NNP Disclosure Amount, Publicly-Traded Firms 
Fin 48 - 1 / 2007 Fin 48 - 2 / 2006-2007 Fin 48 - 3 / 2005-2007 
Variable Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Error   Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Error   Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Error   
st Fin 48 
  -3,000.223 2,872.477     3,072.225 2,708.780     -1,745.364 2,062.881   
Tjit-1 Amnesty 
-52.749 418.426 -95.754 362.148 -71.781 354.731 
 
VCI  
-212.635 597.778 -100.791 761.643 -384.382 783.059 
 
Nexus 
-963.511 1,289.894 -521.462 1,009.147 -561.894 866.684 
 
CombReport 1,649.704 1,831.136 172.756 1,204.498 -71.837 902.133 
 
Addbacks 
-201.424 872.087 -247.269 823.144 -425.980 892.138 
 
Throwback 
-867.993 564.473 -278.604 663.949 133.949 931.906 
 
SalesApport2 
-100.342 592.554 39.136 547.495 198.760 500.231 
 
SalesApport3 
-745.742 1,573.702 -1,990.408 1,232.168 -1,913.141 1,282.515 
 
AuditProb 0.492 0.516 0.016 0.294 0.349 0.385 
 
SOL  
-1,439.193 2,039.017 -358.526 1,055.063 -737.865 1,483.576 
 
UnderpmtIntRate 41.076 208.427 -105.666 191.338 -22.630 167.271 
 
CIT Rate 31.864 267.934 -79.321 186.355 -68.754 188.021 
  SSTM 
  -139.828 882.049     -829.915 1,215.387 -514.088 994.476   
Ckit-1 CorpRev 
-0.344 0.947 -0.319 0.962 -0.443 0.918 
  
Employment 
  -3,133.770 3,512.797     931.826 2,440.927 -301.520 2,579.707   
Intercept 
 
-37,100,000 30,000,000 14,900,000 20,500,000 -26,500,000 23,600,000 
Rho 
 
0.661 0.328 0.231 
R2 
 
0.065 0.053 0.025 
n 
 
143 143 143 
Regressions contain state fixed effects and a fourth order polynomial time trend.                   
Dependent variable is the dollar amount of NNP disclosures divided by gross state product by state by year for publicly-traded firms. 
Regression uses states conditional on joining the NNP over 15 years (1994-2008). 
***, **, * represent statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.10, respectively.                 
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Table 19: Aggregated State Model, NNP Disclosure Amount, Privately-Held Firms 
Fin 48 - 1 / 2007 Fin 48 - 2 / 2006-2007 Fin 48 - 3 / 2005-2007 
Variable Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Error   Coefficient 
Robust 
Std. Error   Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Error   
st Fin 48 
  177.973 63.259  ***   112.240 49.903  **   176.952 61.754  *** 
Tjit-1 Amnesty 61.941 55.545 71.481 55.348 85.981 55.197 
 
VCI  
-8.247 52.578 -3.456 59.540 -33.638 57.541 
 
Nexus 173.132 142.648 175.029 146.688 162.715 147.442 
 
CombReport 203.974 278.387 336.201 272.017 309.640 280.808 
 
Addbacks 87.159 62.276 88.700 66.521 93.106 66.383 
 
Throwback 7.797 59.434 4.833 62.507 0.469 64.970 
 
SalesApport2 
-275.138 254.944 -278.748 251.215 -282.951 252.742 
 
SalesApport3 
-805.353 502.622 -768.890 497.998 -773.187 496.704 
 
AuditProb 
-0.019 0.028 -0.015 0.027 -0.022 0.028 
 
SOL  
-61.043 77.485 -61.594 78.579 -77.248 80.925 
 
UnderpmtIntRate 6.555 11.620 7.697 11.782 9.588 11.822 
 
CIT Rate 5.413 6.442 6.589 6.503 7.578 6.685 
  SSTM 
  16.775 96.500     -11.415 97.708     10.618 97.695   
Ckit-1 CorpRev 0.075 0.077 0.081 0.077 0.098 0.075 
  
Employment 
  -117.525 284.924     -134.490 284.406     -162.988 280.924   
Intercept 
 
246,591.700 57,993.180 *** 276,312.000 62,623.960 *** 354,605.700 71,440.700 *** 
Rho 
 
0.749 0.784 0.809 
R2 
 
0.195 0.179 0.187 
n 
 
318 318 318 
Regressions contain state fixed effects and a fourth order polynomial time trend.                 
Dependent variable is the dollar amount of NNP disclosures divided by gross state product by state by year for privately-held firms. 
Regression uses states conditional on joining the NNP over 15 years (1994-2008). 
***, **, * represent statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.10, respectively.                 
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Table 20: Descriptive Statistics for Case Model for FIN 48 Analysis 
 
Panel A: 2001  (n=29 cases) 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
CDixt Amount 
  17,705.520 27,633.220 0.000 104,231.000
st Fin 48 - 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Fin 48 - 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 Fin 48 - 3 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
fsit-1 Sales 7,785.771 7,044.389 65.736 23,454.000
Assets 7,366.368 5,214.801 336.666 12,486.000
 NI 
  1,326.949 1,045.040 15.852 2,224.000
tait-1 ETR 36.372 1.846 34.742 38.499
CETR 54.790 36.432 26.087 104.116
 BTD 
  568.357 -525.463 25.143 1,033.714
FClit NAICS 53.103 1.012 52.000 54.000
Big Four 0.552 0.506 0.000 1.000
 Number of Entities 
  54.483 39.540 1.000 84.000
SCjxt-1 Amnesty 0.138 0.351 0.000 1.000
VCI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Nexus 0.138 0.351 0.000 1.000
CombReport 0.517 0.509 0.000 1.000
Addbacks 0.034 0.186 0.000 1.000
Throwback 0.483 0.509 0.000 1.000
SalesApport1 0.448 0.506 0.000 1.000
SalesApport2 0.379 0.494 0.000 1.000
SalesApport3 0.172 0.384 0.000 1.000
AuditProb 151.345 223.840 0.000 1,108.000
SOL 3.086 0.270 3.000 4.000
UnderpmtIntRate 10.414 2.571 7.000 15.000
CIT Rate 7.929 1.533 5.000 12.000
SSTM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
CorpRev 260.452 250.358 60.499 1,211.584
Employment 1.246 0.909 0.289 3.894
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Table 20: Continued 
 
Panel B: 2004  (n=82 cases) 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
CDixt Amount 17,942.870 59,806.650 0.000 401,663.000 
st Fin 48 - 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Fin 48 - 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Fin 48 - 3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
fsit-1 Sales 11,652.410 19,735.300 59.989 47,348.000 
 
Assets 13,143.250 22,220.490 20.906 53,317.000 
  NI 2,039.111 3,576.369 2.243 8,509.000 
tait-1 ETR  28.552 5.529 23.549 38.514 
 
CETR 19.979 6.535 9.920 31.208 
  BTD 85.164 127.949 1.828 611.157 
FClit NAICS 41.427 13.639 32.000 72.000 
 
Big Four 0.488 0.503 0.000 1.000 
  Number of Entities 58.098 87.975 1.000 217.000 
SCjxt-1 Amnesty 0.110 0.315 0.000 1.000 
 
VCI  0.098 0.299 0.000 1.000 
 
Nexus 0.134 0.343 0.000 1.000 
 
CombReport 0.366 0.485 0.000 1.000 
 
Addbacks 0.256 0.439 0.000 1.000 
 
Throwback 0.476 0.502 0.000 1.000 
 
SalesApport1 0.378 0.488 0.000 1.000 
 
SalesApport2 0.500 0.503 0.000 1.000 
 
SalesApport3 0.122 0.329 0.000 1.000 
 
AuditProb 229.427 406.522 -270.000 1,638.000 
 
SOL  3.274 0.498 3.000 5.000 
 
UnderpmtIntRate 7.524 3.398 3.000 15.000 
 
CIT Rate 7.252 1.721 1.900 12.000 
 
SSTM 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
CorpRev 565.773 852.399 49.807 6,925.916 
 
Employment 2.433 2.165 0.304 14.533 
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Table 20: Continued 
 
Panel C: 2007  (n=62 cases) 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
CDixt Amount 14,699.000 20,699.750 0.000 86,970.000 
st Fin 48 - 1 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
 
Fin 48 - 2 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
  Fin 48 - 3 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
fsit-1 Sales 9,947.957 13,519.200 19.005 31,634.000 
 
Assets 41,488.730 67,135.090 12.622 149,830.000 
  NI 1,082.467 1,815.607 
-
72.112 4,012.000 
tait-1 ETR  12.926 -21.633 10.684 38.433 
 
CETR 9.194 -17.167 5.754 32.451 
  BTD 256.289 -444.291 56.288 971.714 
FClit NAICS 46.968 7.568 31.000 55.000 
 
Big Four 0.145 0.355 0.000 1.000 
  Number of Entities 15.597 9.446 2.000 29.000 
SCjxt-1 Amnesty 0.048 0.216 0.000 1.000 
 
VCI  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Nexus 0.226 0.422 0.000 1.000 
 
CombReport 0.306 0.465 0.000 1.000 
 
Addbacks 0.355 0.482 0.000 1.000 
 
Throwback 0.387 0.491 0.000 1.000 
 
SalesApport1 0.258 0.441 0.000 1.000 
 
SalesApport2 0.597 0.495 0.000 1.000 
 
SalesApport3 0.145 0.355 0.000 1.000 
 
AuditProb 597.726 696.454 0.000 2,742.000 
 
SOL  3.379 0.577 3.000 5.000 
 
UnderpmtIntRate 9.565 2.519 7.000 18.000 
 
CIT Rate 7.393 1.637 4.630 12.000 
 
SSTM 0.371 0.487 0.000 1.000 
 
CorpRev 876.584 675.074 83.362 2,876.591 
 
Employment 2.508 1.647 0.308 8.018 
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Table 21: Correlation Matrix for the Case-Level Model88 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
88
 Correlation matrix includes 345 cases over 15 years (1994-2008). 
Variable Amount 
Fin 48 
- 1 
Fin 48 
- 2 
Fin 48 
- 3 Sales Assets NI ETR  CETR BTD NAICS 
Big 
Four 
Amount 1.000 
Fin 48 - 1 -0.109 1.000 
Fin 48 - 2 -0.003 0.850 1.000 
Fin 48 - 3 -0.045 0.745 0.876 1.000 
Sales -0.012 0.031 -0.054 0.224 1.000 
Assets 0.032 0.332 0.248 0.257 0.633 1.000 
NI 0.040 -0.005 -0.089 0.018 0.888 0.668 1.000 
ETR  0.106 -0.211 -0.076 -0.157 -0.028 0.005 0.048 1.000 
CETR 0.087 -0.115 0.307 0.258 -0.094 -0.069 -0.088 0.423 1.000 
BTD -0.030 0.246 0.150 0.156 0.863 0.696 0.951 0.059 -0.071 1.000 
NAICS -0.034 0.383 0.370 0.418 0.168 0.199 0.032 0.091 0.010 0.502 1.000 
Big Four 0.135 -0.247 -0.141 -0.230 0.097 0.008 0.281 0.065 0.246 0.307 -0.210 1.000 
Number of Entities 0.049 -0.106 -0.143 -0.121 0.728 0.413 0.920 0.066 -0.015 0.832 -0.051 0.450 
Amnesty 0.077 -0.132 -0.159 -0.182 -0.068 -0.060 -0.037 0.037 -0.041 -0.052 -0.136 0.073 
VCI  -0.059 -0.097 -0.049 -0.041 0.074 0.005 0.102 0.056 0.089 0.001 -0.002 0.134 
Nexus 0.105 0.078 0.118 0.132 0.067 0.063 0.053 -0.005 0.126 0.004 0.024 0.037 
CombReport 0.075 -0.045 0.037 0.018 0.028 0.005 0.052 0.134 0.118 -0.011 -0.021 0.102 
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Table 21: Continued 
  
Variable Amount 
Fin 48 
- 1 
Fin 48 
- 2 
Fin 48 
- 3 Sales Assets NI ETR  CETR BTD NAICS 
Big 
Four 
Addbacks -0.071 0.174 0.152 0.151 0.006 0.068 -0.010 -0.183 -0.064 -0.010 0.060 -0.107 
Throwback 0.017 -0.060 -0.027 -0.007 0.063 0.021 0.058 0.106 0.089 -0.031 -0.035 0.022 
SalesApport1 0.044 -0.254 -0.205 -0.165 0.017 -0.031 0.009 0.046 0.051 -0.077 -0.131 0.038 
SalesApport2 0.003 -0.086 -0.104 -0.099 -0.059 -0.001 -0.045 -0.277 -0.080 -0.098 -0.099 -0.013 
SalesApport3 -0.053 0.393 0.360 0.308 0.052 0.036 0.044 0.279 0.037 0.197 0.268 -0.027 
AuditProb -0.061 0.258 0.259 0.246 -0.024 0.027 -0.043 -0.221 -0.074 0.015 0.111 -0.110 
SOL  -0.035 0.029 0.019 -0.004 -0.067 -0.020 -0.054 -0.059 -0.060 -0.054 -0.015 -0.045 
UnderpmtIntRate 0.054 0.039 0.072 0.092 -0.006 0.006 -0.036 0.035 0.097 0.042 0.050 -0.064 
CIT Rate 0.053 -0.436 -0.367 -0.289 -0.019 -0.024 -0.015 -0.297 0.031 -0.182 -0.296 0.040 
SSTM -0.034 0.389 0.433 0.475 0.094 0.237 0.020 -0.047 0.143 0.098 0.184 -0.131 
CorpRev -0.071 0.223 0.188 0.163 -0.077 -0.012 -0.095 -0.171 -0.122 -0.039 0.100 -0.107 
Employment -0.070 0.135 0.063 0.006 -0.114 -0.054 -0.099 -0.165 -0.219 -0.068 0.063 -0.111 
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Table 21: Continued 
 
Variable 
Number 
of 
Entities Amnesty VCI  Nexus 
Comb 
Report 
Add 
backs 
Throw 
back 
Sales 
Apport1 
Sales 
Apport2 
Sales 
Apport3 
Audit 
Prob 
Number of Entities 1.000 
Amnesty -0.006 1.000 
VCI  0.115 -0.070 1.000 
Nexus 0.041 0.046 -0.073 1.000 
CombReport 0.065 0.002 -0.073 0.113 1.000 
Addbacks -0.037 -0.097 0.064 -0.070 -0.385 1.000 
Throwback 0.047 0.052 -0.088 -0.029 0.438 -0.155 1.000 
SalesApport1 -0.001 0.036 -0.016 0.040 0.178 -0.330 0.427 1.000 
SalesApport2 -0.054 -0.014 0.031 -0.146 -0.326 0.335 -0.282 -0.638 1.000 
SalesApport3 0.067 -0.023 -0.023 0.131 0.233 -0.025 -0.199 -0.373 -0.476 1.000 
AuditProb -0.075 -0.150 -0.026 0.161 -0.019 0.153 -0.088 -0.170 0.095 0.080 1.000 
SOL  -0.063 -0.009 -0.036 0.168 -0.073 0.029 -0.220 -0.227 0.142 0.087 0.014 
UnderpmtIntRate -0.061 0.124 -0.127 0.211 -0.156 -0.129 -0.024 0.109 0.008 -0.134 0.012 
CIT Rate -0.028 0.082 -0.045 0.193 -0.025 -0.082 -0.100 0.052 0.352 -0.483 -0.017 
SSTM -0.079 0.001 0.027 0.237 -0.023 0.062 -0.120 -0.144 -0.049 0.223 0.067 
CorpRev -0.109 -0.141 0.163 -0.041 -0.155 0.329 -0.153 -0.281 0.177 0.108 0.517 
Employment -0.093 -0.122 0.159 -0.158 -0.290 0.298 -0.247 -0.322 0.260 0.055 0.488 
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Table 21: Continued 
 
 
 
Variable SOL  
Under 
pmt 
IntRate 
CIT 
Rate SSTM 
Corp 
Rev Employment 
SOL  1.000 
UnderpmtIntRate -0.139 1.000 
CIT Rate 0.113 0.079 1.000 
SSTM 0.069 0.022 -0.027 1.000 
CorpRev 0.242 -0.136 -0.103 0.040 1.000 
Employment 0.311 -0.206 -0.158 -0.086 0.827 1.000 
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Table 22: Case-Level Model using Assets and ETR 
 
  
Fin 48 - 1 / 2007 Fin 48 - 2 / 2006-2007 Fin 48 - 3 / 2005-2007 
Variable Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Error   Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Error   Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Error   
st Fin 48 
  -44,975.460 70,056.930     238,455.300 193,903.800     72,391.330 123,923.000   
fsit-1 Assets 
-0.573 5.107 4.322 4.631 9.905 7.473 
fsit-1*st FIN 48*Assets 
-0.024 4.700 -4.852 4.782 -10.051 7.682 
tait-1 ETR  153,565.400 133,161.900 -87,201.040 146,721.600 -27,620.540 135,259.100 
tait-1*st FIN 48*ETR 
  -169,630.100 143,436.100     62,651.290 134,872.000     11,219.110 133,016.300   
FClit NAICS 5,030.302 5,087.151 5,930.380 5,180.485 6,894.868 6,204.394 
 
Big Four 
-739.368 41,164.650 525.248 43,094.060 20,042.070 43,339.680 
  
NumofEnt 
  -73.417 1,048.362     -787.211 983.474     -1,920.822 1,591.338   
SCjxt-1 Amnesty 1,598.019 4,822.010 1,746.280 4,756.190 1,234.761 4,783.595 
 
VCI  
-33,224.830 13,629.520 ** -35,408.810 14,320.700 ** -30,551.850 12,185.820 ** 
 
Nexus 
-12,117.120 6,851.507 * -12,358.610 6,608.589 * -12,717.190 6,507.068 * 
 
CombReport 
-2,697.488 7,753.994 -3,144.593 7,834.756 -1,951.846 7,735.849 
 
Addbacks 
-10,732.070 5,439.161 ** -10,690.950 5,426.963 ** -10,828.360 5,488.341 ** 
 
Throwback 
-6,040.921 4,200.691 -6,001.612 4,217.566 -6,363.034 4,173.493 
 
SalesApport2 7,209.668 4,260.399 * 6,864.628 4,253.722 7,036.408 4,250.490 * 
 
SalesApport3 9,634.229 7,819.165 9,148.015 7,880.597 9,224.954 7,830.347 
 
AuditProb 3.753 2.357 3.804 2.366 3.724 2.349 
 
SOL  
-1,541.060 3,798.250 -1,675.264 3,858.906 -1,253.915 3,735.433 
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Table 22: Continued 
 
 
 
  
Fin 48 - 1 / 2007 Fin 48 - 2 / 2006-2007 Fin 48 - 3 / 2005-2007 
Variable Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Error   Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Error   Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Error   
 
UnderpmtIntRate 225.371 1,063.869 213.378 1,066.207 259.626 1,061.811 
 
CIT Rate 
-704.352 1,566.664 -630.021 1,544.057 -713.625 1,566.569 
 
SSTM 13,015.690 9,080.994 12,672.370 9,190.673 12,429.070 9,336.878 
 
CorpRev 
-3.825 3.898 -3.695 3.918 -4.191 3.942 
  
Employment 
  2,657.140 2,528.964     2,663.531 2,532.472     2,771.582 2,527.908   
Intercept 
 
53,300,000 41,400,000 34,700,000 29,000,000 38,300,000 33,300,000 
Rho 
 
0.855 0.848 0.858 
R2 
 
0.198 0.266 0.194 
n 
 
345 345 345 
Regressions contain state fixed effects and a fourth order polynomial time trend.                   
Dependent variable is the dollar amount of NNP disclosures by firm by state by year. 
Regression uses states conditional on joining the NNP over 15 years (1994-2008). 
***, **, * represent statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.10, respectively.                   
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Table 23: Case-Level Model using Assets and CETR 
  
Fin 48 - 1 / 2007 Fin 48 - 2 / 2006-2007 Fin 48 - 3 / 2005-2007 
Variable Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Error   Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Error   Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Error   
st Fin 48 
  -65,165.470 79,033.340     176,853.700 156,377.600     86,491.170 126,824.400   
fsit-1 Assets 
-3.860 7.000 10.058 9.584 24.260 16.690 
fsit-1*st FIN 48*Assets 
-0.128 3.604 -7.434 6.849 -17.808 12.509 
tait-1 CETR 12,948.300 25,041.620 -3,301.475 10,998.960 -4,020.360 11,306.820 
tait-1*st FIN 48*CETR 
  -106,408.900 88,917.040     95,672.860 97,732.280     136,437.900 116,445.900   
FClit NAICS 5,774.531 5,841.586 4,718.062 4,754.798 5,711.288 5,437.122 
 
Big Four 
-18,325.570 47,025.950 35,365.520 47,963.850 57,821.850 60,673.940 
  
NumofEnt 
  829.771 1,577.116     -2,291.620 2,141.121     -5,139.750 3,615.931   
SCjxt-1 Amnesty 1,294.985 5,215.850 1,662.534 5,219.412 1,439.665 5,197.291 
 
VCI  
-33,409.980 18,108.280 * -34,079.790 17,517.130 * -30,380.200 15,536.960 * 
 
Nexus 
-13,308.600 6,611.834 ** -12,771.010 6,848.766 * -13,585.160 6,408.725 ** 
 
CombReport 
-2,042.997 8,276.798 -2,686.321 8,299.351 -2,172.568 8,234.563 
 
Addbacks 
-11,419.230 5,404.688 ** -11,399.580 5,376.645 ** -11,558.910 5,400.757 ** 
 
Throwback 
-5,575.418 4,389.460 -5,268.543 4,407.242 -5,594.107 4,378.328 
 
SalesApport2 7,325.978 4,298.911 * 7,657.603 4,302.100 * 7,637.409 4,280.544 * 
 
SalesApport3 11,499.940 8,131.403 12,007.660 8,121.527 11,954.800 8,112.180 
 
AuditProb 2.755 2.238 2.769 2.296 2.747 2.277 
 
SOL  
-1,774.137 3,714.388 -2,000.215 3,776.509 -1,667.068 3,681.303 
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Table 23: Continued 
 
Fin 48 - 1 / 2007 Fin 48 - 2 / 2006-2007 Fin 48 - 3 / 2005-2007 
Variable Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Error   Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Error   Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Error   
 
UnderpmtIntRate 350.938 1,175.885 277.413 1,178.357 298.508 1,174.418 
 
CIT Rate 
-817.912 1,632.311 -806.781 1,620.708 -809.982 1,623.572 
 
SSTM 16,758.140 9,902.564 * 17,094.830 9,963.921 * 17,230.630 10,046.830 * 
 
CorpRev 
-3.908 4.280 -3.593 4.267 -3.853 4.262 
  
Employment 
  2,386.645 2,637.301     2,242.593 2,634.794     2,296.994 2,616.229   
Intercept 
 
38,200,000 32,000,000 24,400,000 23,600,000 16,200,000 28,600,000 
Rho 
 
0.893 0.890 0.906 
R2 
 
0.207 0.251 0.247 
n 
 
327 327 327 
Regressions contain state fixed effects and a fourth order polynomial time trend.                   
Dependent variable is the dollar amount of NNP disclosures by firm by state by year. 
Regression uses states conditional on joining the NNP over 15 years (1994-2008). 
***, **, * represent statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.10, respectively.                   
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Table 24: Case-Level Model using Assets and BTD 
 
 
Fin 48 - 1 / 2007 Fin 48 - 2 / 2006-2007 Fin 48 – 3 / 2005-2007 
Variable Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Error   Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Error   Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Error   
st Fin 48 
  -39,052.900 54,143.200     191,235.600 213,495.300     -1,999.976 150,696.400   
fsit-1 Assets 16.070 10.437 17.868 14.399 20.775 13.970 
fsit-1*st FIN 48*Assets 
-70.148 47.133 1.275 19.435 -18.105 13.645 
tait-1 BTD 
-7.365 49.475 -86.649 103.646 -69.911 73.505 
tait-1*st FIN 48*BTD 
  3,581.826 2,619.391     -1,167.752 1,242.285     -97.046 397.795   
FClit NAICS 7,790.145 7,035.291 8,194.478 6,932.509 8,389.100 7,474.817 
 
Big Four 4,753.596 45,918.640 72,167.120 76,274.340 54,825.950 51,800.740 
  
NumofEnt 
  -2,511.395 1,770.209     -2,593.680 2,030.158     -2,729.300 1,940.500   
SCjxt-1 Amnesty 
-2,561.153 5,497.118 -2,641.701 5,494.124 -2,595.655 5,492.587 
 
VCI  
-26,826.200 11,699.310 ** -23,691.200 9,096.159 *** -24,555.130 10,278.060 ** 
 
Nexus 
-13,658.170 5,445.107 ** -14,018.340 5,225.845 *** -14,053.060 5,321.771 *** 
 
CombReport 7,021.759 5,504.758 7,042.560 5,492.455 7,086.889 5,469.258 
 
Addbacks 
-3,758.591 3,144.114 -3,542.748 3,130.267 -3,600.070 3,159.984 
 
Throwback 
-1,537.510 3,107.658 -1,513.587 3,104.702 -1,512.127 3,093.509 
 
SalesApport2 2100.3   3 581.065 2,085.477 3,582.344 2,116.770 3,581.299 
 
SalesApport3 15,811.530 9,814.559 15,751.220 9,778.138 15,900.770 9,787.005 
 
AuditProb 2.421 2.366 2.418 2.369 2.409 2.365 
 
SOL  2,570.032 2,097.794 2,840.294 2,010.101 2,810.847 2,038.699 
 
 
  
  146
Table 24: Continued 
 
Fin 48 - 1 / 2007 Fin 48 - 2 / 2006-2007 Fin 48 - 3 / 2005-2007 
Variable Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Error   Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Error   Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Error   
 
UnderpmtIntRate 
-546.930 431.996 -566.103 427.811 -552.230 427.834 
 
CIT Rate 580.259 1,655.378 595.111 1,648.830 581.938 1,652.428 
 
SSTM 9,506.547 9,043.214 9,084.889 9,078.823 9,343.975 9,103.275 
 
CorpRev 
-5.333 3.452 -5.302 3.458 -5.341 3.444 
  
Employment 
  3,760.865 2,244.346 *   3,731.218 2,240.962 *   3,737.839 2,233.365 * 
Intercept 
 
75,100,000 49,400,000 32,600,000 34,600,000 57,900,000 44,300,000 
Rho 
 
0.938 0.943 0.948 
R2 
 
0.257 0.254 0.220 
n 
 
279 279 279 
Regressions contain state fixed effects and a fourth order polynomial time trend.                   
Dependent variable is the dollar amount of NNP disclosures by firm by state by year. 
Regression uses states conditional on joining the NNP over 15 years (1994-2008). 
***, **, * represent statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.10, respectively.                   
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